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Volume 18, Number 3 of the Denver Journal of International Law &
Policy is a special Symposium Issue containing four articles on interna-
tional narcotics trafficking.
These papers were presented at the annual Myres S. McDougal In-
ternational Legal Conference held at the University of Denver College of
Law on April 1, 1989. A broad range of topics concerning international
narcotics trafficking was presented at the conference. Participants in-
cluded legal scholars, government officials and experts from the private
sector.
The Myres S. McDougal International Legal Conference focuses on
timely international legal issues and is presented annually by the Interna-
tional Legal Studies Program at the University of Denver College of Law.
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING SYMPOSIUM
Critical Reflections on International and
National Control of Drugs
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug-related problems have reached a perceived crisis-level in many
consuming countries, particularly in the United States and other Western
European societies. The real crisis is a result of crimes committed in con-
nection with drug trafficking and by those engaged in the drug business,
as well as by users and abusers who commit crimes to support their drug
needs. Producing countries have also started to appreciate the extent of
social, economic and political problems resulting from cultivation, pro-
duction and consumption of drugs. Transit countries and countries used
for recycling of drug proceeds are also experiencing problems similar to
those of producing countries.
As a result, the multi-faceted and worldwide effects of drugs on the
social, economic and political well-being and stability of a number of
countries has reached a level of unprecedented international concern. The
1990 Special Session of the General Assembly on Drugs has evidenced
that concern.
International and national efforts in confronting this new phenome-
non, however, lag far behind the multi-faceted problems created by inter-
dependent cycles of production and consumption, including intermediate
stages of distribution, transportation, and recycling of funds, in addition
to secondary and tertiary consequences in social, health, political and eco-
nomic spheres.
Unfortunately, international and national responses aimed at com-
plete control of cultivation, production, traffic, use and abuse of drugs
* Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law; President, International Associ-
ation of Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences.
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have so far failed. Consuming societies cannot control consumption, and
producing states cannot control production. The essential reason is that
so long as there is demand, there will be supply and, mutatis mutandis,
so long as there is supply, it will generate demand. Furthermore, it should
also be recognized that supply will always find its way to demand. There
are indeed too many transit routes in the world to effectively intercept
the movement of drugs from producing to consuming countries.
The cumulative impact of these and other factors affecting the inter-
national community's ability to effectively control drugs requires a new,
critical appraisal of the international system of drug control and its predi-
cation on certain assumptions concerning the ability of national systems
of control to effectively fulfill their expected goals.
II. ASSESSING THE CONTROLS
A. The International System and Mechanisms of Control1
International efforts at controlling drugs began in 1912 when it ap-
peared that an estimated ten million Chinese had become opium addicts.'
The world community at that time sought to control the spread of opium
addiction making its way to the United States and Western Europe. Since
then, thirteen international instruments have been developed culminating
with the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances which was signed by eighty-nine states and rati-
fied by four states [as of January 15, 1990].'
1. 1 Bassiouni, The International Narcotics Control Scheme in 1 M. C. BASSIOUNI, IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 507 (1986). See also infra note 12.
2. International Opium Convention, The Hague, 23 Jan. 1912 (First International
Opium Conference), 8 L.N.T.S. 187, T.S. No. 612, reprinted in 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 177 (1912).
3. Id. and Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal
Trade in and Use of, Prepared Opium, Geneva, 11 Feb., 1925 (First Opium Conference of
the League of Nations), 51 U.N.T.S. 337; International Opium Convention, Geneva, 19 Feb.
1925 (Second Opium Conference of the League of Nations), 81 U.N.T.S. 356, reprinted in
23 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (1929); Convention for Limiting the Manufacture of Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, Geneva, 13 July, 1931, 139 U.N.T.S. 301, T.S. No. 863, re-
printed in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. (1934); Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium-
Smoking, Bangkok, 27 Nov., 1931, 177 U.N.T.S. 373; Convention for the Suppression of the
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, 26 June, 1946, 198 L.N.T.S., 299; Protocol
Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs Concluded at the
Hague on 23 Jan., 1912, at Geneva on 11 Feb., 1925 and 19 Feb., 1925, and 13 July, 1931, at
Bangkok on 27 Nov., 1931 at Geneva on 26 June, 1936, and at Lake Success, New York on
11 Dec., 1946, 12 U.N.T.S. 179, T.I.A.S. No. 1671; Protocol Bringing Under International
Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of 13 July, 1931 for Limiting the Manu-
facture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol of
11 Dec., 1946, Paris, 19 Nov., 1948, 44 U.N.T.S., 277, T.I.A.S. No. 2308; Protocol for Limit-
ing and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and
Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium (Opium Convention), New York, 23 June, 1942, 456
U.N.T.S., T.I.A.S. No. 5273; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Narcotics Conven-
tion), New York, 30 Mar., 1961, 520 U.N.T.S., 151 T.I.A.S. No. 6298; Convention on Psycho-
tropic Substances (Psychotropic Convention), Vienna, 21 Feb., 1971 (United Nations Con-
ference for the Adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, 11 Jan. thru 21 Feb.,
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The evolutionary process of international legislation has therefore
been consistent. At first, it dealt with opium because of its perceived dan-
gers in the Western societies of the United States and Europe. Gradually,
however, the range of concerns encompassed other types of naturally
based drugs such as the coca derivatives and various types of cannabis
sativa (marijuana, hashish, quat, and indian hemp).
Until 1971, the thrust of international controls was by the consuming
countries of the West over the producing ones of the Third World. This
occurred because consuming countries experienced social problems as a
result of consumption, whereas the producing Third World countries had
no such social problems. The latter derived economic benefits from the
cultivation and traffic of naturally produced drugs. But the consuming
countries' rationale was that ultimately the problems of drug consump-
tion would spread to the producing countries. They argued that economic
dependence on drug-related profits would create economic, social and po-
litical problems for producing countries. Thus, international cooperation
was deemed indispensable for the world community as a whole. These
arguments are as valid today as they were fifty years ago.
Notwithstanding these predictions, consuming countries of the West
have failed to provide the necessary assistance for economic development
to Third World producing countries, and production of drugs has contin-
ued to increase. Gradually the consuming countries used treaties to place
expanded international controls on the producing countries. At first, ef-
forts were aimed at curtailing and later eliminating the cultivation of nat-
ural drugs. As a result, the producing countries had to bear additional
costs in law enforcement and divert vital resources to carry out these
obligations.
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is today the most
universally accepted Convention in the field of drug control." It is, after
the United Nations Charter and the four Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949,' the multilateral treaty with the largest number of State-Parties.
1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, T.I.A.S. No. 9725, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 261 (1971); Protocol
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, at Geneva, 25 Mar., 1972 (United
Nations Conference to Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on Drugs, 1961, 6-25
Mar. 1972), 976 U.N.T.S. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 804 (1972); United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
19 Dec. 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15. (See Comment, 29 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1988)).
Two other international conventions prohibit traffic in drugs: the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 29 Apr., 1958 (United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 24 Feb. through 27 Apr., 1958), 516 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. No. 5639;
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay Convention), Montego Bay, 10 Dec., 1982
(Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,
reprinted in 21 1. L. M. 1261 (1982).
4. See supra note 3; Status of Multilateral Treaties on Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances that are Deposited with the Secretary General (United Nations Economic
and Social Council, 23 Dec., 1983), E/CN.7/1984/9.
5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in the Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, T.I.A.S. No. 3362;
1990
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However, by 1970 it was obvious that the 1961 Single Convention needed
to be strengthened in order to make it more effective. By 1970, the pro-
cess began by which the 1961 Single Convention would be amended, ulti-
mately culminating in the 1972 Protocol Amending the 1961 Single
Convention.'
During that same period, the international community came to the
realization that some specific controls over chemical and pharmaceutical
drugs should also be established. While efforts to amend the 1961 Single
Convention to strengthen it were ongoing, a parallel effort was under-
taken to develop another convention which ultimately became the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.7 These two efforts which should
have logically been integrated into a single convention proceeded along
separate paths.
The international community at that time was divided between con-
suming and producing countries of natural drugs and of chemical and
pharmaceutical ones. However, that division did not represent identical
parties. With respect to the natural drugs, most of the producing coun-
tries, as stated above, were and still are, Third World developing coun-
tries. While the consuming ones were, and still are, the industrialized
Western countries. With respect to the chemical and pharmaceutical
drugs, however, the producing countries were, and still are, mostly the
Western industrialized countries (as well as other industrialized countries
of Eastern Europe, but they were less active on the international market-
ing arena) while the consuming countries include the Third World devel-
oping countries. In short, the main consumption of natural drugs was in
the industrialized West, while consumption of chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal drugs included the developing countries.
While the developed countries of the West desired to impose strong
controls over the cultivation, production and traffic of natural drugs
originating in the developing countries, they were unwilling to impose the
same types of controls over their own chemical and pharmaceutical indus-
tries.' Because of that imbalance, the obligations of consuming and pro-
ducing countries (which are largely derived from their relative power po-
sitions and their social and economic condition) affected the 1972
Amending Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs9 by
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12
Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Related to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 Aug., 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365.
6. Supra note 3.
7. Supra notes 3 and 4.
8. This also extends to chemicals needed to manufacture drugs deriving from natural
products, see Are Chemical Makers A WOL in the War on Drugs? Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1988,
at 80.
9. See Commentary on the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, United Nations
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producing a much stronger system of control than the one established by
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances."0
The imbalance that exists between these two systems of control has
not yet been redressed. One of the reasons for this situation is that
throughout the world a pattern of behavior in chemical drug consumption
has become part of daily life. The widespread habituation to the taking of
drugs from benign aspirin, cold tablets or vitamins, has generated a cul-
ture of pill-taking, which made it much easier and more acceptable to
take other types of pills, even though they produce harmful effects. The
taking of one pill as opposed to another may be a question of slight differ-
ence. This situation made social and legal controls of psychotropic sub-
stances more difficult than the control of natural drugs. The type of social
and legal controls that derive from a generally unacceptable pattern of
behavior involving injecting heroin or snorting cocaine is obviously easier
than that of controlling the taking of pills whose apparent use is generally
accepted behavior if for no other reason than the difference in the color
or shape of the pill is not a significantly distinguishing factor to make it
socially reprehensible."
The differences in patterns of socially acceptable, as opposed to so-
cially unacceptable behavior, as well as what may merge into legitimacy
and what may readily appear to be outside social legitimacy, tend to
make the disparity in the international perception of the dangers of
drugs, as well as the ensuing control mechanism, less readily observable.
As a result, what we see is a strong imbalance in the attempt to control
the natural drugs in contrast to the chemical and pharmaceutical ones.
It must also be pointed out that the originators of the international
narcotics control system were not promoting the complete control of the
drugs by eliminating the cultivation of what are called "illicit drugs." Be-
cause the international system still recognizes the legitimacy and legal
validity of the cultivation of drugs, they are deemed licit if cultivated
under the monopoly or control of a state. 12 The international narcotics
control system, as well as the system of national control, is one that
grants a monopoly of cultivation and processing of natural drugs to the
states. The reason is due to the medical purposes of such natural drugs,
as in the case of morphine. However, it nonetheless appears incongruous
to have a co-existence of a licit system of cultivation and processing
under the monopoly of a given state, as well as a licit system for traffick-
E.73 XI.1 (1973).
10. See Commentary on the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, United Na-
tions, E/CN. 7/589 (1976).
11. See Psychoactive Drug Control: Issues and Recommendations, International Re-
search Group on Drug Legislation and Programs, United Nations Social Defence Research
Institute, S.P. No. 5 (1973).
12. Bogaard, International Control of the Legitimate Trade in Narcotic Drugs, 3
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (1972); P.D. LowEs, THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CON-
TROL (1966).
1990
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ing by the state and by chemical and pharmaceutical companies through
the dispensing of drugs for valid medical and therapeutic purposes, while
at the same time deeming illicit the production and traffic of these sub-
stances when they are not under the control of the state and outside state
regulation for use. While there is no doubt that a valid distinction exists
between what is licit for medical purposes and what is not, it is essen-
tially a qualitative and judgmental distinction. This does not have the
same social and socio-psychological impact as banning the cultivation of
all drugs because they are malum in se.
An alternative to the existing scheme can easily be conceived
whereby all natural drugs - the opium poppy, the coca bush, the canna-
bis sativa - could be banned throughout the world and their eradication
collectively decreed by the world community; and in order to provide for
morphine and other drugs which derive from the opiates, the United Na-
tions could assign the task of limited cultivation of such a crop to a given
country for the benefit of all other countries. In short, an opium poppy
farm could be established in a given country under international control
and would probably require no more than a thousand hectares to satisfy
the world's medical needs. Such cultivation could easily be internationally
controlled and there would not be the problem of having different coun-
tries grow these crops under local controls to produce that which is osten-
sibly for their pharmaceutical needs. Experience has clearly indicated
that in almost every country where licit cultivation exists there is a por-
tion of it that goes into illicit traffic. There is also no reason why, on such
a simple subject, the world community could not agree to abolish cultiva-
tion everywhere in the world in order to concentrate it in a single plot of
land and develop a worldwide consortium. The costs of such licit cultiva-
tion would certainly be low. And there would be no genuine economic
interest on the part of different countries - interested in purchasing
their needs for legitimate pharmaceutical production - to claim that
such a monopoly concentration of the cultivation in one country would
effect them detrimentally. The cultivation of a single hectare of the
opium poppy would cost approximately $500 to $800 per crop. Even if we
assume an inflated cost of $1000 per hectare, the production of 1000 hect-
ares would only be $1 million per year. If the total needs of the world
community in producing morphine based drugs is a total cost of $1 mil-
lion for the poppy, there is simply no legitimate economic reason to pre-
vent it.
That such an idea has not taken root, even though it has been sug-
gested, at least by this writer since 1971,13 is evidence that an interna-
tional control effort does not necessarily evidence the will of states to
fully cooperate at all levels.
13. Bassiouni, The International Narcotics Control Scheme - A Proposal, 46 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 713 (1977) and Bassiouni, International Aspects of Drug Abuse: Problems
and a Proposal, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. PROc. 3 (1975).
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The international narcotics control system, as stated above, is predi-
cated on a licit system of cultivation and production and only those activ-
ities which exceed the licit quota system become illicit.1 4 Under such a
system states may produce based on their estimated needs, and could ex-
port the surplus to other states based on an import/export certification
system. But, in the final analysis, such a system would depend almost
entirely on voluntary international cooperation. Without direct interna-
tional controls it rests only on the ability of those international organiza-
tions that supervise such a system to denounce a potential violator to the
world community.
In addition to the above, the international narcotics control system is
predicated on an indirect control system, by which states undertake cer-
tain international obligations arising out of treaty obligations and then
assume the task of carrying them out through their national legal system
in reliance upon their national implementation measures. 5
In a sense it is almost incongruous to think that an international sys-
tem, which presumably would operate at the top of the pyramid in the
structure of states, ultimately winds up distributing enforcement powers
to the bottom of the pyramid, namely to the participating states. Under
the present system, international structures established to control drugs
are designed only as administrative support, funding, or as monitoring
organizations, without any effective enforcement powers.
These various international organs are:'6
1. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,17 was estab-
lished in 1946 by the Economic and Social Council as the policy-mak-
ing body of the United Nations system with respect to drug matters.
Its membership consists of forty members elected by the Economic
and Social Council and it reviews the overall global drug situation and
prepares policies, as well as sponsoring international conventions.
2. The United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs' 8 essentially serves
as the administrative body, the secretariat and executive arm of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. It assists members in the implemen-
tation of the various drug Conventions and provides services and fa-
cilities to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. It publishes annual and
analytical reports, as well as various national reports required by in-
ternational treaties, and deals with coordinating the work of the
United Nations and World Health Organization, as well as various
14. Supra notes 1 and 12.
15. Supra notes 1, 12 - 13. This is the case with respect to all international crimes. See
e.g., 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES (1986) and M.C. BASSIOUNi,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (1985).
16. See Declaration of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffick-
ing and Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Con-
trols (United Nations, 1988) which describes the functions of all United Nations Agencies in
this field.
17. Id. The Commission also publishes annual reports.
18. Id.
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governments.
3. The International Narcotics Control Board1 (INCB) was estab-
lished under the provision of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs. It was established to limit the cultivation, production, manu-
facture and use of drugs to the adequate amounts required for medi-
cal and scientific purposes. In short, it is the body that establishes the
quotas for countries, based on their estimates of need for the chemical
and scientific licit purposes. The Board consists of thirteen members
elected from the State-Parties. These members serve ostensibly in
their personal capacity, but in reality they are genuine government
representatives. The INCB works closely with the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs and cooperates with other bodies, such as the World
Health Organization and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control. But it must be clearly understood that such cooperative un-
dertakings are purely dependent upon the will of the Board. What is
particularly interesting is that this Board is created by treaty and op-
erates with total and complete independence from the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs.
4. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control 0 (UNFDAC) is
the only multilateral body which was created to provide technical as-
sistance as well as funding relating to crop substitution. In recent
times, it has evolved from that narrow role of being a funding agency
to one that provides technical assistance for all forms of drug abuse
and illicit trafficking, including the field of law enforcement. It was
created in 1971 by the Secretary-General and was established as a
multilateral body to which a number of countries voluntarily contrib-
ute. Because contributions to UNFDAC are voluntary, the projects it
undertakes are dependent upon such voluntary contributions of those
different countries. UNFDAC operates subject to the control of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, but it does not have any
obligation to either work or, in fact, cooperate or correlate its activi-
ties with the other bodies mentioned above, just as these other bodies
have no obligation towards each other.
In addition to these four main bodies, we find that there are several
other agencies within the United Nations that deal with drugs. The
World Health Organization is mandated under the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances to provide advice on the chemical and pharma-
ceutical substances that would fall in the four schedules of drugs estab-
lished under the terms of the Convention. The Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Branch of the United Nations also deals with the crime-
related aspects of drugs. The Center for Human Rights has certain ad-
ministrative tasks with respect to human rights dimensions related to
drugs. In that respect, two other United Nations bodies also are directly
involved, namely The Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommit-
tee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities be-
19. Id.
20. Id., The United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse Control (1987).
VOL. 18:3
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTROL OF DRUGS
cause of their mandate in human rights-related aspects of drug use and
abuse. In addition, all the United Nations bodies involved in the area of
human rights deal also with criminal justice and law enforcement insofar
as there are human rights issues. This, of course, extends to illicit traffick-
ing in drugs.
As a result, it is clear that the international structures that have been
established to deal with the problems of drugs are compartmentalized
and without effective power. Again, one must marvel at the reasons why
the international community would create such a diversity of organiza-
tions, each working under different bureaucratic headings at the interna-
tional level, with separate functions. Little wonder that efforts at control-
ling both the licit and illicit cultivation, traffic, distribution and use of
drugs has not been successful. This raises the question of whether the
international community is genuinely interested in the control of the cul-
tivation, manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs, or whether it is
merely seeking to express its disapproval of these activities, but unwilling
or unable to undertake the necessary steps to make that concern
effective.
B. The Assumptions Underlying International and National Controls
1. Assessment of Supply and Consumption21
It is clear to anyone interested in the subject that there is no ade-
quate way of quantitatively and qualitatively assessing both the supply
and the consumption of drugs throughout the world. With respect to sup-
ply, the assessment is based on an extrapolation of figures predicated on
the amount of drugs seized and a very loose correlation between the num-
ber of arrests and seizures of drugs in different countries and the esti-
mated linkage between these arrests on the one hand and supply and con-
sumption on the other. The supply side of drugs has been consistently
increasing over the past fifty years and there is no way to assess how
much more it can increase or where such increase will come from.
The problem of assessment is the same on the consumption side. In
the United States,22 for example, the estimates of occasional cocaine users
fluctuates between the figure of under 800,000 up to the figure of
5,000,000. The fluctuation in numbers between the users of marijuana
range from 1,000,000 to 5,000,000.23 The estimated number of heroin
users fluctuates from 300,000 to 800,000. The same uncertainty exists in
most countries where the estimated number of users, depending upon the
type of drugs, varies enormously. There is also a large discrepancy be-
21. See International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, Mar., 1989).
See also appendix regarding United Nations released figures.
22. Id.
23. Decker, The Official Report of the National Commission Studying Marijuana:
More Misunderstanding, 8 U.S. F. L. REv. 1 (1973).
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tween the estimates of occasional users of the cannabis sativa derivative
and those of cocaine and coca bush product derivatives.
It is therefore astonishing that the assumptions derived from both
the supply and the consumption of drugs are predicated on figures which
are so tenuous and uncertain. Surely, if the total number of heroin ad-
dicts in the United States was 300,000 and the total number of cocaine
users was less than 800,000, the dimension of the problem would be much
different than if the higher of the estimated figures were to be taken into
account. The same is true for many countries where certainty as to the
number of regular users and occasional users is almost totally absent.
What is probably worse in terms of assumptions is the fact that no
estimates exist as to the potential capabilities in various parts of the
world for additional supply. This might be because few governments are
willing to admit the fact that capacity for supply cannot be controlled, let
alone eliminated. There is a limitless capacity of supply.2 4 Thus, for ex-
ample, if it is believed that the eradication of the coca bush in Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru would eliminate the problem of cocaine supply, one
would have to realize that this conclusion is entirely wrong because simi-
lar geographic and weather conditions may exist, not only in the Andes,
but also in the Amazon area of Brazil, in the Indian subcontinent, in the
Philippines and in Indonesia. The fact is that coca is already cultivated in
all these areas.
These considerations must also be viewed in light of potential expan-
sion of cultivation and increased production in presently producing and
consuming countries. An enormous potential for increased cultivation and
production in many states not presently producing also exists. Further-
more, increased use and abuse in producing and consuming countries and
further potential increase of use and abuse in almost all countries of the
world, is a realistic hypothesis that must be taken into consideration
when assessing the extent of the problem.
The spread of cultivation in consuming countries to meet the needs
of the demand is already well established. Marijuana, for example, is now
extensively produced in the United States and, according to some esti-
mates, domestic production is now fulfilling 25% of the needs of U.S.
consumption.
If supply cannot be controlled, because there will always be a poten-
tial for supply somewhere, how can it be expected that international and
national controls can be effective? The assumptions made by both inter-
national and national policy-makers are predicated on two erroneous fac-
tual assumptions of production and consumption and of supply and de-
mand. Without adequate knowledge of these figures, it is quite logical to
conclude that the consequences derived from any assumed figures will
lead to erroneous outcomes.
24. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, supra note 21. This is a reasona-
ble projection from the figures indicated previously.
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2. The Profit Motive
The supply side of drugs is essentially a world-wide business enter-
prise which the United Nations estimates to be "a $500 billion per year
business."2" Those who engage in it do so for profit and no other reason,
save possibly for some ideologically motivated group seeking to finance its
illegal activities from such revenue sources."6
In some cases, those active in the supply side form monopolies of
cultivation and exportation, such as in the case of the successor Chinese
warlords of the Golden Triangle of Burma-Thailand-Laos, and in the case
of Columbia. In Columbia, the Medellin and Cali cartels control cultiva-
tion, production and export and also control certain aspects of production
and exports from other countries like Bolivia and Peru. These cartels
have also developed vertically-integrated business enterprises whereby
the cartel's direct control reaches the levels of distribution in other con-
suming societies, such as in the United States where the Columbia cartels
operate in Florida and other parts of the country. Probably the most ex-
traordinary reach of such organizations has been to secure the support of
a state through its dictator, as in the case of Panama's General Noriega."
In that case, the control or neutralization of state organs allowed not only
the use of that country as a transit point, but also as a base from which to
recycle drug proceeds. Situations like that may still occur in any of the
many states with a small population whose economic needs might find it
profitable to provide some type of safe haven for production transit or
recycling of proceeds.
Other types of organized crime, like the Italian Mafia and Camorra,
control production of heroin and export of both heroin and cocaine to the
25. See Drug Trafficking and the World Economy, United Nations Department of
Public Information, Document DPI/1040B-40076, January 1990, 12M, at 1. U.N. DOC. DPI/
1040B-40076 (1990).
26. See A. Beria di Argentine, Relazione del Procuratore Generale per
L'Inaugurazione dell'Anno Giudiziario 1989 (Corte d'Appello di Milano, 14 Jan. 1989) at
69, who links certain forms of terrorism and organized crime. A similar position is taken by
Wardlow, Linkages Between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism, 8 CONFLICT Q. 5
(1988).
Links between organized crime and terrorism is one of the topics of the forthcoming
Eighth United National Congress on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
to be held in Havana, Cuba, Aug.-Sept. 1990. See UNPOC A/CONF. 144/P.M. 1 and the
Report of the Interregional Preparatory Meeting for the Eighth United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, and Report of M.C. Bassiouni, Effective
National and International Action Against Organized Crime, and Terrorist Criminal Ac-
tivities, A/CONF. 144 P.M. 1, 11 Apr., (1988), reprinted in 4 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 9.
27. See United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Ter-
rorism, Narcotics and International Communications and International Economic Policy.
Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: Panama: Hearings pt. 2, February 8-11, 1988.
100th Cong., 2d Ses., Senate Hearing 100-773/pt. 2. (SD cat. no. Y/4.F/76/2:S.hrg. 1-773/pt.
2). See also Rosenblum,supra note 26, wherein he refers to hearings and investigations by
this Sub-Committee on U.S. officials having connections with foreign military and other
drug traffickers.
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United States and Western European states. This is due to the groups'
far-reaching power and influence in many segments of the societies where
they operate. Some states, like Italy28 and the United States,29 have en-
acted strong legislation to counteract these manifestations, including for-
feiture of assets provisions. It is paramount to understand that the profit
motive drives the supply side of drugs as much as profit drives any legiti-
mate business enterprise. Thus, the key to controlling the entire drug
business is to control its profits." Though that alone, even if possible, can
never become a panacea for the many aspects of the problem. Further-
more, it is self-evident that reduction of demand and supply are indispen-
sable to reduce profit-making.
An example of the international community's inability or unwilling-
28. For Italy's anti-Mafia and organized crime confiscation laws, see Italian Penal Code,
art. 240, which provides for confiscation of proceeds of crime by judgment of a criminal
court after conviction. The "Anti-Mafia" Law No. 646 of Sept. 13, 1982 provides for confis-
cation of proceeds belonging to persons suspected of being part of a Mafia-like criminal
organization which, includes persons who are part of a group living off criminal proceeds
such as kidnapping. Other confiscations following convictions under Law No. 646 are in the
nature of those provided for by Article 240 of the Italian Penal Code. Also, Article 648 bis,
of the Italian Penal Code applies to money laundering and permits (in connection with art.
240) its confiscation.
29. The United States enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Statute, Title 18, U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, which allows for 20 year penalties, forfeiture and civil
remedies for numerous crimes (normally subject to lesser penalties) if committed as part of
a pattern of activity. Various crimes have been added to the enumerated list since the stat-
ute was enacted in 1970, and now include murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, theft from interstate commerce, embez-
zlement from unions or from employee pension or welfare funds, extortion of loans and
collections, fraud by mail or other interstate means, obstruction of investigations or court
proceedings, public corruption, witness intimidation or retaliation, prohibited payments to
influence union officials, money laundering and illegal property, trafficking in contraband
cigarettes, interstate prostitution, and obscenity offenses. It should be noted that this enu-
meration is due in part to the peculiar federal structure of United States law wherein all
crime is within the competence of State governments and the Federal government exercises
competence only when national or interstate interests are implicated. See also 18 U.S.C. §
1963 and art. 416 bis, Italian Penal Code (forfeiture of criminal proceeds, interests, licenses
and contracts). The United Kingom has also enacted the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of
1986 which deals essentially with confiscation of proceeds (§ 1) and investigation of drug
trafficking activities (§§ 27-33). See also, for France, Loi No. 86-1020 Relative to Combat-
ting Terrorism, arts. 44, 257-3, 462, 463-1, and 463-2 of the French Penal Code; and Ot-
tenhof, Le Droit Pnal Frangois & l'Epreuve du Terrorism, 1987 REVUE DE SCIENCE
CRIMINELLE 607 and MERLE & VITU, TRAIT9 DE DROIT CRIMINAL 273 (6th ed. 1989). For
Spain see Law 1988-3 of 26 Dec., 1984 and Law 1988-4 of 25 May, 1988; and J.L. de la
Cuesta, Traitement Juridique du Terrorism en Espagne, 1987 REVUE DE SCIENCE
CRIMINELLE 589.
30. See The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money
Laundering, President's Commission on Organized Crime (1984). Recently the Council of
Europe prepared a Draft Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of
the Proceeds of Crime, PC-R-SC (90) 8 Rev., 25 Apr., 1990, European Committee on Crime
Problems. This text incorporates some of the provisions on confiscation of proceeds of crime
intended in the 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 3.
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ness to effectively cooperate is in the area of financial controls.3 ' Finan-
cial controls over the entry into the financial circuit of drug proceeds has
proven almost impossible, notwithstanding some occasional successes.8 2
The bank secrecy laws of so many countries make the tracing of drug
proceeds more difficult. To sort out the white, black and gray money that
flows through the financial system is next to impossible. Money, as the
saying goes, has no odor and thus cannot be closely detected once it en-
ters into the legitimate financial pipeline. Thereafter the investments
made with such proceeds are even harder to retrace. The conclusion is
that in the absence of a worldwide uniform system of financial control of
all funds entering the legitimate financial pipeline, no effective controls
can be expected even though some countries, like Switzerland, have made
progress in curbing bank secrecy laws."3 This situation leaves the profit
incentive in drugs significantly unaffected by occasional seizures of drug
proceeds.
The profits of the drug business have attracted all sorts of offenders
from solo operators, such as users supporting their habits to major world-
wide organizations. Among such organizations, some, like the Mafia, span
countries and continents - their adherents reaching into all strata of dif-
ferent societies. Drug profits also fund these organizations, allowing them
to conduct other criminal activities and buy corrupting political influence.
The impact of these profits do more to corrupt social systems, damage
economies and weaken moral and ethical values than the combined ef-
31. Bassiouni, Financial Controls and Drug Profits, Chicago Trib., Sept. 22, 1988, § 1
at 20, col. 1.
32. See Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy and Fi-
nancial Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 INTERAMERICAN L. REV. 23 (1986). For a discussion of the
role of international organizations in the enforcement of international money laundering, see
Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and Related
Matters - A United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J. OF INT'L L. & ECON. 465 (1990);
Zagaris and Papavizas, Using the Organization of American States to Control Interna-
tional Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REV. INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 119
(1986); for a discussion of the role of regional organizations see Zagaris, Inter-American
Drug Abuse Commission Progresses on Legal Development Project, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 186 (1988); Zagaris, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Holds 3rd
Session, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 114 (1988). For the problems of tax evasion and
international enforcement see Pansius, Tax Evasion and Extraterritorial Discovery, in IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 105, (V.P. Nanda
and M.C. Bassiouni eds. 1987).
33. In 1987, the Swiss Bankers Association and its member banks developed new rules
and practices on limiting bank secrecy. This agreement takes into account art. 52, § 3 of the
Swiss Civil Code concerning companies or legal entities having an unlawful, illicit or im-
moral scope. For a study on Swiss banking violations see Bernasconi, Banques et Delin-
quence Economique: 50 Judgments, in REVISION BANCAIRE (2nd rev. ed. 1988); and Bernas-
coni, Le Recyclage de l'Argent d'Origine Criminelle, 4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
CRIMINOLOGIE ET DE POLICE TECHNIQUE 403 (1981); H. SCHULTZ, LE SECRET BANCAIRE ET LE
TRAIT9 D'ENTRAIDE JUDICAIE EN MATIERI P9NALE CONCLU ENTR LA SUISSE ET LES ETATS
UNIS D'AMERIQUE (1976). For a Council of Europe study see Secrecy and Openness: Individ-
uals, Enterprises and Public Administrators, Proceedings of the Seventeenth European
Colloquium, Zargoza, Spain, 21-23 Oct. 1987.
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fects of all other forms of crime.
The quick and easy profits from drug trafficking have also attracted
organizations and groups dedicated to the pursuit of ideological goals
through strategies of violence. Whether by direct involvement in drug
trafficking or by extending their protection to those primarily involved in
the drug business, such organizations have found it lucrative enough to
partake in drug profits, thus expanding the harm to societies. The cor-
rupting reach into government officials, politicians and the business com-
munity further endangers the stability of societies and governmental
processes, and ultimately threaten political stability and even world
order.
3. The Weaknesses of the National Systems"4
In addition to the above, one must also consider the weaknesses of
the various national law enforcement and criminal justice systems.
Within each state there are administrative divisions and bureaucracies
which frequently operate in sealed compartments, and at times even com-
pete with each other, resulting in the weakening of the national enforce-
ment systems. The administration of criminal justice in every country
does not operate as a single cohesive system. All criminal justice systems
have at least four sub-systems: law enforcement, prosecution, judiciary
and corrections. Each one of these is frequently divided into further
smaller and sometimes competing units. The levels of integration and co-
operation between the sub-systems and units of the criminal justice sys-
tem are usually limited, and as stated above, they also suffer from the
syndromes of competition. These organizational difficulties are also at
times aggravated by internal political considerations, personal jealousies,
animosities and ambitions, which at times seem to supersede institutional
and national interests. The drug business, however, no matter how seg-
mented it may be, does not have to operate under such constraints. The
national criminal justice systems are presumed to work as a barrier to
criminal activity. When it comes to the drug business, however that sys-
tem resembles a net whose webs are large enough to allow the fish to
swim through it uncaught and unscathed.
The free enterprise type of activity that characterizes the drug busi-
ness is also free of the bureaucracies that hamstring national and interna-
tional agencies seeking to control the problem. Thus, while states rigidly
observe the confines of their territorial jurisdiction, those in the drug bus-
iness do not, and that permits them to exploit to their benefit the juris-
dictional and operational gaps in inter-state cooperation.
34. See Bassiouni, Criminal Justice Processes and Perspectives in a Changing World,
Report to the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 121 NGO/36.
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4. Connections Between the Drug Business and Other Criminal
Activities3"
In recent times, some reports indicate a nexus between terrorism,
drug trafficking and arms dealing. The logic of such linkages is self-evi-
dent, though there is insufficient reliable data on such linkages between
specific groups. Some data emerged linking the M-19 Group of Columbia,
and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru, with drug traffic, while
linkages between Castro's secret service and revolutionary organizations
also disclosed profit-related linkages with the Medellin Cartel and Gen-
eral Noriega of Panama. Similarly, reports in Italy indicate some linkages
between the Mafia and foreign and local illicit arms dealers, and between
the Mafia and some organizations engaging in terrorist violence. All these
linkages add new dimensions of social, economic and political dangers to
a number of countries and to the stability of the international
community.
5. Economic Aspects
On the economic plane, certain developing societies whose economies
depend on the financial flow of drug-related resources find their econo-
mies gradually crippled as their dependency on drug income increases be-
cause their other productive means which are less profitable diminish.
This is particularly true of agricultural societies, such as Bolivia and Peru
for whose campesinos the growing of the coca bush is more profitable and
less painstaking than, for example, growing coffee or raising livestock.
Such a choice is, however, also dictated by the lack of developmental ca-
pabilities and weaknesses in the infrastructure of these countries. This
situation is a vicious cycle: the production of drugs flourishes in underde-
veloped economies, while also preventing development - one problem
feeding upon the other."
The same phenomenon also extends to developing transit states
where the income from handling the flow of drugs and recycling its pro-
ceeds provides easy and quick profits which detrimentally affect the sta-
bility of their economic system. Thus, the economic viability of such
states, and hence the social, economic and political stability, are
imperiled.
Surprisingly, however, international and national efforts at curtailing
supply and cutting off transit routes have not focused on the rather obvi-
35. See supra notes 26-27. See also Proceedings of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law on Drugs and Small Arms: Can Law Stop the
Traffic? pp. 44-59, comments of Blakesley, Penney, Nadelmann, and Zagaris (1987).
36. La Cuesti6n de las Drogas en America Latina, Comission Nacional Contra el Uso
Ilicite de las Drogas, Venezuela (1987). See also Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine:
The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wisc. L. REV. 1305, and Nadelmann,
Latinoam~rica: economia politica del comercio de cocaina, 9 UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES 27
(1986).
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ous need to offer economic development assistance in a significant and
comprehensive manner to these developing countries. Production of drugs
in developing countries can be measured in direct relationship to the
world economy and consequently to the specific national economies of
those producing countries. The foreign debt of such developing-producing
countries and the falling prices of commodities are directly linked to the
economic dependency of these countries on income generated by drug
production.
In a recent United Nations report, the world organization noted:37
These bellwethers of the world economy in the 1980s - debt, falling
commodity prices, poverty and drug trafficking - are interconnected
and mutually reinforcing. The decline of prices for commodities like
sugar (64%), coffee (30%), cotton (32%) and wheat (17%) between
1980 and 1988 motivated farmers to turn to cash crops like the coca
bush and the opium poppy to avoid economic ruin. At the national
level, the export of illicit drugs often took up the slack in foreign ex-
change depleted by falling prices for agricultural goods as well as for
minerals, including tin (down by 57% in the 1980-1988 period), lead
(28%), crude oil (53%) and iron ore (17%).
The situation was especially desperate in nations burdened with
external debt which needed to be serviced with scarce foreign ex-
change. Indebtedness and declining revenues from export commodi-
ties brought on internal budgetary deficits for many countries, and
debt-repayment guidelines demanded reduced spending in the public
sector. Under these conditions, attempts to stem the tide of drug traf-
ficking through strengthened law enforcement or increased social ser-
vices were effectively crippled. Programmes for replacing illicit culti-
vation with food crops or other legitimate cash crops, which had
achieved some success during the 1970s, suffered in the 1980s due to
falling prices for agricultural commodities. As farmers turned away
from food crops, the need for imported foodstuffs increased, further
weakening currency reserves and bringing about greater dependence
on foreign exchange inputs from drugs.
The constituent elements of the illicit drug economy are found in
highest concentration in the western hemisphere. Latin American and
Caribbean nations were hurt badly by plummeting prices for coffee,
sugar, tin and petrol, among others. Their combined foreign debt will
reach $429 billion in 1990 and is greater than that of any other region
in the world.
In the meantime, the burgeoning United States market for illicit
drugs was close at hand. Various estimates put its size at from $50
billion to $100 billion a year. Cocaine from South America holds the
lion's share of the market, but Mexico, Central America and the Car-
ibbean islands are involved as transit points for cocaine traffic as well
as the production of cannabis (marijuana). Cultivation of opium pop-
pies for heroin production also takes place in Mexico.
37. Drug Trafficking and the World Economy, supra note 25.
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The cocaine industry is a major employer in the three key nations
of Bolivia, Columbia and Peru. Estimates of the number directly em-
ployed range between 600,000 and 1.5 million. About three quarters
are farmers and leaf pickers; nearly one quarter are pisadores
(stompers) who mix leaves and raw chemicals like kerosene with their
bare feet; a few thousand work in clandestine laboratories processing
coca paste into refined cocaine and 1,000 or so, including cartel bil-
lionaires, direct import-export and finances. In addition, many more
people owe their livelihood indirectly to the multiplier effect on local
economies, although not as many as would be the case with legitimate
industries of the same proportions, since most of the locally retained
profits are spent unproductively on real estate, luxury goods, status-
symbol cattle ranches, private armies and bribery.
What are the returns on their labour for the 99% of the cocaine
work-force who grow coca and turn it into paste? A study of the peas-
ant farmers in the Hapare district of Bolivia, largely Andean Indians,
looked at the effects of integration into a cocaine economy. The coca
leaf boom took off in 1982-1983, at the same time that economic reces-
sion and a severe drought wrought havoc in the rural highlands. Bo-
livia's gross national product declined by 17% between 1980 and 1985,
per capita consumption fell by 30%, per capita income by 20% and
unemployment doubled. Terms of trade for farmers suffered from in-
flation of 2,800% in 1985 and 10,000% in 1986. In 1985, producers of
coca leaves could earn $9,000 from 2.2 acres, while those growing the
next most profitable crop, citrus fruits, were averaging only $500 from
plots of the same size.
Landless farmers and workers laid off due to the collapse of the
tin market found work as pisadores, earning wages six to eight times
higher than those for any other skilled or unskilled labour in the legal
rural economy. Despite the immediate benefits, including sheer eco-
nomic survival, there has been a high price to pay. The cost of living,
once relatively low in Chapare, rose to greater heights than in any
other section of Bolivia, eating away at earnings. Cash exchange re-
placed traditional forms of barter and mutual support that provided
stability and equity within Indian communities. Food crops such as
potatoes and maize were in uncharacteristically short supply due to
diversion of labour to coca.
As local development corporations did not receive revenues from
the illicit coca trade, investments in potable water, plumbing and elec-
trification were not made. The work of the pisador, involving the
treading of kersosene-leaf mashes throughout the day, day after day,
is unhealthy in the extreme. Finally there is the subjection of local
residents to intimidation and brutality - they are simultaneously
vulnerable to the coercion of criminal organizations and to police and
army crackdowns. For all this, the local population has become depen-
dent on the price of coca, which has been falling sharply since 1985.
An additional impact is the breakdown of tribal, communal and
co-operative rural organizations under pressure from traffickers and
affiliated terrorist groups. Conversely, in Bolivia and throughout the
Andean regions, those areas with the strongest local organizations
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have most successfully resisted submersion in the cocaine economy. 8
a. Case Study: The Heiron Economy
In its ability to addict consumers and generate multi-billion dollar
sales, cocaine is rivaled only by heroin. Heroin is a derivative of opium,
which in turn is processed from the sap of the opium poppy. A kilogram
of heroin has a wholesale value of about $400,000 in the United States;
cut to six percent purity, its value reaches $2.2 million. Shadowy warlords
operating inside the "Golden Triangle," a mountainous area where the
borders of Myanmar (formerly Burma), Thailand and the Lao People's
Democratic Republic come together, were estimated to be producing sixty
tons of heroin per year in the mid-1980's. Of these, twenty tons were di-
rected to European and North American consumers.
This indicates sales of tens of billions of U.S. dollars in Western mar-
kets alone (the remaining forty tons would be divided between sales in
Asia, where prices are considerably lower and purity is generally higher,
and caches held as hedges against confiscation or poor crop years for the
poppy). As is the case with cocaine, only a small percentage of total sales
accrue to the producing region. Finance and distribution of Golden Trian-
gle opium, morphine and heroin are handled by various outside consorti-
ums. Most of them utilize the freewheeling Hong Kong financial markets,
although Japanese criminal syndicates known as the Yakuza also have
become involved.
The dominance of the Golden Triangle in production of opiates has
been eclipsed in the last two decades by the "Golden Crescent," encom-
passing lands running through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. As social
upheaval and civil strife in Iran and Afghanistan in the 1980's disrupted
production and shipping, Pakistan became the world's largest source of
heroin. By 1984, European police concluded that seventy percent of the
world's supply of high-grade heroin came from that country.
The difficulty of substituting legitimate crops for the opium poppy is
indicated by a study conducted in the area around Mahaban Mountain,
in Pakistan's north-west Frontier Province. About 125,000 people live on
the ridges and valleys of the mountain, most of them cultivating plots of
land averaging only half an acre. The opium poppy has been the main
crop since the 1800's, when it was legally grown for export under British
colonial rule. Thin soil, steep slopes and small plots make profitable culti-
vation of any other crop difficult. Earnings for poppy cultivation are
roughly ten times higher than for tobacco and fruit. Crop substitution
programmes have encouraged alternatives such as wheat grown from
high-yield seeds, but the international price for the crop has been falling
during the 1980's. A relatively undeveloped regional infrastructure pro-
vides little opportunity for extra-agricultural income, and longstanding
38. Id. at 1.
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values of the local Pushtun people place a premium on landowning status.
In addition, pressure is exerted on them to continue poppy cultivation by
opium traffickers located in the town of Gandaf, at the foot of the moun-
tain. They provide credit to the farmers, intervene in legal disputes and
are said to operate well-armed private militias.
b. Case Study: The Crack Economy
In the mid-1980's, when the United States market for powder cocaine
was waning, drug entrepreneurs devised a product that resuscitated sales
and brought them to even higher levels: crack. This crystalline form of
cocaine can be smoked, producing an instantaneous although short-lived
euphoria. More importantly, in marketing terms, it could be sold as vial-
encased "rocks" costing from five to fifteen dollars each. Sales shot up in
low-income inner-city neighborhoods, where powder cocaine was too ex-
pensive to attract many customers. In these communities, where unem-
ployment is high, the education system in crisis and economic opportuni-
ties few, crack offers an avenue of psychological escape for users and a
source of income for sellers.
Burgeoning crack sales in urban neighborhoods gave rise to the image
of formerly impoverished youths turned dealers who earn fantastic sums
of money, sport expensive clothes and jewelry and cruise the streets in
luxury automobiles. A recent investigation of the crack economy in New
York City revealed that such benefits are obtained by only a handful of
dealers. For most of those in the crack trade, earnings are at the mini-
mum-wage level or below. In return, they work long hours and live under
the threat of violence from superiors or rival gangs.
At the same time, violence and criminality associated with the drug
and its distribution are taking a heavy toll on neighborhoods already in
the grip of economic stagnation.
Attempts to start neighborhood businesses are discouraged, schooling
is routinely disrupted, hospital emergency rooms overflow with victims of
overdoses and shootings, and residents with skills and ambitions which
could be put to use productively are wasted in the illusory pursuit of
quick profits from the drug traffic. 9
The economic dependency of producing countries on drug-produced
income which is spurred by the market prices of consuming countries are
the most fundamental aspect of this entire problem. But it has yet to be
addressed by the international community and particularly by the devel-
oped consuming countries.
6. The Crime Problem
It is unequivocally established that the problems of crime related to
drugs derive from the fact that drugs are illicit. As a result, the argu-
39. Id. at 2-4. See also Nadelmann, supra note 36.
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ments made by the proponents of decriminalization cannot be taken
lightly. This is particularly so because it is easily demonstrable that the
political will of states in creating an effective and integrated international
control scheme for the complete eradication and control of drug cultiva-
tion and traffic does not exist, nor is it demonstrated by the actions of
governments up to now. Similarly, the divisions between various interna-
tional organs, as well as the lack of direct enforcement powers given to
them, and the lack of a truly integrated international legal control and
implementation system, once again demonstrates the lack of will of states
to effectively control that phenomenon.
It is also well established that the national systems of criminal justice
have not been able to develop the types of mechanisms for bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in such a way as to render their international
cooperation effective. Internally, the national systems of criminal justice,
subject to their traditional divisions of law enforcement, prosecution, ju-
diciary, and corrections, with all the sub-systems or sub-administrative
and bureaucratic divisions that exist between them render these systems
ineffective at controlling the problem of drugs at the national levels, let
alone of being effective in controlling the problem at the international
level.
The problem of drug-related crime derives essentially from the
criminalization of the use of drugs. It must therefore be clearly under-
stood that the policy choice of criminalizing the use of drugs is predicated
on a moral-social judgment by a given society and by the international
community as a whole which contributes to producing these criminal out-
comes. While certainly deference must be given to the moral and social
policy choices of societies, it must also be re-examined in light of its inef-
fectiveness, as well as its costs. In short, if a moral-social choice is made,
but is ineffective, what good is it to make such a choice? This is not to
say that moral-social choices must be measured only on an economic cost
benefit analysis. In a society like the United States, for example, the ex-
penditure of an estimated ten to fifteen billion dollars a year on drug
control and the administration of justice as it relates to drug matters
must be weighed against other options. These options will, however, de-
pend on as yet uncertain facts. If, for example, the heroin user population
is 200,000 persons, that of cocaine 500,000 persons, and that of marijuana
1 million persons, would these numbers justify the saving of ten to fifteen
billion dollars in criminal justice costs devoted to enforcing their
prohibition?
Such a cost benefit analysis must also take into account all the
human costs related to crime victimization and the loss of human life as a
result of the criminalization process. An analysis of this sort may appear
callous to some and in particular to those for whom this type of activity
violates their sense of morality or social ethics. For them, it would be
similar to decriminalizing prostitution, obscene and pornographic mate-
rial or gambling. Nevertheless, what is particularly interesting is that in
all of these areas, just as in the area of drugs, there has been a substantial
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de facto decriminalization. This is particularly true with respect to mari-
juana in the United States and many other Western European countries.
Criminalization of drug usage has remained essentially a matter of
legal opprobrium with limited effectiveness in its application. Proponents
of decriminalization have amply made their case in that connection and it
is not the purpose of this paper to reconsider or re-examine these argu-
ments, but merely to highlight the problems of ineffective international
control which seems to ignore that the unfortunate reality will not be
cured by more spending and harsher penalties. 0 The various interna-
tional and national control systems will first need substantial changing to
render them effective in controlling the problem.
7. International Cooperation Modalities4 '
There are a number of international modalities which have been re-
lied upon in all aspects of international cooperation in crime-related mat-
ters. They are:
1. extradition;
2. judicial assistance and cooperation in the area of securing tangible
and intangible evidence;
3. transfer of criminal proceedings;
4. transfer of prisoners; and
5. recognition of foreign penal judgments.
It is interesting that so far these various mechanisms of international
cooperation have remained at a very primitive level. Only three countries
have enacted integrated national legislation on inter-state penal coopera-
tion: the Federal Republic of Germany,"2 Switzerland 4 and Austria.4 4
40. Bassiouni, Needed: A new approach to the war against drugs, Chicago Sun Times,
Oct. 28, 1988, at 46, col. 1.
41. See 2 M.C. BASSlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE (1987); E.
MULLER-RAPPARD & M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTER-STATE COOPERATION IN PENAL MATTERS: THE EU-
ROPEAN CONVENTIONS (3 vols. 1987-88).
42. F.R. Germany, Gesetfiber die Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafrecht, (Act Con-
cerning International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters) of Dec. 31, 1982, entered into
force Jan. 7, 1983, BUNDESGESATZBLATT 1982, Teil I, No. 2071. (Federal Official Gazette 1982,
p. I, at 2071). The act replaced the German Extradition Act of 1929 and provides for com-
prehensive measures of extradition and other forms of mutual assistance in penal matters,
including execution of foreign sentences. See also 0. LAGODNY, DIE RECHTESSTELLUNG DES
AUSZULIEFERNDEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1987); T. VOGLE, AUSLIEFERUNG-
SRECHT UND GRUNDGESETZ (1970); Vogler, The Expanding Scope of International Judicial
Assistance and Cooperation in Legal Matters, DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE 287 (Band 66, Heft 3-4,
1986).
43. Entraide Internationale en Mati~re Penale (Swiss Federal Law on International Co-
operation in Penal Matters) Mar. 20, 1981, which also applies to international terrorism,
arts. 3(b) and 12.
44. Bundesgesetz vom 4. Dezember 1979 Uber die Auslieferung und die Rechtshilfe in
Strafsachen (Auslieferungs und Rechtshilfegesetz -ARGH) (Austrian Law on Mutual Assis-
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These integrated national approaches provide more flexibility than is
available in countries that use these modalities in an uncoordinated and
disparate fashion.
Most countries still believe that bilateralism is better than multi-
lateralism. Yet it is quite clear that 165 countries cannot all have the
same legal capabilities of being able to know of all of the other legal sys-
tems of the world, as well as the various requirements in order to process
such requests and to receive them and act upon them. Least of all, the
personnel necessary to staff such offices is either nonexistent or woefully
inadequate. That is not to speak of the technical personnel needed to
know the different languages in which such applications and requests are
made and received. In effect, there is a very primitive system of bilateral
and, in some cases, regional cooperation involving small staffs in the vari-
ous ministries of justice that deal with all these various modalities as well
as they can.
The problems here range from the macro to the micro. At the macro
level there are no integrated multilateral agreements that take into con-
sideration all these different forms of cooperation. As a result, each one of
these forms operates separately instead of being integrated together. An
appropriate analogy is that of a gear box and the ability to shift gears.
For example, if extradition cannot be granted because one country denies
extradition of its nationals, there is the opportunity to shift into the gear
of transfer of criminal proceedings, and then the individual would not
escape prosecution simply because nationals are not extradited by that
requested state. However, the separate compartments in which these
mechanisms are kept have largely reduced their effectiveness. Govern-
ment bureaucrats representing their governments at international and re-
gional organizational meetings are somewhat reluctant to go ahead with
making such a new step into integrating these mechanisms. Yet their ti-
midity is reflective of the same timidity that all bureaucrats and govern-
ment representatives have when they meet at regional and international
levels. The politics of international relations always seem to prevail over
the common sense and good judgment that jurists would have if they
were not subjected to those considerations which are due in large part to
the lack of a genuine and effective will by governments to engage in inter-
national cooperation. In short, governments would prefer to adhere to
rigid conceptions of national sovereignty and the ensuing jealousies that
result therefrom rather than to engage in effective international coopera-
tion. Thus, the will, as manifested by governmental conduct, does not
match the rhetoric.
At a different level, it must be noted that there are no new interna-
tional or regional organizations that have been created to operate in the
field of international cooperation in penal matters, though international
tance in Criminal Matters) BGBI.Nr. 529/1979. See also R. LINKE, H. Epp & R. FELSEN-
STEIN, INTERNATIONALEN STRAFRECHT (1981).
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cooperation has indeed increased.4 5 However, specific undertakings are
yet to be developed. For example, there could be regional informational
clearing houses for law enforcement cooperation and sharing of data and
information about international, regional and even local organizations en-
gaging in drug-related crime. At present there is no central database or
central office to provide technical assistance to one another. It would be
simple, for example, to establish in a given region a centralized library
containing all the laws and regulations of the different regional countries
concerning international cooperation in penal matters and criminal laws.
The library staff would be capable of providing such technical assistance
to the different requesting countries. Such a centralized legal reference
service would clearly have no political implications and no political liabil-
ities for the participating governments but would certainly provide an
enormous resource to the various government offices seeking to prepare
applications and requests for the various modalities of international coop-
eration in penal matters. Why such a central legal reference system has
not been established is another clear indication of the governments' lack
of interest in making effective use of these mechanisms. It might not be
the lack of will of governments, but the low level of imaginative thinking
of governments that prevent such basic and simple ideas from being im-
plemented. There are, of course, a number of proposals such as the estab-
lishment of an international criminal court and the establishment of re-
gional international courts yet to be implemented."' At the national level,
criminal courts can specialize in handling mechanisms for international
45. INTERPOL, however, has become consistently more involved in drug matters.
Groups like the "Pompidou Group" of the Council of Europe and the "Trevi Group" of the
European Economic Community have engaged in interchange of intelligence information.
The United Nations sponsored in 1989 a consortium of Heads of National Drug Law En-
forcement Agencies (HONLEA). The Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) has also become
more active. As stated in a recent United Nations report:
Regional co-operative agreements recently reached include those among the
governments of Central America in 1989, of five Eastern European countries in
1988, the Balkan States in 1989, five Nordic countries in 1987, four African
countries in 1989, and countries belonging to the South Asian Association for
Regional Co-operation (HONLEA report, 1989). Regional Co-operation is also
bolstered by the South American Agreement, the Colombo Plan, and the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of
American States.
See Law Enforcement and Drug Trafficking, United Nations Department of Public Informa-
tion, 12M at 2, DPI/1040C-40076 (Jan. 1990).
46. One of the proposed solutions advocated before the General Assembly in 1989, G.A.
Res. 44139, 4 Dec., 1989, and subsequently discussed at the 21-25 Feb., 1990 Special Session
is that of establishing an international criminal court. The idea for such a court has long
been advocated by this writer and others. See M.C. BAssIouNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987). The
International Law Commission at its 1 May - 20 July, 1990 session will examine this ques-
tion, as will a committee of experts organized by the International Institute of Higher Stud-
ies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa) in cooperation with the United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Branch, 24-28 June, 1990. The General Assembly's regular 1990
session will also consider the proposal.
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level cooperation, but unfortunately, none of these practical measures
have as yet developed. Once again, it is important to question the will of
governments to make more effective international cooperation.
8. Suppression of Illicit Traffic
As indicated above, the assumption that illicit traffic can be sup-
pressed is largely unfounded, since total or even substantial control of
supply or demand cannot be achieved.47 Furthermore, the international
narcotics control system has not developed the necessary international
legislative measures for effective control.
As stated above, international cooperation in penal matters depends
upon the voluntary compliance of states whose national systems of do-
mestic controls and inter-state cooperation are overburdened and limited
in their capabilities. National criminal justice systems are unable to cope
with both the domestic as well as the international dimensions of the
problem.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Over the years, international, regional and national efforts have only
resulted in more seizures of drugs, more arrests of drug offenders, more
arrests of drug users, more costs in law enforcement, and significant bur-
dens on the criminal justice systems. Worse yet is the added human and
social costs, particularly the increased levels and incidences of violence
and victimization. Yet production of drugs increased more significantly
than the number of offenders and users. The bottom-line remains nega-
tive, and that negative balance also is on the increase. Some see the ulti-
mate conclusion of this process as the decriminalization of the use of hard
drugs, much like the de facto decriminalization via nonenforcement of
marijuana usage in the United States and many Western European socie-
ties. Some countries, like the Netherlands, have embarked on that course
of conduct for over a decade. Others, like Switzerland and the Federal
Republic of Germany, have allowed certain areas of some cities to be free
from law enforcement activities. In Zurich's main park there is even free
distribution of needles to heroin addicts as a way of reducing AIDS and
other health hazards. While in Frankfurt an area of the city operates free
of police interference with the sale and use of drugs.
The overall approach to international control of drugs is woefully de-
ficient as is the national control in most legal systems of the world. It is
unlikely that the present trend of existing controls will succeed. Whether
or not the world community can think of a more integrated and effective
international system that would provide greater opportunities for the
47. Cf., Resource Book on Measures to Reduce Illicit Demand for Drugs (United Na-
tions, 1979); International Strategy and Policies for Drug Control (United Nations 1982);
Combating Drug Abuse and Related Crime, (United Nations Social Defence Research Insti-
tute, 1984).
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control of supply and demand, as well as for an effective system of sup-
pression of traffic, is very much in doubt. To suppress any form of traf-
ficking, one must assume the ability to control both supply and demand
or to control either supply or demand or, at least, to be able to disrupt
major trafficking networks. None of these exist. So how could there be a
continued criminalization if neither supply nor demand nor suppression
of trafficking can be effectively achieved?
My own conclusion is that the world community is at this point in-
terested in making an apparent "good faith" effort. But, after a period of
time, de facto decriminalization is likely to occur.
The schemes and scenarios for decriminalization are supported by an
objectively defensible cost-benefit analysis of the costs of drug control
versus results obtained.'8 Some of the research also attempts to quantify
the human and social costs and hypothesize as to what would occur in the
event of decriminalization. The outcome is clearly unfavorable to the ex-
istence of a controlled approach. However, no one can assess the human
and intangible social costs resulting from decriminalization. For others,
the effort at controlling the harmful effect of drugs should not be aban-
doned before genuine and effective integrated international and national
efforts are undertaken. They too are correct because such efforts have
never been undertaken, even though they are the common subject of po-
litical pronouncements.
The prospects for effective international controls are so remote, how-
ever, that one can only agree with the principle of control with the knowl-
edge that its effective implementation is unlikely, and one must consider
other alternatives. Neither control of supply or demand, or both, will ever
eliminate a problem which, by its very nature, cannot be totally eradi-
cated-history teaches us that much. The goal therefore has to be to con-
trol or limit the harmful consequences. But levels of social tolerance are
subjective and depend within each society on different factors, particu-
larly psychological perceptions based on value judgments, which will also
vary in time."9 A new approach must be found, if for no other reason than
it may be dictated by the exigencies of objective (and quantified subjec-
tive) cost-benefit analysis. The search may well be for a new balance be-
tween advocates of total criminalization and those of total decriminaliza-
tion. But in the final analysis, any new approach will have to depend on
the willingness of all states to cooperate effectively at many levels.
Whether it is possible to have faith in this prospect will depend on the
degree of one's optimism about a process which has for so long failed to
attain its avowed goals.
The experience of the 1960's in Western industrialized societies with
respect to marijuana is indicative. While I do not think that legalization
48. See Nadelmann, U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export, 70 FOREIGN POL'Y 83 (1988).
49. The War on Drugs: Is It Time to Surrender?, Report from the Institute of Philoso-
phy & Public Policy (Vol. 9, 1989).
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of the use of drugs will occur in the next quarter century, I would venture
to guess that decriminalization will nonetheless occur in a de facto sense.
This has been the experience with marijuana. It seems possible that the
same will occur with respect to the use of cocaine and heroin and heroin-
related products. Somehow, after major consuming societies have ex-
panded significant resources, which will be wasted under the present sys-
tem, there will soon come an implicit realization that the waste of such
resources is no longer a valid social and economic choice. The conse-
quence will be that consuming societies will become habituated to the use
of drugs by some of its members, just as those societies have become ha-
bituated to a certain level of crime, as well as to a certain level of damage
to the environment. As with all social ills, societies have a way of habitu-
ating themselves and adjusting to their existence. They merely lower their
expectations while increasing their levels of tolerance.
There is no doubt that an integrated series of strategies operating at
different levels can be developed nationally and internationally to cumu-
latively achieve a reduction of the levels of harms of this problem in order
to render it more manageable and more tolerable by the states directly
affected and by the world community as a whole.50 Most observers of this
phenomenon, however, would agree that these results are not likely to
occur. The only hope would seem to be a natural process of use reduction
that could occur as a result of greater worldwide awareness of the dangers
and harmful effects of drugs. Where governments have failed, perhaps the
good judgment of peoples all over the world can partially succeed. 5'
50. A World Ministerial Summit to Reduce Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Co-
caine Threat was convened in London on 8-11 Apr., 1990 and essentially urged reduction of
demand. See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 6218, 3 May, 1990, which
also contains the "Pomjudou Group" recommendations. Both the London Summit and the
"Pomjudou Group" meeting followed the same approach embodied in Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers Resolution (73)6, 19 July, 1973 on The Penal Aspects of Drug
Abuse, though without reference to it. This shows that no new ideas have been developed,
only old ones in new forms are re-argued.
51. See di Gennaro, Droga: Cultura Antica e Cultura Moderna, 6 TRIMESTRALE DI CUL-
TURA ED ESPERIENZE GIOVANILI 11 (1986), wherein he compares different "drug cultures" and
expresses the hope that the contemporary "drug culture" may be a passing fad.
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APPENDIX
The following figures have been released by the United Nations Divi-
sion of Narcotic Drugs. They indicate approximate quantities of drugs
which have been reported as seized from 1979 through 1988.
WORLD TOTALS OF DRUGS SEIZED
1. Cannabis Herb/Plants
1979: less than 10,000 tons.
1983: approximately 25,000 tons.
1987: over 50,000 tons.
1988: approximately 20 tons.
2. Opium
1979: approximately 60 tons.
1983: approximately 65 tons.
1987: approximately 50 tons.
1988: over 70 tons.
3. Heroin
1979: less than 3 tons.
1983: approximately 12 tons.
1987: approximately 17 tons.
1988: over 22 tons.
4. Cocaine
1979: less than 20 tons.
1983: approximately 50 tons.
1987: approximately 150 tons.
1988: over 175 tons.
1990

Developments in International Judicial
Assistance and Related Matters
BRUCE ZAGARIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Propelled by the unprecedented growth of international narcotics
trafficking in the last six months, significant developments in interna-
tional judicial assistance have occurred. As the penetration of interna-
tional drug trafficking into the fabric of society throughout the world and
in the United States persists, governments and concerned persons will
continue to improvise mechanisms to enable governments and particu-
larly law enforcement officials to perfect international judicial assistance
in the investigation and prosecution of international narcotics trafficking.
This paper traces selected developments in international judicial as-
sistance and its role in the pervading illegal narcotics activities currently
facing the world community. Since the forum takes place at an American
law school, the focus will be on the policies and mechanisms of interna-
tional judicial assistance in the United States. Since judicial assistance
has been most effective in the United States and other common law coun-
tries when it is implemented by a treaty, the first part of the paper dis-
cusses treaty developments. In particular, the United Nations Drug Con-
vention, which will soon come into force, has tremendous potential for
strengthening international judicial assistance. Legislation, the subject of
the second section of the paper, has attempted bold strokes of strength-
ening international judicial assistance. Our legislators, desperate to make
up for lost time, are mandating new international cooperation models for
not only United States law enforcement agencies, but for foreign law en-
forcement agencies as well. Unfortunately, our legislators are requiring
sanctions too precipitously for nonfulfillment of unrealistic goals in this
frontier area. The third section reviews judicial trends. Decisions by U.S.
courts in implementing attempts at international judicial assistance are
discussed. To have a comprehensive overview of international narcotics
policy, one should also look at the role of international actors and their
recent development. Unfortunately, time does not permit inclusion of
these developments, except in passing.'
* Practicing attorney, Oppenheimer, Wolfe & Donnelly, Washington, D.C.; Co-
Chairperson of the Committee on International Criminal Law, Criminal Justice Section,
American Bar Association; Editor-in-Chief, INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER;
Former Consultant to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention regarding inter-
national modalities to combat new forms of organized crimes.
1. For a discussion of the role of international organizations in the enforcement of in-
ternational money laundering, see Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of
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II. TREATIES
A significant breakthrough has occurred in the treaty area. Two ex-
amples are the signing, after several years of negotiation, of the multilat-
eral United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, and the Mexico-United States Narcotics
Agreement. However, the inability of the United States and even the
world to agree easily and quickly on appropriate bilateral treaties is ex-
emplified by the difficulty the United States Congress and Administra-
tion are having over the composition of the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties and with which countries the U.S. should have these agreements.
This section highlights these recent examples of treaties for combatting
international narcotics.
A. The United Nations Drug Convention
On December 19, 1988, the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was signed.2 The
Convention has far-reaching provisions that go way beyond the prior
draft.' More importantly, the fact that 106 countries of diverse composi-
tion were involved in the negotiations provides enormous political clout
to the document. Of great importance are the provisions on money laun-
dering, conspiracy, forfeiture, and adjunctive law aspects.
1. Background to the Adoption of the Convention
The background to the U.N. Drug Convention is that the General
Assembly of the United Nations, by its resolution 39/141 of December 14,
1984, requested the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
to request the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate, at its thirty-first
session held in February, 1985, as a matter of priority, the preparation of
a draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs that considered
the various aspects of the problem as a whole and, in particular, those not
envisaged in existing international instruments.4 As a result of this re-
quest and subsequent action by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and
the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations prepared the initial text of a draft Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Based on the
Money Movement and Related Matters - A United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 465 (1989).
2. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances adopted December 19, 1988 (E/Conf./82/15), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493
(1989) [hereinafter U.N. Drug Convention].
3. For background on a draft of the Convention, see Zagaris, U.N. Draft Convention
against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, 2 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 247 (1986).
4. For the history of the convention see United Nations Economic and Social Council,.
Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit




comments on that draft at its thirty-second session in 1987, the Secre-
tary-General prepared a consolidated working document which was circu-
lated to all governments in April, 1987, and was considered at two ses-
sions of an open-ended inter-governmental expert group. On December 7,
1987, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/111 which gave further
instructions for advancing the preparation of the draft Convention. Be-
cause the expert group had not permitted thorough consideration of all
the articles, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to
consider convening a further intergovernmental expert group, meeting for
two weeks immediately prior to the tenth special session of the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs in February, 1988, to continue revision of the
working document on the draft Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and, if possible, to reach agree-
ment on the Convention. At its tenth special session, held at Vienna from
February 8-19, 1988, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs reviewed the text
of the draft. It decided that certain articles thereof should be referred to
the Conference to be convened for the adoption of a Convention.
The Economic and Social Council, by its resolution 1988/8 of May 25,
1988, decided to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries for the adop-
tion of a convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances at Vienna from November 25 to December 20, 1988.
Invitations to participate in the Conference were sent to those who had
been invited to participate in the International Conference on Drug
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, held at Vienna from June 17-26, 1987. The
Economic and Social Council also convened a review group for the Con-
ference to review the draft texts of certain articles and the draft Conven-
tion as a whole to achieve overall consistency in the text submitted to the
Conference. The United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances met at the Neue Hofburg at Vienna from November 25 to Decem-
ber 20, 1988. The Secretary-General invited to the Conference, inter alia:
all states, specialized agencies and interested organs of the United Na-
tions, interested inter-governmental organizations to be represented by
observers, and interested non-governmental organizations in consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council and other interested non-
governmental organizations that may have a specific contribution to make
to the work of the Conference. In addition to the 106 states represented, a
multitude of specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and
observers from non-governmental organizations attended. The length of
time during which the Convention was considered and the diverse group
of participants is expected to provide wide acceptance to the Convention.
Nevertheless, some parts of the Convention will be controversial.
2. Scope of the Convention
The scope of the Convention is broad. Signatory parties are required
to take necessary measures, including legislative and administrative mea-
sures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective
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domestic legislative systems.5 Signatory parties are bound to enact legis-
lation and implementing regulations. Signatory parties will carry out their
obligations in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equal-
ity, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
other states. A signatory party must not undertake in the territory of an-
other signatory party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of
functions that are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other
party by its domestic law.' Under the U.N. Drug Convention, while signa-
tory parties (i.e., supplying countries) are expected to take action to coop-
erate, other parties (i.e., consuming countries) are required to respect the
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of the other signatory
countries.
3. Offenses and Sanctions
Article 3 defines the offenses and sanctions. It obligates the signatory
parties to adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a
crime under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, a series of
offenses. Included are the following:
(a)(i) The production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering,
offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever,
brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or ex-
portation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary
to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, 1961 Convention as
amended or the 1971 Convention;
(a)(v) The organization, management or financing of any of the of-
fense enumerated in (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above.
Two provisions concern money laundering. They are as follows:
(b)(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such prop-
erty is derived from any offense or offenses established in accordance
with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participa-
tion in such offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or dis-
guising the illicit origin or the property or of assisting any person who
is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade
the legal consequences of his actions;
(b)(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, loca-
tion, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of
property, knowing that such property is derived from an offense or
offenses established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this para-
graph or from an act of participation in such an offense or offenses.
The Article goes further and declares additional offenses, although
signatory parties are obligated to criminalize the following offenses, sub-
ject to the constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system:
5. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
6. Id. art. 2(3).
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(c)(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the
time of receipt, that such property was derived from an offense or
offenses established in accordance with subparagraph(a) of this para-
graph or from an act of participation in such offense or offenses;
(c)(iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts
to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the com-
mission of any of the offenses established in accordance with this
article.
Article 3 and particularly Article 3(b)(i) is likely to raise a lot of con-
troversy. It appears to make it an offense to convert or transfer property
for the purpose of providing legal counsel and defense to a defendant
since it criminalizes transferring or converting money to assist a person to
"evade the legal consequences of his actions."'7 This provision would seem
to forbid, however, only the transfer or conversion of money to provide
legal counsel if the person is guilty. Obviously, if it turns out that the
defendant is not guilty for whatever reason, it would appear that the
transfer or conversion of funds would be permitted. This is an odd result.
Since there is no legislative history at this point, it is difficult to know
exactly the meaning of the provision.
The U.N. Drug Convention obligates the parties to ensure their
courts and other competent authorities can consider, presumably in pro-
viding for punishment and perhaps procedural aspects of the litigation,
factual circumstances that make the commission of the offenses particu-
larly serious, such as:
(a) the involvement in the offense of an organized group to which the
offender belongs;
(b) the involvement of the offender in other international organized
criminal activities;
(c) the involvement of the offender in other illegal activities facilitated
by commission of the offense;
(d) the use of violence or arms by the offender; and
(e) the fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offense
is connected with the office in question.
4. Confiscation
The inclusion in a broadly recognized multilateral convention of the
crime of money laundering proffers prosecutors a new tool to wield
against narcotics traffickers and especially organized criminals. Similarly,
inclusion of crimes associated with actual trafficking - the organization,
management or financing of the offenses - will help prosecute these or-
ganized criminals who are so clever and powerful that they can remove
7. For background on a draft of the Convention, see Zagaris, supra note 3.
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themselves from the transportation and initial conversion of the receipts.
Significantly, the inclusion of a broad conspiracy provision should assist
prosecutors in many countries who cannot show actual sales or even
money laundering by some persons but who have strong evidence of par-
ticipation in the overall scheme.
A key article and one likely to raise controversy concerns confisca-
tion. In particular, the parties must adopt measures as may be necessary
to enable the confiscation of:
(a) proceeds derived from offenses established in accordance with arti-
cle 3, paragraph 1, or property the value of which corresponds to that
of such proceeds; and
(b) narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials and equip-
ment or other instrumentalities used in or intended for use in any
manner in offenses covered in Article 3, paragraph 1.8
The Convention also requires each party to adopt such measures as
may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, trace
and freeze proceeds, property, instrumentalities and so forth.' To imple-
ment the confiscation measures, a country that receives a confiscation re-
quest from another country with jurisdiction over a covered offense must
submit the request to its competent authorities for confiscation. The re-
quested party must take measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize
proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things. The requested
party will act in accordance with and subject to the provisions of its do-
mestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or multilateral treaty
or arrangement to which it may be bound to the requesting state. The
signatory parties are obligated to seek to conclude bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties, agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of
international cooperation in confiscation."0
When acting in accordance with a confiscation request, a party may
give special consideration to concluding agreements on:
(1) contributing the value of such proceeds and property, or funds de-
rived from the sale of such proceeds of property or a substantial part
thereof to intergovernmental bodies specializing in the fight against
illicit traffic;
(2) sharing with other parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, such
proceeds of property.1" The ability to utilize confiscated funds for
combatting narcotics is an innovative mechanism to strengthen orga-
nizations such as the United Nations Fund for Drug Control
(UNFDAC). The actual experience in contributory funds to intergov-
8. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
9. Id. art. 5(2).
10. Id. art. 5(4); Agreement on Cooperation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and
Drug Dependency, Feb. 23, 1989, United States-Mexico, 28 I.L.M. 58 (1990)[hereinafter
"Agreement"].
11. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(5)(b).
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ernmental bodies combatting narcotics and between states will be a
key to continual successful operation by these persons.
If the proceeds have been intermingled with property acquired from
legitimate sources, such property will, without prejudice to any powers
relating to seizure or freezing, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed
value of the intermingled proceeds." The U.N. Drug Convention also pro-
vides that each party can consider ensuring that the onus of proof be
reversed regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property
liable to confiscation, to the extent that such action is consistent with the
principles of its domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and
other proceedings.'" However, the U.N. Drug Convention states that the
confiscation provisions will not be construed as prejudicing the rights of
bona fide third parties."' The confiscation provisions will provide a potent
new weapon in the hands of law enforcement officials. The confiscation
provisions provide incentives for law enforcement agents to aggressively
prosecute offenses and also provide them with the means to fight against
the often well funded defendants. The rights of bona fide third parties
are vital and undoubtedly many persons will focus on the need to
strengthen their rights. This provision could be interpreted to protect
persons providing legal services to defendants in narcotics cases.
5. International Judicial Assistance
The U.N. Drug Convention has several articles requiring signatory
parties to provide international judicial assistance. In particular, it obli-
gates the parties to engage in extradition, mutual legal assistance, trans-
fer of proceedings and other forms of cooperation and training.
The signatory parties agree to include each of the offenses within the
U.N. Drug Convention as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty
existing and to be concluded between parties. 5 Hence, the U.N. Drug
Convention, if signed by both Columbia and the U.S., could well be the
mechanism enabling Columbia to extradite narcotics traffickers to the
U.S. For instance, the Convention provides that if a party making extra-
dition conditional on the existence of a treaty is requested to extradite by
a party with which it has no treaty, it can consider the U.N. Drug Con-
vention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offense to
which the convention applies.' 6 The parties agree they will try to con-
clude bilateral and multilateral agreements to implement or improve the
effectiveness of extradition." Extradition is subject to the legal conditions
of the requested party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the
12. Id. art. 5(6)(b).
13. Id. art. 5(7).
14. Id. art. 5(8).
15. Id. art. 6(2).
16. Id. art. 6(3).
17. Id. art. 6(11).
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
bases on which extradition can be refused." s In line with the principles of
international extradition law, a requested state may refuse to extradite if
there exists substantial grounds to believe that extradition would facili-
tate the prosecution or punishment of a relator due to his race, religion,
nationality or political opinions or if extradition would cause prejudice for
any of those reasons to any person affected by the request." The signa-
tory parties will try to expedite extradition procedures and simplify ex-
tradition requirements relating thereto for any offense to which the provi-
sions on extradition or the U.N. Drug Convention apply.20 If permitted by
its domestic law and applicable treaties, a requested party may under ur-
gent circumstances and at the request of a requesting country, arrest or
take other appropriate measures to ensure the presence at extradition
proceedings of a person who is present in its territory.21 In the event a
requested party does not extradite a person for an offense within the
Convention on the basis that the relator is a national or because the of-
fense was allegedly committed in its territory, the requested party must
submit the case to its authorities for the purposes of prosecution, unless
otherwise agreed with the requested party.22
An entire article of the U.N. Drug Convention mandates wide mutual
legal assistance in investigation, prosecution and judicial proceedings for
criminal offenses within the Convention.22 Mutual legal assistance may
include the following: taking evidence or statements from persons; effect-
ing service of judicial documents; executing searches and seizures; exam-
ining sites and objects; providing information and evidence; providing
originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including
bank, financial, corporate or business records. "' Any other forms of mu-
tual legal assistance allowed by the domestic law of a requested country
can be furnished.2 5 An important breakthrough is that a requested party
cannot refuse to render mutual legal assistance on the basis of bank se-
crecy.26 Business and bank confidentiality has been a serious impediment
to obtaining mutual legal assistance.2 ' The assertion of bank secrecy laws
as a reason for a mutual legal assistance request has endangered a great
deal of litigation and promoted diplomatic tensions.2 8 The parties are ob-
18. Id. art. 6(5).
19. Id. art. 6(6).
20. Id. art. 6(7).
21. Id. art. 6(8).
22. Id. art. 6(9).
23. Id. art. 7(1).
24. Id. art. 7(2).
25. Id. art. 7(3).
26. Id. art. 7(5).
27. For a discussion of problems with bank and business confidentiality, see Tigar &
Foyle, International Exchange of Information in Criminal Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL As-
PECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 61 (1983).
28. The MLATs between both the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands are limited in
terms of the scope of crimes in order to safeguard the offshore financial sectors. See, e.g.,
Zagaris, U.S. and Cayman Islands Conclude Mutual Assistance Treaty, 2 INT'L ENFORCE-
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ligated to facilitate or encourage, to the extent consistent with their do-
mestic law and practice, the presence availability of persons, including
persons in custody, who consent to assist in investigations or participate
in proceedings." If the signatory parties are not bound by a mutual legal
assistance treaty, their custom of the provisions of the mutual legal assis-
tance article of the convention will apply.30 The information which must
be included in a mutual legal assistance request is detailed.8 1 The re-
questing party will not transmit nor use information or evidence received
for investigation, prosecutions or proceedings other than those stated in
the request without the prior consent of the requested party.3 2
A requested party may refuse a request under the following condi-
tions: if not made in conformity with the convention; if compliance would
likely prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public, or other essential
interests; if a requested party could not meet the request under domestic
law; and if it would be against the legal system of the requested party
relating to material legal assistance for the request to be granted. 3 The
requested country must provide reasons for any refusal of mutual legal
assistance.3 4 A requested party can postpone granting a request if it
would interfere with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or proceeding.
Such a situation requires the requested party to consult with the request-
ing party to determine if the assistance can still be reduced pursuant to
conditions deemed necessary by the requested party. 5 A person from a
requested country who travels to the requesting country to give evidence
is given safe conduct for fifteen days after his presence is no longer re-
quired or for any other period on which the parties agree.36
In the Convention, new functions are provided for the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions. In particular, the Commission will be responsible for the review of
the operation of the Convention.37 It may make suggestions and general
recommendations based on the examination of the information received
from the parties and may call the attention of the International Narcotics
Control Board, which was established by the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, on any matters which may be relevant to the functions of the
Board. The Commission has the obligation, on any matter referred to it
by the Board under Article 22, to take such action as it deems appropri-
ate. 8 Finally, the Commission may draw the attention of non-Parties to
MENT L. REP. 200 (1986).
29. U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(4).
30. Id. art. 7(7).
31. Id. art. 7(10).
32. Id. art. 7(13).
33. Id. art. 7(13).
34. Id. art. 7(15).
35. Id. art. 7(17).
36. Id. art. 7(18).
37. Id. art. 21(a).
38. Id. arts. 21(b)-(d).
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decisions and recommendations which it adopts under the Convention, so
that they may consider taking action in accordance therewith.39
The Board has been given additional responsibilities, as a result of
the Convention, with respect to the articles concerning substances fre-
quently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances," materials and equipment,41 and commercial documents and
labelling of exports.2 The Board may call upon the party concerned to
adopt such remedial measures, as shall seem necessary under the circum-
stances, for the execution of the provisions of those Articles. 3 If the
Board finds that the party concerned has not taken remedial measures
which it has been called upon to take, it may call the attention of the
Parties, the Council and the Commission to the matter.
The U.N. Drug Convention provides that many new weapons will be
at the disposal of law enforcement officials. The binding language of the
Convention, the diversity and number of countries that participated, and
the length of time deliberated will make it difficult for countries to ignore
the mandates of the Convention. Nevertheless, the controversial provi-
sions, such as the apparent criminalization of the use of proceeds from
crimes to pay criminal defense counsel, even before adjudication, is likely
to engender debate.
Although the international control system remains an indirect system
reliant on the voluntary cooperation of its participant states, the control
mechanisms are increased, the ability to battle organized criminals is en-
hanced (i.e., through confiscation and requirements for harsher penalties),
and the authority of international organizations is strengthened. The re-
quirement that signatory parties improve their international judicial as-
sistance, especially extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures,
represents valuable progress over the prior scheme. 5
B. Narcotics Cooperation Agreement Between Mexico and U.S.
In what could be a watershed development, the Governments of
Mexico and the United States have concluded an agreement to cooperate
in combatting narcotics trafficking and drug dependency. 4 The role of
the United Nations Fund for Drug Prevention, particularly the U.N. Con-
vention on Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances
and the Comprehensive and Multidisciplinary Plan of Future Activities
39. Id. art. 21(f).
40. Id. art. 12(1).
41. Id. art. 13.
42. Id. art. 16.
43. Id. art. 22(b)(i).
44. Id. art. 22(b)(iii).
45. For a discussion of prior international controls of drug abuse, see Bassiouni, Inter-
national Aspects of Drug Abuse: Problems and a Proposal, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC.
3 (1975).
46. Agreement, supra note 10.
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in the Control of the Improper Use of Drugs, are acknowledged at the
beginning of the Agreement.
The Agreement attacks the narcotics and drug dependency problems
from four major areas: (1) prevention and reduction of illicit demand for
narcotics and psychotropic substances; (2) control of supply; (3) suppres-
sion of illicit traffic; and (4) treatment and rehabilitation. Perhaps the
most important provision, especially for facilitating international judicial
assistance, is the requirement that the signatory parties adopt the neces-
sary measures to fulfill the obligations of the Agreement. These obliga-
tions include legislative and administrative measures which conform to
the fundamental provisions of their respective national legal systems. In
broad terms the Agreement also safeguards the national integrity of each
signatory country. It obligates the signatory parties to fulfill their obliga-
tions under the Agreement pursuant to the principles of self-determina-
tion, non-intervention in internal affairs, legal equality, and respect for
the territorial integrity of States. It also specifies that the signatory par-
ties are not allowed by the Agreement to exercise and perform in the
other signatory's jurisdiction the functions or authority exclusively en-
trusted to the authorities of that other signatory party by its national
laws or regulations. The Agreement obligates the signatory parties to con-
sult in advance with each other on actions that one of the parties may
intend to undertake which may affect the other party in a manner incon-
sistent with the objects and purpose of the Agreement.
The Agreement provides that cooperative measures will be under-
taken within a framework of joint responsibility and will be defined by
the parties according to their budgetary capabilities through a Memoran-
dum of Understanding. Specific areas are set forth for programs that are
intended to accomplish the following:
(a) reduce demand through prevention, treatment, and public aware-
ness activities;
(b) eradicate the narcotics cultivation and establish programs for sub-
stitute crops;
(c) identify and destroy narcotics processing labs and facilities;
(d) regulate the production, importation, exportation, storage, distri-
bution, and sale of inputs, chemicals, solvents, and other chemical
precursors whose use is diverted to the unlawful preparation of nar-
cotics and psychotropic substances;
(e) establish systems for exchanging information on combatting nar-
cotics trafficking and drug dependency;
(f) draft such new legal instruments as the Parties consider appropri-
ate for combatting narcotics trafficking and drug dependency; and
(g) in general, undertake all activities that are considered relevant to
achieving better cooperation between the Parties.
Institutionally, a principal engine of the cooperation will be the
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United States-Mexico Permanent Mixed Commission of Cooperation
Against Narcotics Trafficking and Drug Dependency [the Commission]
that will begin operating within six months from the entry into force of
the Agreement. It will be composed of the coordinating operational and
consultative authorities of the Parties. The Parties will designate the op-
erational authorities. The consultative authorities will be the Foreign
Ministries of the Parties. The Commission will meet every four months
with the principal mission of formulating recommendations to the respec-
tive governments on the most effective form in which the cooperation
under the Agreement can be provided. The Commission's recommenda-
tions will require the approval of each of the Governments to be imple-
mented. The approval will be formalized diplomatically through Memo-
randa of Understanding that must be executed by the operational
coordinating authorities of the Commission. Annually, the Commission
will prepare a report on the implementation of the Agreement. It will de-
scribe the status of the cooperation between the Parties and will consti-
tute the joint basis for both governments in evaluating the efforts of the
Parties in combatting narcotics trafficking and drug dependency.
The Agreement will enter into force when the governments of the
Parties notify each other through diplomatic channels that they have
completed all their respective constitutional requirements and proce-
dures. The Agreement continues indefinitely and can be terminated by
either party at any time, provided notification is given through diplo-
matic channels in writing, in which case the Agreement will terminate
ninety working days from the date of delivery of such notification. The
signatory parties can revise the provisions and such revisions will take
effect when the Governments of the Parties notify each other through
diplomatic channels that they have completed their respective constitu-
tional requirements and procedures.
The Agreement does not specifically cover money laundering related
to narcotics trafficking nor does it cover forfeiture of assets. Nevertheless
the Agreement is so broad, both in scope and with its Commission, that it
could decide to tackle both matters within the Commission's work (i.e.,
by way of joint programs to exchange information and audit returns of
suspected traffickers). The establishment of a Commission may well be a
watershed in narcotics cooperation. In other criminal cooperation areas,
the establishment of working groups has provided a dynamic element
that facilitates intensive cooperation and enables governments to find in-
novative solutions to new and sometimes unforseen crime problems. The
Commission also provides for both countries to bring together persons
that will develop relationships and commitments to solving narcotics
problems. In the past, as such relationships blossom and develop, they
often surpass the nationalistic and domestic blinders that limit coopera-
tion and even cause cooperation to die. Some critics may charge that the
U.S. should not do business with a government that has not cooperated in
the past or that is indelibly corrupt. It is correct that without the will to
administer agreements they are worthless. However, even if one govern-
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ment is not willing or is unable to implement an agreement, the existence
of an obligation to cooperate under international law can itself cause
pressure and ultimately bring down a government. Without an agreement
binding a signatory party, both countries lose a potential source of per-
suasion. Additionally, governments change. This Agreement will continue
to exist, and succeeding governments, as well as members of the Commis-
sion, may make a positive difference. The Agreement appears to represent
a conscious, determined effort by the new Salinas administration to
strengthen bilateral cooperation. The U.S. should wholeheartedly wel-
come this initiative and complement it as much as possible. Indeed,
strong forces in Mexico are presently undermining and will continue to
undermine this initiative. To succeed, the Mexican Government and bi-
lateral mechanisms will require all the political support they can muster.
C. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties47
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are vital to international
judicial assistance because without them prosecutors must rely on letters
rogatory and subpoenas in order to obtain information abroad. Until the
last few years, the United States has lagged behind the Western Euro-
pean countries in concluding MLATs. As a result, our prosecutors do not
have adequate tools either to obtain or provide international judicial as-
sistance to combat narcotics trafficking. At present six proposed Treaties
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters are pending rat-
ification in the United States Congress: the Cayman Islands;45 Mexico;49
Canada; 50 Belgium;5' the Bahamas; 2 and Thailand."
47. Much of this section is drawn from Zagaris, supra note 1.
48. For a discussion of the success of working groups between Italy and the U.S. in the
context of an MLAT see, Zagaris & Simonetti, Judicial Assistance under U.S. Bilateral
Treaties, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 219,
226-227 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1988).
49. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britian and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 537 (1987) [hereinafter Cayman MLAT].
50. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 13, 100th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1988).
51. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
52. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Aug. 18, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 16,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)[hereinafter Bahamas MLAT]. See also Zagaris, Bahamas
Agrees to a Treaty with the U.S. for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 90
TAXES INT'L 3 (1987).
53. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Kingdom of Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 19,
1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). SEE ALSO Zagaris, Thai Govern-
ment Presses U.S. Government For Help in Return of Missing Art, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
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In the first hearing on MLATs held April 20, 1988, they appeared to
sail through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with minimal dis-
cussion, and it seemed they would be quickly ratified. 5 A MLAT is in-
tended to enable law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence abroad
in a form admissible in U.S. courts.55 It supplements existing interna-
tional arrangements.56 Letters rogatory tend to be a slow and relatively
inefficient mechanism because the requests must pass through a number
of bureaucratic steps, including courts in both countries, foreign minis-
tries, justice ministries, and in some cases, embassies.5 7 Also, they can be
relatively costly since the U.S. Government has had to employ private
lawyers in the foreign country to succeed with the requested assistance."8
By contrast, MLATs permit requests to move directly from one law
enforcement agency to another. The MLATs provide for a wide variety of
assistance, including servicing documents, providing records, locating per-
sons, taking the testimony or statements of persons, producing docu-
ments, executing requests for search and seizure, forfeiting criminally-ob-
tained assets, and transfering persons in custody for testimonial
purposes. 9 Once ratified, the six pending MLATs will add to the current
MLATs in force with Switzerland, the Netherlands, Turkey and Italy.
MLATs are more effective than letters rogatory for the following reasons:
1. They obligate each country to provide evidence and other forms of
assistance, whereas letters rogatory are expected solely as a matter of
comity.
2. MLATs, either by themselves or in conjunction with domestic im-
plementing legislation, can provide a means of overcoming bank and
business secrecy laws that have in the past so often frustrated the
effective investigation of large-scale criminal activity, such as narcot-
ics trafficking and white collar crime.
REP. 49 (1988).
54. For a discussion of the first set of hearings, see Zagaris Senate Foreign Relations
Gives Favorable Response to 6 MLATs, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 197 (1988).
55. See Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, in II INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 151 (C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
56. For a discussion of developments in U.S. MLAT policy, see Nadelmann, Negotia-
tions in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (1985).
57. For a discussion of the use of letters rogatory to obtain assistance in criminal cases,
see Chamblee, International Legal Assistance in Criminal Case, in I TRANSNATIONAL LITI-
GATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMMODATIONS 188, 215-219 (Fedders
ed. 1984) [hereinafter "Fedders"].
58. For a discussion of the need to employ private attorneys abroad to succeed in let-
ters rogatory, see Elsen, An Overview of the Use of the Compulsory Process by Federal
Agencies to Gather Evidence in Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Cases - Bank of
Nova Scotia, Marc Rich, Toyota Motor Corp., and Banca Della Svizzera Italiana Ex-
amined, in Fedders, supra note 57, at 775, 780.
59. For a useful and comprehensive, although somewhat dated, review of the types of
mutual assistance under MLATs, see Grutzner, International Judicial Assistance and Co-
operation in Criminal Matters, in II A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 189 (Bas-
siouni & Nanda eds. 1973).
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3. A MLAT can include procedures that will allow the U.S. to obtain
evidence in a form that will be admissible in U.S. courts. For example,
the use of certificates needed to admit foreign business records, or the
opportunity for adequate direct and cross-examination of witnesses in
depositions taken abroad.
4. U.S. MLATs are structured to streamline, and make more effective,
the process of obtaining evidence.
5. The MLAT procedure is more direct and streamlined compared to
the multiple, cumbersome and uncertain procedure of the letters
rogatory.
Each of the MLATs have different provisions. For instance, in the
case of Canada the MLAT provides more cooperation than the others due
to the shared borders, the resultant volume of criminal cases and the sim-
ilarity of legal systems. Regarding Belgium, Mark M. Richard, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, applauded the fact that
the U.S. had an opportunity to negotiate, in a rather short period, a
MLAT with a European country that is a major commercial and financial
center. In doing so, the U.S. has set the stage for MLAT negotiations with
neighboring countries having legal systems similar to those of Belgium. 0
The MLAT with Switzerland has been utilized to overcome problems
with Swiss bank secrecy."' Similarly, MLATs may be important when
dealing with inbound investment from other offshore jurisdictions, such
as the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas.
Some important limitations prevent certain types of cooperation on
inbound investment in both the Cayman and the Bahamas MLATs. The
Cayman MLAT, which was preceded by a supplementary agreement of
July 26, 1984, to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and by
tremendous diplomatic friction arising out of attempts by the U.S. to en-
force grand jury subpoenas against Cayman entities, including the two
Bank of Nova Scotia cases, applies to offenses that are crimes in both the
U.S. and the Cayman Islands and are punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment.6 2 The information may also be used in civil proceedings
60. Hearings on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1988) (statements of Mary V. Mochary, Principal
Deputy Legal Advisor, and Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), re-
printed in Exec. Rep. No. 8, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1988).
61. For a discussion of the US-Swiss MLAT and Swiss banking secrecy laws, see Tigar
& Doyle, supra note 27, at 66; Nadelmann, supra note 56, at 470. For a Swiss view, see Frei,
Swiss Secrecy Laws and Obtaining Evidence from Switzerland, in Fedders, supra note 57,
at 1.
62. In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings: United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1984). For a discussion of the Bank of Nova Scotia cases in the context of securing
evidence abroad, see Elsen, supra note 68, at 782; Zagaris & Papavizas, Recent Decisions by
United States Courts on the Exercise of Subpoena Powers to Secure Evidence Abroad in
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for the recovery of unlawful proceeds from a crime within the scope of the
treaty or for the collection of tax or enforcement of tax penalties resulting
from the knowing receipt of such unlawful proceeds. Importantly, the
agreement excludes any matters relating, directly or indirectly, to the im-
position, calculation, or collection of taxes, unless this involves the unlaw-
ful proceeds of a crime covered by the treaty. The proposed Cayman
MLAT applies to all offenses of ancillary civil or administrative proceed-
ings taken by the U.S. Government or its agencies connected with, arising
from, related to, or resulting from any narcotics activity referred to in
Article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs of 1961, as
amended by the protocol of 1972.
The proposed MLAT requires that, to obtain assistance, the request-
ing country (e.g., the U.S.) must present a request to a judge of a Grand
Court in the Cayman Islands, sitting as an administrative tribunal. His
decision will be final. Under the 1984 Agreement, the Assistant U.S. At-
torney General was required to merely issue a certificate to the Attorney-
General of the Cayman Islands. The latter was required then to issue a
notice to the person within 14 days of the date of the receipt of the certif-
icate. It was not possible to deny or even inquire about the legitimacy of
the certificate. In essence, the Cayman Government gave the U.S. attor-
ney carte blanche authority to ask for assistance. The proposed MLAT
allows a requested state power to deny requests under five broad areas.
The MLAT provides that a party cannot take compulsory measures, in-
cluding a grand jury subpoena, to obtain documents located in the other's
territory in respect of a criminal offense within the scope of the treaty
unless the treaty obligations have first been fulfilled. Only when the pos-
sibilities of assistance under the treaty have been exhausted will the par-
ties be able to make use of measures under other international treaties
which are applicable to both.63 The MLAT specifically provides that the
treaty does not create any right on the part of a private person to obtain,
suppress or exclude any evidence or to impede the execution of a
request.6 4
The proposed Bahamas MLAT has limitations similar to those in the
proposed Cayman MLAT. The preamble limits its purpose to that of pro-
viding cooperation relating to serious crimes, such as narcotics trafficking.
The type of assistance covered is unusually broad, and encompasses the
immobilization and forfeiture of assets and any other matters mutually
agreed upon. It also states that it is not intended or designed to provide
mutual assistance to private parties and does not allow private parties to
obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence or to impede the execution of a
Criminal Matters, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 301, 307 (V. Nanda & M. Bassiouni eds. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW].
63. Cayman MLAT, supra note 48, art. 17.
64. Id. art. 1(3).
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request. 65 The crimes covered are even narrower than the proposed Cay-
man MLAT. Only certain enumerated crimes must be a crime in both
countries and be punishable by one year's imprisonment or more. The
grounds for a requested state to refuse a request is much broader than in
the proposed Cayman MLAT and in other U.S. MLATs which reflects
the recent uncertain criminal assistance history between the Bahamas
and the U.S.
The proposed Bahamas MLAT provides that in urgent circum-
stances, requests may be made orally but shall be confirmed in writing.
This provision allows the requesting state to take quick action (i.e., to
obtain information including the immobilization of assets in the re-
quested country). Like the proposed Cayman MLAT, the proposed Baha-
mas MLAT would limit the information obtained under the treaty for
purposes other than those stated in the request without the prior consent
of the requested state. In addition, it requires confidentiality except to
the extent that the information or evidence is needed for investigations or
proceedings forming part of the prosecution of a criminal offense. Once
information is transmitted to a requesting state and is used in a trial, it
also can be used in the requesting state for related purposes, including
recovery of unlawful proceeds and the collection of tax, or enforcement of
tax penalties, resulting from knowingly receiving the unlawful proceeds of
an offense. The authorization of the use of information and evidence for
related criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, especially for tax
matters, is a significant accomplishment for the U.S."6 The treaty pro-
vides for assistance in forfeiture proceedings. These provisions would ap-
ply, for instance, to the Carlos Lehder case where the U.S. would like to
forfeit alleged assets of Lehder in the Bahamas."7
However, in May 1988, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
delayed the scheduled mark-up of the six pending MLATs at the request
of Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).68 Senator Helms has effectively blocked
ratification of the MLATs because of the following issues:
1. Many MLATs combine civil and criminal matters resulting in a
tendency to reduce individual safeguards in the implementation of
these treaties.
2. Foreign governments make greater use of MLATs and, in the fu-
65. Bahamas MLAT, supra note 52, art. 18(3).
66. For the utility of treaties in international enforcement of tax matters, see Pansius,
Tax Crimes and Extraterritorial Discovery, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 62,
at 105, 135; Wassenaar, Current Enforcement Priorities of the Internal Revenue Service, in
CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD 9 (BNA 1986 course handbook).
67. For a discussion of the Lehder case and the potential use of the Bahamas-US
MLAT to forfeit assets in the Bahamas, see Zagaris, Lehder Conviction Calls Into Play
Proposed Bahamas MLAT, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 151 (1988).
68. For a discussion of the controversy over the right of criminal defendants to have
access to MLATs, see Zagaris, Sen. Helms' Inquiries over Individual Rights in MLATs De-
lay Mark-up, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 160 (1988).
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ture, the U.S. may receive many applications from overseas to deal
with individuals who may be using tax shelters in the U.S. that are
considered criminal evasion abroad.
3. The U.S. has used MLATs as a fishing expedition for wholesale
discovery but precludes them from procuring documents for those
Americans accused by foreign governments. Additionally, MLATs do
not benefit the accused when foreign governments bring the accusa-
tions. Defendants in criminal cases are not allowed to make use of
these treaties. Exculpatory evidence obtained by the requesting gov-
ernment is not provided to the accused who is prohibited from using
that evidence.
4. MLATs do not provide for cross examination of witnesses in the
authentication of documents, as required by the 6th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
5. The MLATs do not provide for safe conduct to potential witnesses.
As a result, the governments rely upon depositions rather than the
appearance of witnesses at trial, which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. Three pending MLATs contain safe conduct provisions so a
person whose appearance and testimony in the requesting country is
requested under a treaty receives safe conduct while he or she is in
the requesting country for such purposes.
6. Foreign governments and the U.S. rely on the word of the other
treaty partner, rather than upon knowledgeable individuals, in ob-
taining documentary information.
7. The U.S. Government is not required to demonstrate probable
cause to obtain documents under the treaties from a government
thereby violating the 4th Amendment of the Constitution. 9
On June 14, 1988, as a result of the Helms' requests, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee held additional hearings on several policy is-
sues.7" The focus of the hearings was the right of criminal defendants to
use the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to gather and introduce
evidence in criminal trials. An ancillary issue was whether the Senate
should strengthen the safe conduct provisions for witnesses. Two of the
witnesses, Robert Pisani, Executive Director, International Legal Defense
Counsel, Philadelphia, and this writer, recommended that the Committee
give its advice and consent to the MLATs despite the problems in the
proposed treaties because of the important role the six countries play in
solving narcotics and money laundering crimes."1 In particular, Pisani and
this writer recommended access by defendants to MLATs for criminal
trials and the inclusion of safe conduct provisions to encourage witnesses
69. Helms, Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the need
to review MLATs (undated and on file with the author).
70. For a discussion of the second MLAT hearings, see Ferrera, Second MLAT Hear-
ings Spark Debate on Policy Issues, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 197 (1988).
71. See separate statements of Robert Pisani and Bruce Zagaris to the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, June 14, 1988, supra note 60, at 165.
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to voluntarily appear and testify in the requesting country. Philip T.
White, former Director of the Office of International Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, strongly supported each of the treaties and urged that
the Committee recommend to the Senate that it give its advice and con-
sent to the MLATs. 7 2 A lively debate ensued among Committee members,
including Senators Helms, Kerry, and Adams, over the desirability of
MLATs without recommended changes.s
The controversy delayed the report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the six MLATs, and the inability to put them on the con-
sent calendar in the waning days of the current Session meant that they
would not be ratified until 1989."' Ironically, the Bahamas Government,
on October 17, made press releases and sent a letter to Senator Claiborne
Pell, Chairman, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations, castigating the
U.S. Senate for not being able to ratify the MLAT after the U.S. and the
Committee so soundly criticized the Bahamas for its lack of cooperation."
In recognition of the need for improved MLAT policy, the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 mandates that the Attorney General prepare model
MLATs. More than likely, the Senate will ratify all of the pending
MLATs in this session of Congress.
The treaty and related agreements area has experienced a dynamic
development with the signing of the U.N. Drug Convention. The poten-
tial for cooperation with countries such as Mexico through bilateral agree-
ments remains significant. Institutionally, the Commissions in both the
U.N. Drug Convention and the U.S.-Mexico Agreement can play impor-
tant roles. For instance, in the U.S.-Mexico Agreement the Commission
has both operative and consultative functions. The preparation of annual
report enables it to engage in planning. Only by enabling dedicated pro-
fessionals in law enforcement to work together over time will cooperative
law enforcement personnel be able to triumph over organized traffickers.
Much work and progress remains in the MLAT area. However, since Con-
gress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act has requested the Department of Jus-
tice to give priority to preparation of model extradition agreements and
MLATs, the U.S. should make progress in this area.
72. See statement of Philip T. White to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
June 14, 1988, Id. at 207.
73. See transcript of the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June
14, 1988), at 12-55 (on file with the Committee and the author).
74. For a discussion of the attempts to report them out of the Committee, see Senate
Foreign Relations Committee MLAT Vote Postponed, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 266
(1988); Zagaris, Senate Committee Approves the Bahamas And Mexico MLATs Over
Helms Objections, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 308 (1988).
75. For a discussion of the Bahamas Government complaints over the lack of coopera-
tion by the U.S., see Zagaris, Bahamas Government Criticizes Inability of U.S. Government
to Ratify the U.S.-Bahamas MLAT, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 16 (1988).
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III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During the last five years, at least three significant pieces of legisla-
tion have substantially improved opportunities for U.S. law enforcement
officials and courts to engage in international judicial assistance. The
three pieces of legislation are the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. This
discussion is limited primarily to discussing the most recent statute -
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
A. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Part of the difficulty in effective international judicial assistance in
international narcotics enforcement lies in the limitations imposed by
U.S. internal legislation. The U.S. can improve its ability to engage in
international judicial assistance by improving its own legislation. In 1984,
a series of hearings on money laundering and tax evasion due to offshore
tax havens called attention to limits on the international judicial coopera-
tion due to the federal rules. As a result of provisions added at the last
minute to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the U.S. sub-
stantially eliminated many of these obstacles. The Act liberalizes the
rules concerning introduction of foreign business records in U.S. federal
courts. It makes authentication of foreign business records easier and
eliminates the need for live testimony in most cases. The Act also pro-
vides for the suspension of the statute of limitations for up to three addi-
tional years in criminal cases if the U.S. Government can make a reasona-
ble showing that evidence is located in a foreign country and if it has
made an official request for the evidence. The new law also authorizes
federal courts to extend the "Speedy Trial Act" deadline by up to one
year and the statute of limitations for up to three years when foreign
evidence is sought. Exchange of information is mandated by requiring
that the Department of Justice be notified when a pleading is filed in a
foreign country in opposition to the U.S. Government's official request for
evidence for use in a U.S. criminal proceeding. 6
B. 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act
In the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act," Congress strengthened the re-
porting and monitoring required by financial institutions. Congress also
ordered the Department of Treasury to attempt to create an international
currency control agency to assist with enacting uniform money laundering
laws and to collect and analyze the currency transaction reports. The
same legislation requires the conclusion of agreements by the U.S. with
countries to expand access to information on transactions involving large
76. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).




amounts of U.S. currency. It also requires the conclusion of agreements
by the U.S. with countries to expand access to information on transac-
tions involving large amounts of U.S. currency and requires the instiga-
tion of sanctions against countries which refuse to conclude such agree-
ments. Congress requires the Department of Justice to prepare model
extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. The Act calls for the ne-
gotiation of an agreement with Western Hemisphere countries to form a
multinational force to conduct actions against illegal drug smuggling or-
ganizations and calls also for international negotiations to establish an
international drug force to pursue and apprehend major international
drug traffickers. More emphasis could and should have been placed on
international criminal courts. Most importantly, for purposes of interna-
tional judicial assistance, the Act requires the President begin discussions
with foreign governments to investigate the establishment of an interna-
tional criminal court for persons accused of engaging in international
drug trafficking or having committed international crimes. Another im-
portant component of international judicial assistance in the Act is that
several provisions call for technical assistance to other governments. The
technical assistance will be provided bilaterally through intergovernmen-
tal organizations.
1. Creation of International Agency To Collect, Monitor and Ana-
lyze Currency Reporting
The Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate with fi-
nance ministers of foreign countries to establish an international currency
control agency ("ICCA").7 8 Its purpose would be to:
(1) Serve as a central source of information and database for interna-
tional drug enforcement agencies;
(2) collect and analyze currency transaction reports filed by the
ICCA's member countries; and
(3) encourage the enactment of uniform cash transaction and money
laundering statutes by member countries.
This provision appropriately identifies and requires U.S. leadership
towards the establishment of a multilateral regulatory approach. The es-
tablishment of the ICCA will probably take at least a few years since it is
a new idea and confidentiality is a priority and a sensitive matter among
many governments.
78. For a discussion of the US-Swiss MLAT and Swiss banking secrecy, see Tigar &
Doyle, supra note 27, at 66; Nadelmann, supra note 56, at 470; for a Swiss view, see Frei,
Swiss Secrecy Laws and Obtaining Evidence from Switzerland, in Fedders, supra note 57,
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2. Kerry Amendment to Restrict International Laundering of U.S.
Currency
A last-minute amendment by Sen. Kerry (Amendment No. 3697) was
adopted by a vote of 85-3 in the Senate version. It requires the United
States Government to undertake international negotiations to expand ac-
cess to information on transactions involving large amounts of U.S. cur-
rency, wherever those transactions occur worldwide.7 9 At the beginning of
the section Congress makes the finding that international currency trans-
actions, especially in U.S. currency, which involve the proceeds of narcot-
ics trafficking, are the engine of narcotics trade in the U.S. and worldwide
and hence is a threat to the national security of the U.S. The amendment
requires the Treasury to enter into negotiations with the appropriate fi-
nancial supervisory agencies and other officials of all foreign countries,
the banks and other financial institutions which do business in U.S. cur-
rency. It obligates Treasury to assign highest priority to countries whose
financial institutions the Secretary of the Treasury determines, in consul-
tation with the Attorney General and the National Director of Drug Pol-
icy, may be engaged in currency transactions involving the proceeds of
international narcotics trafficking, particularly U.S. currency from drug
sales in the U.S.
The provisions state that the purposes of negotiations are:
(1) To conclude one or more international agreements to ensure that
foreign banks and other financial institutions maintain adequate
records of large U.S. currency transactions; and
(2) to establish a mechanism whereby such records may be made
available to U.S. law enforcement officials.
In particular, the Treasury is to further cooperative efforts, voluntary
information exchanges, the use of letters rogatory, and mutual legal assis-
tance treaties.
The section requires reports to determine non-compliance by foreign
governments. Not later than one year after the enactment, the Secretary
of Treasury must submit an interim report to the Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, on
progress in the negotiations. Not later than two years after enactment,
the Secretary must submit a final report to such Committees and to the
President on the outcome of those negotiations and identify countries
whose financial institutions the Secretary has cause to believe are engag-
ing in currency transactions involving the proceeds of international nar-
cotics trafficking, and who have not reached agreement with U.S. authori-
ties on a mechanism for exchanging adequate records on international
currency transactions in connection with narcotics investigations and




The President must mete out stiff penalties on recalcitrant govern-
ments. If, after receiving the advice of the Secretary of the Treasury and
in any case at the time of receipt of the Secretary's report, the Secretary
determines that a foreign country:
(1) Has jurisdiction over financial institutions that are substantially
engaging in currency transactions affecting the U.S. which involve the
proceeds of international narcotics trafficking;
(2) such country has not reached agreement on a mechanism for ex-
changing adequate records on international currency transactions in
connection with narcotics investigations and proceedings; and
(3) such country is not negotiating in good faith to reach such an
agreement.
The President must impose appropriate penalties and sanctions in-
cluding temporarily or permanently:
(1) Prohibiting such persons, institutions or other entities in such
countries from participating in any U.S. dollar clearing or wire trans-
fer system; and
(2) prohibiting such persons, institutions or entities in such countries
from maintaining an account with any bank or other financial institu-
tion chartered under the laws of the United States or any State.
However, the President may certify to Congress that it is in the na-
tional interest that these penalties should be delayed or waived. In addi-
tion, financial institutions in such countries that maintain adequate
records will be exempt from such penalties and sanctions.
For purposes of the section, U.S. currency is defined as Federal Re-
serve Notes and U.S. coins. The term "adequate records" is defined as
records of U.S. currency transactions in excess of $10,000, including writ-
ten documentation by the person initiating the transaction of the source
of the currency being deposited or transferred, or other records of compa-
rable effect.
The section is designed to strike a blow at jurisdictions where money
laundering occurs and to cut their ties to the U.S. banking system
through sophisticated wire transfer systems. Although the purpose of the
Kerry amendment is laudable, its thrust is misdirected. The legislative
history admits even with strict record keeping requirements in the U.S., it
is difficult to trace money laundering. In effect, the legislation seeks to
impose on foreign governments the requirements of the U.S. Bank Se-
crecy Act. Ironically, although the U.S. Government, and particularly
Congress, castigated the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Mexico and other
governments for not concluding agreements, the efforts of the U.S. Gov-
ernment have been deplorable in this connection. The Criminal Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice has insufficient resources to conclude
extraditions and MLATs. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is so
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
divided, including indecision on the desirability of even having treaties
with governments such as the Bahamas and Mexico, that the Senate did
not ratify the six pending MLATs, many of which were concluded more
than two years ago. In effect, the Kerry section duplicates section 1363 of
subtitle H of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. In particular, section 1363
provided that the Treasury, in consultation with the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, must initiate discussions with the central
banks, or other appropriate government authorities of other countries,
and propose that an information exchange system be established to assist
the efforts of each participating country to eliminate the international
flow of money derived from illicit drug operations and other criminal ac-
tivities. Two years after the enactment of section 1363, little, if any, pro-
gress is evident. Not one agreement has been concluded on an informa-
tion exchange system. Nor are any agreements imminent."s
3. Provisions on Extradition
Section 7087 of the ADAA amends 18 U.S.C. section 3184 to allow
the filing of an extradition complaint and the issuance by a judge or mag-
istrate of the United States District court for the District of Columbia of
a warrant of apprehension for a person charged whose whereabouts
within the U.S. are not known."1 Prior to the amendment, a judge or a
duly authorized magistrate could only issue a warrant of apprehension for
a person whose extradition was sought from the U.S. if the complainant
"reasonably and in good faith" believed the person could be found within
the court's jurisdiction.2 If the requesting country did not know where in
the U.S. the relator (charged person) might be found, or whether the per-
son was in the U.S. at all, no warrant of apprehension could be issued.
4. Title IV - Cooperation with International Organizations and As-
sistance to Foreign Governments
The enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act has significant interna-
tional law policy provisions in Title IV, referred to as "international nar-
cotics control."83
Section 4101 calls for the coordination of efforts by member nations
of the Organization of American States (OAS) to fight the illegal drug
trade. The section explains that events in drug source and transit coun-
80. For a discussion of § 1363 of the money laundering provisions of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, see Zagaris, supra note 1, at 470.
81. For a discussion of the extradition provisions of the new Act on which this account
relies in part, see Abbell, Congress Passes First Substantive Amendment to United States
Extradition Laws In More than 100 Years, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 414 (1988).
82. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 899 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884
(1973).
83. For a discussion in the Act on its bill form, see Smith, Omnibus Drug Bill Passes
and Has International Implications, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 297 (1988); Ferrera, Om-
nibus Drug Bill II: On a Fast Track, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1980 (1988).
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tries in the Western Hemisphere require international agreement on the
formation of a multinational force to conduct operations against illegal
drug smuggling organizations. It states that the U.S. Government should
try to initiate diplomatic discussions through the OAS to establish and
operate a Western Hemisphere anti-narcotics force. The Act prescribes
an important limitation to the participation of the U.S. It provides that
the U.S. will provide operations of such an anti-narcotics force, but be-
lieves that the personnel for such a force should be provided by the coun-
tries with the most serious threat from drug trafficking operations. Sec-
tion 4101(e) also urges the President to seek the establishment "in each
of the relevant regions of the world" of other multilateral anti-narcotics
forces.
Section 4102 supports the United Nations efforts to stop illegal drug
trafficking. It encourages the U.N. to explore ways and means to establish
an international mechanism aimed at stopping the trafficking of illegal
drugs. Section 4103 asks the President to call for international negotia-
tions to establish an international drug force that will pursue and appre-
hend major international drug traffickers. In section 4104 Congress di-
rects the President to convene, as soon as possible, an international
conference on combatting illegal drug production, trafficking and use in
the Western Hemisphere, involving the highest-ranking law enforcement
officers, and other appropriate officials from every government in the
Western Hemisphere. Section 4106 states that the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics Matters should seek to establish a re-
gional anti-narcotics training center in the Caribbean. In this regard, it
should contribute funds or other resources to such a center and seek such
contributions from other countries.
The Act contains authorizations to accomplish the international
criminal cooperation initiatives. It authorizes the appropriation of $3 mil-
lion for fiscal year 1989, under section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, for U.S. contributions to multilateral and regional drug abuse
control programs. The $3 million is allocated as follows:
(1) $2 million for a U.S. contribution to the United Nations Fund for
Drug Abuse Control;
(2) $600,000 for the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Com-
mission (CICAD) Legal Development Project. The proportion of the
U.S. contribution to the total funds of this project may not exceed the
proportion of the U.S. contribution to the OAS budget as a whole for
that fiscal year;84
(3) $400,000 for the CICAD Law Enforcement Training Project, with
84. For a discussion of the CICAD legal development project, see Zagaris, Inter-Ameri-
can Drug Abuse Commission Progresses on Legal Development Project, 4 INT'L ENFORCE-
MENT L. REP. 186 (1988); Zagaris, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Holds
3rd Session, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 114 (1988).
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the same limitation.8 5
Section 4108 calls for the President to begin discussions with foreign
governments to investigate the feasibility and advisability of establishing
an international criminal court for persons accused of having engaged in
international drug trafficking or having committed international crimes.86
Section 4204 earmarks no less than $2 million to implement chapter
5, part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This section relates to
international military education and training for the limited purposes of
education and training in the operation and maintenance of equipment
used in narcotics control interdiction and eradication in eligible countries
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Eligible countries are only those
that are major illicit drug-producing or major drug-transit countries that
have democratic governments and whose law enforcement agencies do not
engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
relating to police training is waived.
Under section 4205, military assistance is provided to improve the
ability of so-called friendly governments to control illegal narcotics pro-
duction and trafficking. It is also used to strengthen the bilateral links of
the U.S. with friendly governments by offering concrete assistance in this
area, and it strengthens respect for internationally recognized human
rights and the rule of law in efforts to control illicit narcotics production
and trafficking. A limited waiver is also provided from section 660(a) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Section 4206 requires the reallocation of funds appropriated for se-
curity assistance from those countries not taking adequate steps to halt
illicit drug production or trafficking to those countries that have met their
illicit drug eradication targets or have otherwise taken significant steps to
halt illicit drug production or trafficking.
Individual sections in the Act provide assistance for Bolivia, Peru,
Mexico, Columbia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Laos. In addition, $1 mil-
lion is earmarked for fiscal year 1989 to provide more narcotics control
assistance to countries that are drug-transit countries but are not major
drug-transit countries.
Subtitle G requires the State Department to become more active. In
section 4602, $5 million is authorized for appropriation without fiscal year
limitation for use in paying rewards for information. Section 4603 pro-
vides that a passport cannot be issued to an individual who is convicted
85. For a discussion of the proposals for CICAD to conduct training, see Zagaris, Inter-
American Drug Abuse'Commission Holds First Session, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 123,
125 (1987).
86. For a discussion of the provisions in the Act calling for initiation of discussions by
the U.S. on the feasibility and advisability of establishing an international criminal court,
see Zagaris, Senate Resolution Instructs President to Begin Discussions on the Creation of
an International Criminal Court, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 348 (1988).
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of a felony drug offense under state or federal law, or of a misdemeanor
offense in an individual case. Section 4603 cannot be used for a first con-
viction misdemeanor that involves only possession of a controlled sub-
stance. A federal drug offense includes violations of the Bank Secrecy Act
or the Money Laundering Act if the Secretary of State determines that
the violation is related to illicit production of, or trafficking in, a con-
trolled substance.
Section 4604 requires the Department of State, Customs Service and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to develop a comprehensive
machine-readable travel and identity document border-security program
that will improve border entry and departure control through automated
data capture of machine-readable travel and identity documents. It re-
quires these agencies to submit to Congress and the President, within
sixty days, a detailed implementation plan for the program. The program
must include an integrated cooperative data exchange system that will
incorporate law enforcement data on narcotics traffickers, terrorists, con-
victed criminals, fugitives and others currently documented in the "Look-
out Systems" of all three agencies and departments. Developing the pro-
gram requires integration of the following documents which must be
machine-readable: border crossing cards, alien registration, pilot's li-
censes, passports and visas. The agencies designated to contribute to the
integrated cooperative data-exchange system and to update such informa-
tion on no less than a monthly basis are: the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration; the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Internal
Revenue Service; the Federal Aviation Administration; the U.S. Marshals
Service; and the U.S. Coast Guard. $23 million is authorized for the pro-
gram ($7 million for Customs; $7 million for I.N.S.; and $9 million for the
State).
Section 4605 finds that the Secretary of State, under section 1233 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal years 1986 and 1987, is
required to increase U.S. efforts to negotiate updated extradition and mu-
tual legal assistance treaties, relating to narcotics offenses, with each ma-
jor drug-producing country. Section 4606 requires that U.S. diplomatic
missions in each major illicit drug-producing or drug-transit country ex-
pand their investigative activities with respect to illicit drug use and traf-
ficking by U.S. Government personnel and their dependents. The section
appropriately notes that much greater international law enforcement co-
operation is required in combating the illicit drug problem. Section 4606
requires the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to jointly de-
velop a model extradition treaty with respect to narcotics-related viola-
tions (including extradition of host country nations), a model mutual le-
gal assistance treaty and model comprehensive anti-narcotics legislation.
The Secretary of State must report to Congress not later than six months
after the Act on actions taken to implement section 4605.
Congress in section 4607, urges the Secretary of State to permit the
assignment of additional DEA agents to U.S. diplomatic missions in for-
eign countries in which illicit narcotics production or trafficking is, or is
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likely to become, a significant problem. Section 4801 (subtitle I) provides
that it is the consensus of Congress that agencies of the intelligence com-
munity should be more actively involved in the effort to combat illicit
international drug trafficking.
The Act also contains provisions which, on their face, have no inter-
national criminal law implications but which will be significant in an in-
ternational law context. For instance, section 7001 of Title VII prescribes
the death penalty for drug-related killings. Many governments refuse ex-
tradition on the grounds that the relator is likely to incur the death pen-
alty.8 The abolition of the death penalty is based on humanitarian con-
siderations and public policy. In Western Europe the extradition policy
on cases wherein the death penalty can occur is based on a long history of
opposition to the death penalty. The policy is contained in a number of
constitutions, such as those of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. The prohibition against
extradition, in cases where the death penalty may be imposed, is also con-
tained in the Draft Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 8 and the
Harvard Research Draft on extradition.8 9 It violates public policy to indi-
rectly reach the same outcome through extradition if the requesting state
has the death penalty. This is not the case if the requesting state
promises not to execute the relator once extradited. 0
If the United States wants to extradite and obtain mutual assistance
in international cases, as it obviously must in order to prosecute cases
against major drug kingpins such as Carlos Lehdrer, it will need to in-
creasingly conclude conventions with conditional extradition provisions
for death penalty cases. Otherwise, it will lose ground on obtaining inter-
national cooperation. A case that is now pending involves an extradition
request by the U.S. Government from Canada, for Charles Ng, a 27-year
old former U.S. marine.9 1 Mr. Ng is wanted for the murders of at least
twelve people in California. The extradition treaty between the U.S. and
Canada allows Canada to invoke a provision that enables it to refuse ex-
tradition or require the U.S. to guarantee that the relator will not be exe-
cuted. There have been at least two other cases involving extradition re-
quests by the U.S. to Canada, where the death penalty was potentially at
issue.
87. For an excellent discussion of the death penalty and extradition see BASSIOUNI, II
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. VIII, § 5.
88. For an example of the conditional extradition, see the Extradition Treaty between
the United States and Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, art. VII, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476 (en-
tered into force Dec. 5, 1963).
89. O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. P./AF./doc. 326/73, art. 10 (1973).
90. Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 188 (Supp. 1935). For the Eu-
ropean perspective, see Bassiouni, Lahey & Sang, La peine de mort aux Etats Unis-L'Etat
de la questions en 1972, in REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 23
(1973).
91. For a discussion of the Ng and other Canadian cases, see Burns, With Death at
Issue, Can Canada Wash Its Hands? N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1988, at A4, col. 3.
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In 1985, the U.S. requested the extradition of Mr. Kindler, one of
two Philadelphia men convicted in 1984 for first-degree murder of a rob-
bery accomplice who had been beaten to death with a baseball bat and
dumped into the Delaware River. John Crosbie, the Justice Minister of
Canada, approved his extradition in January, 1986, "to discourage those
who commit murder in a foreign state and seek haven in Canada hoping
to avoid the death penalty." However, Kindler escaped in October, 1986.
Last month he was arrested again in New Brunswick. The Canadian court
has stayed the minister's order on the basis that extraditing Kindler may
deny him his rights to "life, security and liberty" under Canadian law.
In 1983, the request to extradite Tony Ng (no relation to the above)
to the U.S. was granted only after the State of Washington agreed it
would not seek the death penalty even though the crime involved the
murder of thirteen people in a Chinese gambling club in Seattle. Mr. Ng
eventually received seven consecutive life terms for his role in the affair.
5. Transportation of Witnesses in Custody in Foreign Countries to
the U.S. to Testify in Criminal Proceedings
The Act added a new section 3508 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The
new section authorizes the Attorney General to transport a witness who is
in custody in a foreign country to the United States, in custody, for the
purposes of appearing and testifying in a state of federal criminal pro-
ceeding. The Attorney General is to return the witness to a foreign coun-
try upon completion of his testimony in the U.S.
Before this new provision, such a person in foreign custody could
only be brought to the U.S. under a state or a federal material witness
statute."2 Because the federal statute does not allow the detention of a
witness if his testimony can be adequately obtained under a deposition, it
was often debatable if sufficient reasons existed to hold such a witness in
custody for a federal criminal proceeding."' An additional problem was
that the prior law makes it difficult for the U.S. to return a witness to the
country from which he was in custody, due to complications in the extra-
dition and immigration laws.
If a mutual assistance agreement exists between the U.S. and the for-
eign country in which the witness is in custody, and the MLAT provides
for the transfer and return of the witness, section 3508 will not apply.
The new section 3508 will not work if the foreign country does not want
to send the witness. Unless a treaty covers the case, a government will not
require a person in custody in that country to go, in custody, to the
United States and remain under custody in the U.S. pending his appear-
92. For a discussion of the material witness statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3144. See also
Zagaris, Inquiries over Individual Rights in MLATs Delay Mark-Up, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 160 (1988).
93. For a discussion of the requirements for bringing such a witness from abroad, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 3508 (West Supp. 1989).
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ance as a witness. One commentator points out that the statute gives the
Attorney General total discretion whether to request the temporary
transfer to the U.S. of a witness in custody in a foreign country. 4 Al-
though this discretion could be exercised to the detriment of a defendant
whose case requires the testimony of a witness, courts hopefully will su-
pervise this provision so that it applies fairly to both sides.
6. Transfer of Americans Convicted in Foreign Countries of Of-
fenses Committed After October 31, 1987
The Act adds a new section 4106A to Title 18 of the United States
Code. The new section allows the transfer of Americans convicted in for-
eign countries of offenses committed after October 31, 1987. Prior imple-
menting legislation did not specify how such offenders could be released
on parole or supervised release in the U.S. prior to completion of their
full sentence less credits for good time. The new section will assist in fa-
cilitating continued transfers to the U.S. of American offenders convicted
in foreign countries with which the U.S. has prisoner transfer treaties in
force.
Under section 4106A, the U.S. Parole Commission will make the re-
lease determination for a returning offender by applying the sentencing
guidelines as if the offender were convicted of the same offense in the
U.S. and sentenced by a U.S. district court. The Parole Commission must
consider the recommendation of the U.S. Probation Service, on the basis
of an investigation analogous to a presentence investigation done pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. section 3552 and information that the sentencing country
will provide. The Parole Commission can make a determination outside
the guideline range on the basis that a court may depart from that range.
The legislative history explains that the Parole Commission can take into
account disparate conditions in foreign prisons and the treatment of per-
sons arrested by foreign authorities (i.e., torture in the country or even.
abuse during interrogation). Although not mentioned in the legislative
history, the considerably excellent conditions (i.e., dinners and sex
brought from the outside, virtually unlimited visitors and visits) can in-
fluence the Parole Commission to treat a returning American more
harshly.
Within 45 days of the Parole Commission's determination, the of-
fender and the U.S. can appeal the determination as if it were a sentence
imposed by a U.S. District Court on a defendant convicted of an offense
committed after October 31, 1987.91 Under section 4106A(b)(3), the su-
pervision of a transferred offender lies in the U.S. district court for the
94. For a discussion of such a MLAT provision, see Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty,
June 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, art. VII, T.I.A.S. No. 10734.
95. For a useful discussion and policy commentary on new § 3508, see Abbell, Congress
Passes Statute to Permit Witnesses in Custody in Foreign Countries to Come to the
United States to Testify in Criminal Proceedings, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 418 (1988).
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district in which the offender resides.
Several other changes were made to enhance the operation of U.S.
prisoner transfer treaties. 18 U.S.C. section 4109 is amended and the
counsel can be appointed and compensated for work under the Criminal
Justice Act (18 U.S.C. section 3006A) for an indigent transferee in con-
nection with the Parole Commission's determination of such transferee's
period of incarceration and supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 4106A, and in connection with the appeal of that determination. 18
U.S.C. section 4100(b) as amended allows the appointment of a guardian
ad litem on behalf of an American offender abroad who is believed, by
the officer who verifies the consent of such offender to transfer to the
U.S., to be mentally incompetent or otherwise incapable of knowingly and
voluntarily consenting to the transfer. 18 U.S.C. section 4109 as amended
permits the payment of travel expenses and compensation to a guardian
ad litem for an indigent U.S. offender whose consent to transfer to the
U.S. under a prisoner transfer treaty must be given by such a guardian.
Some Americans serving time abroad, despite the new provisions,
may be reluctant to return with the new sentencing guidelines offering
less flexibility than the term previously under the pre-November 1, 1987
guidelines. 6
The United States has made significant gains in enacting legislation
making the use of foreign evidence easier. The initiative by Congress to
create an international currency agency to collect, monitor and analyze
currency transaction reports is laudable. Although it will take some time
to reach an international accommodation, U.S. leadership is helpful. The
Kerry Amendment to restrict international laundering of U.S. currency is
misdirected and has a taste of imperialism that will generate a negative
response. However, Title IV of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which mandates
increased cooperation with international organizations and technical as-
sistance to foreign governments, is a step in the right direction. However,
an approach which encompasses more resources and is more broadly di-
rected is required. For instance, rather than a strike force, law enforce-
ment needs a comprehensive approach that includes criminal justice pol-
icy, legislative policy, law enforcement policy to implement the goals, laws
and agreements, and courts to adjudicate disputes. Obviously, a strike
force is only a small part of the criminal justice system. More impor-
tantly, an international court to resolve disputes is badly needed, espe-
cially when government leaders and government entities are charged with'
offenses of narcotics and narcotics related matters. Regionally, the Coun-
cil of Europe and the European Committee on Crime Problems serves as
a model that does many of the comprehensive criminal policy that is re-
quired. The U.S. has an important role to play in providing technical as-
sistance in law enforcement, especially in areas such as asset forfeiture
96. For a discussion of the legislative history of this section, see 134 Cong. Rec. H11256
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
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and technology for investigation.
IV. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
In the last year or so, the courts have been much more amenable to
allowing U.S. and foreign prosecutors to obtain information on business
and bank records when money laundering and narcotics trafficking is con-
cerned. They have started allowing compelled consent decrees whereby
grand jury targets are required to sign a statement allowing foreign banks
to provide account information. However, as the recent decision of the
District of Columbia Circuit demonstrates, the willingness of U.S. courts
to enforce grand jury subpoenas for foreign bank records depends on the
factual showing that is made. This discussion includes cases that deal not
only with narcotics trafficking, but also related penetration of money
launderers and persons charged with financial crimes.
A. Enforceability of Grand Jury Subpoenas for Foreign Bank Records97
Many cases involving organized traffickers concern efforts by U.S.
prosecutors to obtain financial information from foreign banks in order to
prosecute alleged traffickers and their managers on money laundering,
racketeering, and tax crimes. Since the managers and bosses of the organ-
ized drug rings are smart enough to hire carriers (also known as "mules")
and smurfs to launder drug profits, the U.S. and other governments can
often only successfully establish enough evidence to convict them of fi-
nancial crimes. This often involves penetrating foreign bank records.
A U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opinion
has come to a much different conclusion from the Court of Appeals for
the 11th Circuit on the propriety of a United States court enforcing a
subpoena requiring a bank to produce records located abroad relating to
transactions taking place abroad. The case In re: Sealed Case, Nos. 87-
5208 and 87-5209 (August 7, 1987) involves a grand jury subpoena for
documents created and held in the bank's branch office in "Country Y," a
bank secrecy jurisdiction."8 The bank itself does business in many coun-
tries, including the U.S. and Country Y, and is owned by "Country X." In
response to the bank's refusal to comply with the subpoena on the basis
that it would violate the laws of Country Y, and with a subsequent U.S.
district court order to do so, the district court held a show cause hearing
and issued an order holding the bank in civil contempt. To enforce its
order, the court ordered the bank to pay a fine of $50,000 per day, until it
complied with the court's production order. It stayed its order pending
appeal. On appeal the Court of Appeals held that the contempt order
97. Subsections A and B of this section appear in Zagaris, supra note 1.
98. For a useful discussion of the case on which this portion of the paper is based, see
Abbell, U.S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Differs with 11th Circuit on En-




should not stand. Although it stated that it would not, in this case, decide
the issue of whether a court may ever order action in violation of foreign
laws, it stated that it was not comfortable believing that a court should
order a violation of law, particularly in a foreign country. The Court
noted the bank that was the subject of the order was not the focus of the
criminal investigation. Additionally, the bank was not merely a private
foreign entity, but rather an entity owned by the government of Country
X. The Court distinguished the 11th Circuit decisions in the Bank of
Nova Scotia cases primarily on the basis of the lack of good faith of the
Bank of Nova Scotia in responding to the subpoenas that were the sub-
ject of those decisions. The Court also stated that, in deference to comity,
it wanted to refrain from judging the acts of the government of another
within its territory.
The opinion also concerned the ability of an individual to assert that
the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself includes the right
not to incriminate oneself under the laws of a foreign country. It arose
because the grand jury subpoenaed not only the foreign bank documents,
but also the former assistant manager of the branch of the bank in Coun-
try Y who is currently an employee of the bank in the United States. The
former assistant manager, besides having personal knowledge of many of
the bank transactions that were the subject of the grand jury investiga-
tion, was a personal friend and former business associate of several of the
targets of the investigation. He testified about his knowledge of the
targets and their activities which he learned in his personal capacity.
However, he sought to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect
to the targets' banking activities in Country Y. Upon his refusal to com-
ply with the court's order that he testify, the court held a show cause
hearing and held him in civil contempt. It stayed its order committing
him for civil contempt pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals refused to concur with the District Court's
holding that the grand jury secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Crim.
P., afford the assistant manager sufficient protection to remove any real
concern of foreign prosecution. However, it did hold that he had no real
concern of prosecution because the offense for which he could be prose-
cuted in Country Y is not an extraditable one. Hence, Country Y could
prosecute him only if he voluntarily returned there. It further held that
protection against such voluntarily assumed danger is not within the
scope of protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
B. 9th Circuit Upholds Use of Cayman Bank Records in a Tax Case
In United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1987), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld the conviction of defendants
on tax charges arising from narcotics offenses. In doing so, the Court
made two holdings which are harmful to offshore jurisdictions. It held
that the Cayman Islands bank statute, and particularly its confidentiality
provisions, do not provide the customer with reasonable expectation of
privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
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and the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Letter Agreements do
not create a right by non-governments such as financial institutions or
their customers to challenge the authenticity of the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral's certification for bank records.
A defendant and bank customer, in this case, entered a conditional
guilty plea arising from an indictment for income tax evasion, filing of
false income tax returns, and failure to disclose foreign financial interests.
The U.S. District Court denied the Customer's motion to suppress bank
records obtained from the Cayman Islands bank account. The defendant
Mann and his wife were indicted as a result in part from records of funds
deposited in Mann's account with Barclay's Bank, Grand Cayman Island.
The information was obtained under the 1961 Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. In particular, Attorney
General Meese issued a certificate for Mann's bank records on the basis
of the following reasons: (1) the I.R.S. was unable to find a legitimate
source for Mann's income; (2) Mann refused to identify the source of the
income; (3) an informant identified Mann as the operator of a boat used
by a convicted marijuana importer; and (4) the I.R.S. had reason to be-
lieve that Mann maintained a bank account in the Cayman Islands. On
the basis of the Barclay's Bank records, the Mann's were indicted. The
defendants' motion to suppress was denied in part due to their lack of
standing to contest the acquisition of the records.
The Court of Appeals rejected the claim that the Mann's had a pro-
tected Fourth Amendment right in the Cayman account. The Court con-
cluded while the Cayman Islands statute provides for a general privilege
against the disclosure of bank records, it is subject to many exceptions.
The Court also reasoned that the existence of exceptions to foreign pri-
vacy, since the customer knows that access to these records may be possi-
ble in a variety of situations. The Court also found that the documents
requested by the Attorney General were authorized by the letter agree-
ment and were relevant to the investigation.
The Court also upheld the decision of the District Court that Mann
had no right to challenge the Attorney General's certification under the
treaty. It noted that the district court failed to differentiate the analysis
between the standing of a defendant under the treaty from the separate
issue of whether he had a Fourth Amendment right in a treaty. If the
treaty does not indicate such intent, only the foreign sovereign has the
right to protest. The Court concluded that the treaty and letter agree-
ment do not appear to establish any individual right in Mann. The Court
noted that the letter agreement merely recognizes the ability of con-
tracting states to request records from financial institutions in other con-
tracting states for offenses "connected with, arising from, related to, or
resulting from any narcotics activity."
The result in Mann seems correct since the bank secrecy laws are not
intended to protect persons when the treaty party establishes evidence of
narcotics offenses by the defendant in cases in which the Single Narcotics
Convention applies. The inability of the defendant in Mann to have
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standing to challenge procedure under the treaty, although a correct ap-
plication of the agreement is questionable policy. 9 It would seem prefera-
ble to allow individuals to challenge misapplication of the treaty. It would
also seem preferable to allow individuals to provide defendants with the
right to use the agreement to secure information. Conferring such rights
on defendants would achieve a just result. The case should also have a
beneficial impact for law enforcement since increasingly persons will real-
ize that, notwithstanding bank secrecy legislation, the U.S. and foreign
governments can penetrate and obtain information about their accounts
in offshore jurisdictions where criminal matters, especially relating to
crimes such as narcotics trafficking, are at stake. Because the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and U.S. law enforcement officials in general do not
begin to have enough resources to effectively prosecute cases with foreign
aspects, cases such as this should deter some would be criminals. 10 0
C. Assistance under Bilateral Tax Treaties
In a unanimous decision the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) can issue a summons to obtain tax in-
formation in response to a request from Canadian authorities without the
need to demonstrate that a Canadian tax investigation had not reached a
stage analogous to a referral of the U.S. Department of Justice. In partic-
ular, the Court found that neither the 1942 double tax convention nor the
applicable U.S. legislation on the issuance of third-party summons under
the Internal Revenue Code required such a determination provided the
I.R.S. can show that the following requirements have been fulfilled: The
investigation is relevant to a legitimate purpose; the I.R.S. does not al-
ready possess the information; and it has followed the statutorily required
administrative steps. As long as the summons fulfills the statutory re-
quirements and is issued in good faith, the Court held that compliance is
mandated, whether or not the Canadian tax investigation is directed to-
ward criminal prosecution under Canadian law.
The case arose out of a bank account maintained by Philip George
Stuart, a Canadian citizen, in the Northwestern Commercial Bank in Bel-
lingham, Washington. The Canadian Department of Revenue (Revenue
Canada) initiated a tax investigation of Stuart attempting to ascertain his
Canadian income tax liabilities for 1980, 1981, and 1982. In January 1984,
the I.R.S. received from Revenue Canada a request pursuant to Articles
XIX and XXI of the 1942 Canada-U.S. income tax treaty to provide it
with information about certain bank accounts. The I.R.S. Director of For-
eign Operations, the U.S. competent authority, found the requests were
within the 1942 treaty's scope and, therefore, served administrative sum-
99. For a criticism of the failure to allow private parties or non-governmental parties
the right to use MLATs, see Hearing on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning Cay-
man Islands before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988)(statements of Bruce Zagaris and Bob Pisani).
100. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. -, 103 L.Ed 2d 388, 109 S.Ct. 1183 (1989).
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monses on the bank.
At Stuart's direction, the bank refused to comply. Pursuant to 26
U.S.C. section 7609(b)(2), respondents, Canadian citizens and residents
who maintained the bank accounts in question, petitioned the District
Court to quash the summonses contending that section 7602(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code forbids the I.R.S. from issuing a summons to further
its investigation of a U.S. taxpayer when a Justice Department referral
for possible criminal prosecution is in effect. Additionally, Stuart argued
that Revenue Canada's investigation of him was "a criminal investigation,
preliminary stage." He contended that U.S. law forbade the use of a sum-
mons to obtain information for Canadian authorities regarding respon-
dent's U.S. bank accounts.
The District Court denied the petition and ordered the bank to com-
ply with the summonses. In particular, the Magistrate found that, even if
the legal claims of the respondents were assumed to have merit, they had
failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the Canadian authori-
ties' investigation had progressed that far. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that, before the I.R.S. could fulfill a request for information
under the 1942 Canadian treaty, it had to determine that Revenue Ca-
nada was acting in good faith and that its investigation had not reached a
stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the I.R.S.' In this
regard, the Ninth Circuit stated that the burden of proof on this point
rests initially with the I.R.S. rather than the taxpayer attempting to
quash a summons. The Ninth Circuit then ruled that the affidavit sub-
mitted by the I.R.S. failed to state that such a determination had been
made with respect to Revenue Canada's investigation of Stuart. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the Ninth
Circuit's decision in this case and the Second Circuit's holding in United
States v. Manufactures & Traders Trust Co. 10 2
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion concluded that, although at the
time of the assistance by the I.R.S. no Justice Department referral was in
effect, the I.R.S. affidavits did satisfy the requirement of good faith of
United States v. Powell.'" In scrutinizing I.R.S., section 7602(c), the
Court concluded that Congress did not mean to make enforcement of a
treaty summons depend on the foreign tax investigation not having
reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral. Justice Bren-
nan, the author of the opinion, concluded that the purpose behind Arti-
cles XIX and XXI of the 1942 treaty, the reduction of tax evasion by
permitting signatories to demand information from each other, shows
that such provisions should not limit inquiry in the manner Stuart wants.
Justice Brennan's opinion also held that section 7602 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code is directed at investigations of possible violations of U.S. reve-
101. United States v. Stuart, 813 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. United States v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 703 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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nue laws, prohibiting the issuance of a summons "if a Justice Department
referral is in effect." Since the summons in the Stuart case was not di-
rected at the U.S., but rather at Canadian revenue laws, section 7602(c)
does not bar the enforcement of the summonses at issue.
Before the Brennan opinion examined whether the 1942 Convention,
in conjunction with section 7602(c), narrows the class of legitimate pur-
poses for which the I.R.S. may issue an administrative summons, it found
that the affidavits submitted by the I.R.S. in the respondents' cases satis-
fied the requirements of good faith set forth in the Powell case. In this
connection, the I.R.S. Director of Foreign Operations stated under oath
that the information sought was not within the possession of U.S. or Ca-
nadian tax authorities, that it might be relevant to the computation of
respondents' Canadian tax liabilities, and that the same type of informa-
tion could be obtained by Canadian authorities under Canadian law.
Brennan's opinion first examined the legislative history of section
7602(c) and found that the restriction for issuing a summons if a Justice
Department referral is in effect with respect to a person about whom in-
formation is sought by means of the summons was intended uniquely to
protect persons who might be subject to grand jury investigation. Con-
gress, according to the Brennan opinion, did not intend to make the en-
forcement of a treaty summons contingent on the foreign tax investiga-
tion's not having reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department
referral. Additionally, the Court examined the text of the 1942 treaty and
its legislative history. In particular, Articles XIX and XXI of the treaty
oblige the U.S. competent authority to furnish, on request, relevant infor-
mation that it is "in a position to obtain under its revenue laws." Respon-
dents unsuccessfully argued that, since the I.R.S. would not be able,
under American law, to issue an administrative summons to gather infor-
mation for use by the Government once a Justice Department referral
was in effect, the I.R.S. is not in a position to obtain such information
once the Canadian authorities have reached a corresponding stage in their
investigation. The Court looked without help for interpretative aids in
the legislative history. The Court was somewhat persuaded that the U.S.
Government's regular compliance with requests for information by Cana-
dian authorities had not inquired whether they intended to use the infor-
mation for criminal prosecution. The Brennan opinion seemed to hang its
hat on the absence of a procedure comparable to the U.S. grand jury sys-
tem in Canada and even the difficulty of discerning precisely in any coun-
try whether their system has the equivalent of a Justice Department
referral.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia found the convention com-
pletely in disposition of the issue and demonstrating that the U.S. Gov-
ernment's position was proper.
The opinion seems a proper interpretation of the statute and treaty.
To change the result will require explicit wording in a tax treaty or new
legislation. Neither are likely. However, signatory parties to conventions
and memoranda of understanding are more carefully reviewing the do-
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mestic legislation of the treaty partner and determining how the conven-
tion or memorandum of understanding would interact with the domestic
law. In some cases, a negotiating team will request an opinion from the
other team on the probable interpretation of gray areas.
Interestingly, the cases litigating the letters rogatory provisions in
the U.S. have also focused on the stage at which the foreign proceeding
should be before the requesting state is capable of petitioning for assis-
tance under the letters rogatory. The letters rogatory cases also address
the issues of whether the U.S. Government or even the requesting state
must demonstrate that the investigations have matured to such a level
that they merit assistance from the U.S.10 4 More than likely, appellate
courts and even the U.S. Supreme Court may have to make some pro-
nouncements on the letters rogatory statute. In the meantime, this deci-
sion represents an important victory for the U.S.
D. Use of Letters Rogatory in the U.S. When Foreign Investigations
Are at a Preliminary, Non-Adjudicatory Stage
In a case decided in July, 1988, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has upheld the subpoena by the U.S. Government for the bank
records of a depositor in a U.S. bank based on a letters rogatory request
even though the investigation abroad was preliminary and without any
adjudicatory procedures." 5 The decision is significant because it would
allow the U.S. Government to fulfill requests without requiring any stan-
dards of due process abroad and apparently would provide for better pre-
trial discovery for foreign governments than for U.S. law enforcement
agencies in the U.S. 06 The decision conflicts with the holdings of the Sec-
ond Circuit.10 7 The Second Circuit cases hold that letters rogatory only
apply to a tribunal that has adjudicatory powers and not to pre-indict-
ment investigations. The latter are not deemed a "proceeding" within the
meaning of the letters rogatory provisions. The better policy would seem
to ensure due process abroad. Additionally, financial privacy in the U.S.
should be safeguarded to meet the normal expectations of foreign
104. See, e.g., In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad
and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. ., 102 L.Ed.2d 776,
109 S.Ct. 784 (1989); Zagaris and Razdan, Florida Bankers are Concerned About Judicial
Assistance to Law Enforcement Officials in the Absence of a Treaty and a Court Request, 4
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 366 (1988).
105. Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 104.
106. See the discussion in Zagaris and Razdan, supra note 103. One court has already
held that foreign governments are in some instances entitled to more discovery than U.S.
persons, including the U.S. Government, since they are exempt from the Right to Financial
Privacy Act when applying for letters rogatory. See Zagaris, Court of Appeals Upholds Ex-
emption of Letters Rogatory from Financial Privacy Act, 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. RR.
288 (1989).
107. See Fonesca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980)(per curiam) (Superinten-
dent of Exchange Control of Colombia); In Re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of





E. U.S. Circuit Court Considers Letters Rogatory From Scotland Yard
The absence of a well developed network of MLATs has put pressure
on the use of letters rogatory when both the U.S. and other countries
want to cooperate in the prosecution of drug or financial crimes. A poten-
tially precedential case concerning the use of letters rogatory is now
pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.0's It involves an appeal from an order of March 21, 1988, in which
U.S. District Judge John Garrett Penn denied motions of the D.C. coun-
sel for lawyer Thomas J. Ward to quash the appointment of Commission-
ers and the outstanding subpoenas or, alternatively, for a protective order
limiting the disclosure and use of the information requested by Scotland
Yard. The appeal appears to raise the issue of whether the letters roga-
tory statute can be used to provide assistance to foreign policy investiga-
tions prior to the initiation of proceedings, and whether non-tribunals can
obtain assistance under the statute.
1. Proceedings in the District Court
The case began on September 30, 1987, when F.J. Coford, a Crown
Prosecutor from the British Crown Prosecution Service, sent a letter re-
questing assistance in the transmission of certain information. The letter
described a police investigation that was then being conducted in London
concerning allegations of stock manipulation during a British takeover by
Guinness of the distillers company and involving an American citizen,
Thomas J. Ward, an attorney in the District of Columbia. The letter ex-
plained that the inquiry was still in the stage of a police investigation and
the only criminal proceeding that then existed concerned Ernest Saun-
ders, the former Chief Executive of Guinness, who was charged with ob-
struction for allegedly destroying documents relevant to the criminal
stock manipulation investigation. The letter of request explained that
they needed interviews of, and documents from, specified U.S. residents
employed by businesses and law firms in D.C. The letter requested that a
police officer from Scotland Yard be allowed to attend and participate
when the requested inquiries were made. On January 21, 1988, pursuant
to an ex parte request from the Assistant Harris, Associate Director, Of-
fice of International Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, as Commissioners of the Court, Judge Penn issued such an order.
Thereafter, the Commissioners issued subpoenas and Mr. Ward, through
his attorneys, moved to quash.
At the district court level, the issues were: (1) whether section 1782
allowed a U.S. District Court to compel U.S. citizens privately to provide
testimony and documents to foreign police for use in a foreign criminal
108. This section is a reprint of the article by Zagaris & Gardner, U.S. Circuit Court
Considers Letters Rogatory from Scotland Yard, 5 INT'L ENFORc EMENT L. REP. 12 (1989).
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investigation; and (2) even if testimony could be compelled (in a private
interrogation in the U.S. Attorney's office) to assist a foreign criminal in-
vestigation, whether the district court should limit the use and disclosure
of that information to prevent the abuse of section 1782, as well as the
statutes controlling the manner in which U.S. and foreign authorities,
agencies and civil litigants properly may gather information. On March
21, 1988, the District Court denied Mr. Ward's motion. '0 9
Subsequently, Mr. Ward contacted the Commissioners to request the
right to attend and participate in depositions scheduled to obtain the re-
quested information. After the Commissioners refused, Mr. Ward again
petitioned the District Court, seeking to participate in the depositions.
The Court denied his request.
2. Appellate Brief
On appeal the Ward brief, written by David D. Aufhauser the lead
attorney for Williams & Connolly, framed the issue as whether 28 U.S.C.
section 1782 authorizes a U.S. court to compel U.S. citizens to be interro-
gated privately by foreign police who are conducting a criminal investiga-
tion of a U.S. subject, in the absence of any proceeding against the sub-
ject in a foreign tribunal. The appellate brief focused on the fact that the
plain meaning and legislative history of letters rogatory under section
1782 is limited to allowing U.S. court-ordered assistance to foreign litiga-
tion. The appellate brief underscored the lack of any authority in the
statute for assisting foreign police conducting a foreign criminal investiga-
tion in the United States. It noted that four of the five opinions on this
issue have so held and argued that the fifth decision granted judicial as-
sistance based on factual findings not present here.
The appellate brief framed the second and final issue as whether 28
U.S.C. section 1782 authorizes a court to compel U.S. citizens to give tes-
timony to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, acting without a properly convened
grand jury, where such testimony may be used:
(a) In a U.S. prosecution;
(b) by U.S. agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission, act-
ing without a properly instituted enforcement action; and
(c) by civil litigants in U.S. courts, acting in disregard of discovery
procedures provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellate brief, in answering the second issue, contended that
even using the elimination in the 1964 amendment to the letters rogatory
statute (section 1782), such a revision would at most have permitted the
Court to provide for assistance to certain specified litigants who seek to
take discovery to preserve evidence prior to filing their complaint. Such a
109. For the District Court opinion, see In Re Letter of Request from the Crown Prose-
cution Service of the United Kingdom, 683 F.Supp. 841 (D.D.C. 1988).
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procedure would be analogous to what is permitted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 27(a). In this connection, the appellate brief argued that
error occurred when the District Court denied Mr. Ward's request for a
protective order limiting the use and disclosure of the information to be
gathered by the Commissioners. The brief noted that without such an
order the information could be shared with U.S. prosecutors, the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, the British regulatory agencies, and
Guinness, a civil litigant in a suit against Mr. Ward, in violation of sec-
tion 1782 and other applicable laws.110
3. Appellee Brief
The appellee brief framed the first issue as whether the district court
correctly ruled that assistance to foreign governments pursuant to section
1782 can occur in support of both "pending" and "not yet pending" pro-
ceedings against Ward and Ernest Saunders, against whom proceedings
already existed at the time of the letters rogatory. The brief relies for its
authority on the recent Azar case, known formally as In Re Request for
Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago."'
The appellee brief noted that none of the four decisions cited by the
Ward brief addresses the issue of distinguishability on grounds expressly
and succinctly stated by the District Court. They deal with the question
of who or what constitutes a "tribunal." Prosecution Services was never
claimed to be a tribunal (the issue in the other four cases) but only "an
interested person" under section 1782(a). Essentially, the U.S. Govern-
ment argues that a "pending" proceeding in a foreign country is not nec-
essary to invoke section 1782, but only the contemplation of a proceeding
in a foreign country.
The appellee brief provided three additional alternative grounds for
affirming the decision. The brief explained that, although there were, and
still are, no proceedings pending against Ward, such proceedings were
pending against Saunders when the letters rogatory were issued. Sec-
ondly, the brief argued that Ward does not have standing to intervene
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 because he does not have a protectable "inter-
est" since he is not the subject of a subpoena, and his only goal is to
monitor or derail an investigation. Finally, responding to the lack of limi-
tations over the Commissioners' powers and the potential for the infor-
mation obtained in the investigation to be transmitted to other investiga-
tors, the appellee brief argued that section 1782 is a flexible, open-
textured statute, and its principal safeguard against abuses is the admin-
110. For a discussion of civil actions involving Ward, see Pelham, Ward Keeps U.K.
Inquiry at Bay, Legal Times, Dec. 5, 1988, at 7.
111. 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986), 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), petition for cert.
filed, (No. 88-559). For a discussion of the Azar case, see Zagaris & Razdan, Florida Bankers
Are Concerned about Judicial Assistance to Law Enforcement Officials in the Absence of a
Treaty and a Court Request, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 366 (1988); Smith, International
Decisions, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 816 (1988).
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istration of that flexibility, under the statutory scheme, by U.S. District
Judges.
4. Reply Brief
In the Reply Brief, attorneys for Mr. Ward charge the U.S. Govern-
ment has tried to rewrite and reinterpret the record below by claiming for
the first time that a British proceeding, and not simply a criminal investi-
gation, was either pending or imminent, and also that Mr. Ward lacked
standing. The Reply Brief argued that, because it agreed to the relevant
facts at the district court level, the United States must abide by the rec-
ord it helped create. The Reply Brief then cites the letter of request for
its argument that everyone below recognized and agreed that the letter of
request sought assistance in the conduct of a criminal investigation only
and not for use in British litigation or any other form of adversarial pro-
ceeding. The Reply Brief contended that the letter rogatory was directed
at Ward only and that the charges against Mr. Saunders were unrelated
to the assistance sought by Scotland Yard.
5. Oral Argument and Order for Supplemental Briefing
At the oral argument, the panel seemed confused by the disparate
facts presented by the parties. As a result the panel issued an order re-
quiring the Government to brief the following. Specifically, the court or-
dered the filing of a supplemental brief for the United States addressing
these questions:
(a) What inquiry does the United States (Department of State and/or
Department of Justice) make prior to forwarding to the district court
a request (letter rogatory or application) for assistance in a criminal
matter under 28 U.S.C. section 1782?
(b) Does the U.S. Attorney's presentation to the district court of a
request in a criminal matter under 28 U.S.C. section 1782 indicate
that the United States is satisfied that the prerequisites to assistance
under section 1782 are met?
(c) Define the individuals or authorities who, under 28 U.S.C. section
1782, qualify to present as an "interested person" requests for assis-
tance on criminal matters.
(d) In criminal matters, what qualifies as "a proceeding... in a tribu-
nal" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1782? If no proceeding is
pending at the time of a request for assistance, what indication must
there be that a proceeding will commence? (Include reference to the
time period, if any, within which the "proceeding . . . in a tribunal"
must be anticipated to commence.)
(e) In a criminal matter for which assistance is properly requested
under 28 U.S.C. section 1782, what authority does the district court
have to set terms and conditions under which (1) the proof (testi-
mony, statement, documentary production) will be taken; and (2) the




The Government filed a brief answering the questions and Mr.
Ward's attorneys had until February 9 to respond.
In the wake of the decision of the 11th Circuit in the Azar case, an
affirmance by the D.C. Circuit Court could have an effect on the persons
to whom assistance can be provided and the timing when such assistance
can be provided. Many important issues exist. The Subcommittee and
Committee on White Collar Crime should continue to monitor this and
the Azar case. Although the Subcommittee considered the potential of
recommending the filing of an amicus brief, it unanimously was decided
that the facts do not permit the proper ventilation of the issues. In par-
ticular, the existence of a case against Saunders at the inception of the
request precludes the court from conclusively determining such issues
and is likely to result in an affirmance of Judge Penn's decision.
F. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Rejects Specialty Doctrine in Ap-
plying Swiss Court's Extradition Order Enjoining Prosecution for Fiscal
Offenses
U.S. courts will increasingly adjudicate requests to extradite or give
judicial assistance for financial crimes such as money laundering, racke-
teering, and tax crimes based on illegal narcotics transactions. One of the
issues is whether the offenses, many of which are new, violate the spe-
cialty doctrine in the applicable agreements. This issue was recently de-
cided by a U.S. Court of Appeals. On February 5, 1989, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a two to one decision, affirmed
the conviction on various drug related charges, holding, inter alia, that
the prosecution did not violate the doctrine of specialty. The defendant
and appellant Oscar Fernando Cuevas, alias Gomez, received from the
U.S. sizable amounts of narcotics revenues at a Switzerland address.11 2
Currency Monetary Instruments Reports (CMIRs) had not been filed as
required. Ernesto Zawadski coordinated the collection of narcotics reve-
nues in the U.S. He recorded the transactions in a ledger and dissemi-
nated the narcotics revenues to cash couriers Guzman, Onate, and
Lozano, for transport to Cuevas. Zawadski's letter reflected that he had
dispatched cash couriers to London regularly for contact with Cuevas who
then "laundered" the American bills at London banks. Courier Spiteri
testified that he delivered without CMIR's $400,000 in cash to Cuevas.
Zawadski and Guzman were then arrested. The cash they carried was
tainted with the scent of cocaine. No CMIR was filed. Cuevas denied hav-
ing knowledge of Zawadski or Guzman or knowing of the criminal charges
pending against them. Cuevas was then arrested in Zurich. The Swiss
court issued an extradition order for him identifying the alleged narcotics
112. This section is a reprint of the article by Zagaris, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Rejects Specialty Doctrine in Applying Swiss Court's Extradition Order Enjoining Prose-
cuting for Fiscal Offenses, 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 58 (1989).
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
violations and currency transaction relating thereto as the basis for the
extradition. The order also contained an "injunction" advising U.S. au-
thorities not to prosecute Cuevas for "the fiscal aspect of the factual cir-
cumstances of the indictment." "Fiscal aspect" was not defined in the
order and Cuevas was subsequently convicted.
The doctrine of specialty prohibits the requesting country from pros-
ecuting the extradited individual for any offense other than that for
which the requested state agreed to extradite.1 3 The order states that
Cuevas is to be extradited on the fifteen-count indictment, including cur-
rency violations. The order has appended an injunction prohibiting prose-
cution or punishment concerning the fiscal aspect of the indictment.
In affirming, the appellate court's opinion explained that the Swiss
Government does not oppose prosecution to the full extent of the fifteen
count indictment. The court found that prosecution for the money hauls
or currency transactions derived from narcotics should not by themselves
lead to the payment of taxes, fees or any fiscal penalties. Similarly, the
court found that taxes, fees or fiscal penalties relating to the money hauls
should not be imposed surreptitiously through narcotics conspiracy pen-
alties. The opinion held that, since the appropriate test is whether the
extraditing country would consider the acts for which the defendant was
prosecuted as independent from those for which he was extradited, and
since the Swiss court consistently characterizes the narcotics and cur-
rency reporting conspiracies as integrally related, 14 the prosecutor did
not violate the doctrine of specialty. In this connection, the court ex-
plained that, despite a substantial overlap in the proof offered to estab-
lish the crimes, two offenses are not the same offense for double jeopardy
purposes if each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not. The court also explained the Swiss extradition order ac-
knowledged that counts 2 through 15 involved "transporting proceeds
from drug dealings without a permit" suggesting that the Swiss court
never intended to sever the currency violation counts from the narcotics
conspiracy count.
An interesting aspect of the case is that Cuevas was allowed to raise
the doctrine of specialty. Since the requested state benefits from the doc-
trine and has the right to claim its enforcement, some courts in the U.S.
113. For background of the doctrine of specialty in U.S. extradition law, see BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. VII, § 6-1 (1983). For a
discussion of the principal generally in international law, see SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 146 (1971). For the principle of specialty in the Council of Europe's extra-
dition treaty, see The European Force April 18, 1960, reprinted in MULLER-RAPPARD & BAS-
SIOUNI, EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ch. 2 (1987). For a
discussion of the principle in European extradition law, see European Committee on Crime
Problems, LEGAL ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 20 (1970).
114. For the test of whether the extraditing country would consider the counts for
which the defendant was prosecuted as independent from those for which he was extradited
as the appropriate test of the doctrine of specialty, see United States v. Paroutian, 299 F. 2d
486, 491 (2d Cir. 1962).
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have found that the absence of protests or objections by the requested
(surrendering) state will deprive the relator of the benefit of the doc-
trine.1 5 The modern and sensible view is to allow the relator to raise the
doctrine."1 8
Another secondary issue was whether sufficient evidence was intro-
duced to support the jury's finding that Cuevas knew that the vast quan-
tities of small bills, which he regularly deposited at British banks, derived
from the narcotics conspiracy. Here, the court found ample evidence to
support the inference of knowledge: Cuevas was integrally involved in and
familiar with Zawadski's activities; Cuevas repeatedly gave false informa-
tion concerning his own activities to bank officials, to couriers and to law
enforcement officers on matters which showed he knew the nature of the
illegality in which he was the pivotal international participant; Cuevas
adopted a false name; and Cuevas gave the bank officials false informa-
tion concerning the source of the small bills he deposited saying they
were derived from "family coffee" and "sugar" businesses.
Another procedural battle over which a strong dissenting opinion was
filed concerned the decision of the lower court not to permit an expert
witness to testify. In particular, Cuevas sought to have the testimony of
Professor Gerald Nickelsburg, who has expertise in the currency controls
of South American countries and the international transactions necessi-
tated by those controls. The trial court concluded that the proffered testi-
mony was irrelevant because the case involved only money transaction in
the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, and that there
was no evidence of any money transactions originating in any of the
South American countries. A key factor in affirming the trial court on this
issue was the standard that an appellate court does not disturb the deci-
sion not to permit an expert witness to testify unless it is manifestly
erroneous. 
1 7
The majority found that the witness admitted possessing no knowl-
edge of currency laws or transactions involving London, Zurich and the
United States, no knowledge on "money laundering," and no knowledge
of Cuevas or of Cuevas' activities. According to the majority opinion, the
witness was proffered to testify only on currency exchange law in Colom-
bia. The trial judge found this proposed testimony not relevant and also
potentially confusing.
The dissent found that the proffered testimony would have been ma-
115. For a discussion of the requirement that the surrendering state object to prosecu-
tion for an offense not thought to be included in the extradition order, see Ficconi and Kella
v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
884 (1973); U.S. ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935).
116. For a discussion of the principle that the relator should be able to raise and bene-
fit from the doctrine of specialty, see Bassiouni, supra note 1, at ch. VII, § 6-7. See also
Bassiouni, International Extradition in the American Practice and World Public Order, 36
TENN. L. REV. 1 (1968).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986).
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terial to Cuevas' defense that he was engaged in a legitimate currency
exchange service for Colombian businesses and that the laundered funds
had a non-narcotics origin. The dissent pointed out that, contrary to the
characterization of the facts as limited to money transactions in the U.S.,
U.K. and Switzerland, at least one witness, Patricia Villa, testified on cur-
rency transactions that originated in Colombia. The dissent explained
that the location of the transaction was not the only fact in the case.
Proof that the money was derived from drug sales and that the defendant
knew of that fact were also relevant to at least four counts in the indict-
ment if not to all counts. The dissent disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that the proffered expert witness could not have explained the
necessity for transporting U.S. dollars to Europe. The dissent stated that
Mr. Nickelsburg could have provided a legitimate and non-criminal ex-
planation for Cuevas' currency exchange activities. By excluding Nickels-
burg's testimony, the dissent takes the position that the District Court
deprived Cuevas of his fundamental right to defend against the offense
alleged in his indictment. There was an appeal issue on the use of hearsay
evidence in the testimony of the U.S. Government's witness. Increasingly,
money laundering and currency violations cases involve a series of expert
witnesses who explain the mode and reasons for international currency
transactions.
V. CONCLUSION
In reviewing recent developments in international narcotics policy,
one can see mixed results. Overall, the policy does not seem to be working
since more drugs are being sold, more people are becoming addicted, re-
sulting in violent crime and misery throughout our own and many other
countries. Indeed, so powerful have the traffickers become that the
United Nations Crime Prevention Branch has reported recently that a
new breed of organized criminal has arisen. However, the concluding of
the U.N. Drug Convention represents one bright spot. In the bilateral
agreement area, the U.S. must become more active in international orga-
nizations and using diplomacy to achieve its purposes. For instance, the
initiatives by the U.S. in the Economic Summit in Toronto and in the last
General Assembly of Interpol to put cooperation in money laundering as
a priority has had positive effects. However, imposing sanctions and
threatening governments for noncooperation is a dangerous gambit be-
cause the U.S. itself by its own admissions recently has accommodated
persons accused of participating in high-level narcotics and money laun-
dering transactions, such as General Noriega. The U.S. would be better
off to work through international fora against governments and govern-
ment leaders that are active in drug trafficking or that fail to cooperate.
To be successful, diplomacy must have legitimacy. To establish legitimacy
often requires time and forceful marshalling of evidence and arguments.
To short cut the process and try to impose realpolitik may be counter-
productive. Treaties and international assistance remain areas in which
developments in enforcement have the most potential because no large
VOL. 18:3
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
country other than the U.S. has so few treaties and yet so much rhetoric
about international cooperation.
In legislation the moves to facilitate the use of foreign evidence in
trials is positive. The effort to buttress asset forfeiture has been effective
against some organized traffickers. The U.S. must be careful not to erode
too drastically the rights of innocent third parties. The erosion of civil
liberties in criminal defense cases seems a foregone conclusion when the
system is breaking down due to overload. Unless a way is found to relieve
the system, legislation will probably continue to erode civil liberties. Ex-
cept for decriminalization, no proposals exist for relieving the court and
criminal justice system of its overload. In fact, the political trend is in the
opposite direction - the imposition of more criminal and civil sanctions.
Another legislative problem is that Congress is increasingly providing
overlapping and burdensome provisions on financial institutions, profes-
sionals, and other persons by frequently amending both law and regula-
tions provisions in the Bank Secrecy Act (Title 31), the Anti-Money
Laundering Act (Title 18), and the section 60501 currency transaction re-
porting requirements in the tax code (Title 26). Many experts believe
that the fury of legislative activity has eclipsed the ability of regulators in
the executive, legislative and judicial branches and of the private sector
to understand and properly implement the legislation. Because the politi-
cal dynamics require action, regulators are wont to continue pressing for-
ward. The time has come for an agency independent of the agencies im-
plementing these laws (i.e., the General Accounting Office) to determine
whether Title 31 remains an effective tool against money-laundering or
whether the U.S. has enough with 18 U.S.C. sections 1956 and 1957. At
issue is whether the U.S. Government is effectively using its resources,
since a backlog of between seven to eight months exists before CTRs are
reviewed. A backlog exists from the time that CTRs are reviewed and
when they are reviewed to other agencies. Rather than enacting new legis-
lation and requirements against money laundering, it may be more effec-
tive for law enforcement agencies to consolidate and fine tune the existing
tools.
In 1989 and thereafter, some of the best enforcement work and big-
gest cases will come from the many projects that have been brewing in
the interagency task forces. In this connection, some of the offshore juris-
dictions traditionally known for their secrecy will be bad places to invest,
since they have been, and will continue to be, targets for investigation.
In the next few years the interaction of legislation, treaties, cases,
administrative regulations and activities of international organizations
provide a rich source of opportunities and challenges for law and criminal
justice professionals. Much more research and resources should go to-
wards to interaction of international organizations involved in narcotics
enforcement. Some global interactions are begun and sustained primarily
by governments of nation states. Other interactions, such as narcotics and
money laundering transactions, involve nongovernmental, governmental
and inter-governmental actors. One of the pre-requisites for prosecuting
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successfully a campaign against international narcotics traffickers is to
view the law enforcement community as an actor in a world politics para-
digm and contrast it with the state-centric paradigm. " 8 More research
and planning must be done to chart the role and growth of various inter-
national organizations, so that they can become effective players against
narcotics traffickers. 1 9 Unless world leaders and concerned citizens begin
to view the law enforcement community as an actor in a world politics
paradigm and plan for its sustenance and growth, the world will have dif-
ficulty in winning the ongoing battle with organized narcotics traffickers
and their associates.
118. See, e.g., R.O. KEOHANE & J.O. NvE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE 3 (1977). The au-
thors explain that many scholars see the territorial state being eclipsed by international
actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements and international
organizations. See also Keohane & Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics: An
Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS xii (R.O. Keohane & J.O.
Nye eds. 1981).
119. For additional discussion of the role of the world paradigm on a regional level, see
Zagaris & Papavizas, Using The Organization of American States to Control International
Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REv. INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 119 (1986).
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Internationalizing The War on Drugs: The
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances
DAVID P. STEWART*
The recent adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances' marks a signifi-
cant step by the world community towards bringing effective law enforce-
ment measures to bear against international narcotics traffickers. Illicit
trafficking in natural and man-made substances has grown exponentially
over the past two decades to the point where no nation or culture is im-
mune to the ravages of rampant drug abuse. Existing domestic laws in
many countries, and the international enforcement regime established
under prior multilateral treaty arrangements, have proven unequal to the
task of controlling, much less suppressing, this vicious trade. Awakened
to the need for concerted and more effective action to harness the traf-
fickers, the international community began work in 1984, under UN aus-
pices, on a new multilateral treaty that would establish a comprehensive
set of laws and guidelines to be adopted and applied by all party states in
combatting illicit trafficking.
Adopted by consensus at an international conference of 106 states in
Vienna in December 1988, the Illicit Trafficking Convention is intended
to establish a new international legal regime for combatting international
drug trafficking. Explicitly recognizing in the preamble that illicit traffick-
ing is "an international criminal activity,"2 it requires that each signatory
state establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law a comprehen-
* Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. Mr. Stewart was a member of the
U.S. Delegation to the International Conference at which the Convention was adopted. The
views expressed, however, are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
position of the Department of State or the U.S. Government.
1. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, UN Doc. E/CONF.82/15 and rev. 1, adopted by consensus Dec. 19, 1988;
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter Convention]. For background, see A REPORT
ON THE STATUS OF THE DRAFT, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND ISSUES FOR THE SENATE,
S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also SENATE EXEC. RPT. 101-15, REPORT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (1989) (reporting favorably with the understandings).
The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on Nov. 22, 1989; the U.S. instrument
of ratification was deposited with the U.N. on Feb. 20, 1990.
2. Convention, supra note 1, preamble, 4. The term "illicit traffic" is defined in art.
1(m) to mean "the offences set forth in article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2," that is, the specific
offenses required by the Convention to be made illegal under the domestic law of party
states.
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sive list of activities involved in or related to international drug traffick-
ing. It obligates party states to cooperate in taking broad measures to
suppress illicit trafficking across national boundaries and, within their
own jurisdictions, to enact and enforce specific domestic laws aimed at
suppressing the drug trade. These laws include those related to money
laundering, confiscation of assets, extradition, mutual legal assistance and
trade in chemicals, materials and equipment used in the manufacture of
controlled substances. The Convention is one of the most detailed and
far-reaching instruments ever adopted in the field of international crimi-
nal law, and if widely adopted and effectively implemented, will be a ma-
jor force in harmonizing national laws and enforcement actions around
the world.
This article briefly reviews the most important provisions of the Il-
licit Trafficking Convention, from the perspective of U.S. as well as inter-
national law. As the largest importer and consumer of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances in the world, the United States has had substan-
tial experience in developing effective law enforcement tools against in-
ternational traffickers.' The U.S. participated actively in the negotiation
of the Convention, and many of its provisions reflect legal approaches and
devices already found in U.S. law. At the same time, for many other coun-
tries lacking the modern legal tools for effective counter-narcotics en-
forcement, the Convention broke new ground; achieving consensus among
states with widely varied domestic systems of criminal law was a substan-
tial achievement requiring innovation and a certain degree of
compromise.
BACKGROUND
International efforts to control the trafficking of drugs began in 1909,
when thirteen states met in Shanghai in an attempt to regulate what was
then the major narcotics problem, opium. Their efforts led to the signing
of the International Opium Convention at The Hague in 1912." Subse-
quently, under the auspices first of the League of Nations and then of the
United Nations, a series of multilateral conventions was developed in or-
der to supervise and regulate the production, control and shipment of
narcotic drugs for licit (i.e., medical and scientific) purposes. 5 These con-
3. Ninety-five percent of the illicit narcotics consumed in the U.S. originates overseas.
Foreign sources account for all of the cocaine and heroin and most of the U.S.-consumed
marijuana. It is estimated that U.S. consumers use 65% of the world's supply of illegal
narcotics.
4. Convention of Jan. 23, 1912 relating to the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and
Other Drugs, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No. 612, 1 Bevans 855, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
5. See Second International Opium Convention, done at Geneva Feb. 19, 1925, 81
L.N.T.S. 317; Convention of July 13, 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863, 3 Bevans 1, 139 L.N.T.S. 301;
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, done at Geneva
June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299; Protocol of Dec. 11, 1946, done at New York, 61 Stat. 2230,
T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 4 Bevans 267, 12 U.N.T.S. 179; Amendments to 1931 Convention, Mar.
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ventions created a complex and to some degree overlapping system of reg-
ulation as well as international oversight bodies to monitor and enforce
their provisions. As a result, efforts were undertaken in the United Na-
tions to simplify and unify international narcotics regulation.
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs6 consolidated the ear-
lier international instruments into a simpler, more streamlined regime.
Not only were the most important substantive provisions of the earlier
treaties integrated into a single treaty, but the various oversight mecha-
nisms were merged into a unified body, the International Narcotics Con-
trol Board. The Single Convention extended international control to in-
clude the cultivation of plants grown as the raw material of natural
narcotic drugs, putting cannabis plant and coca bush under the same in-
ternational control system as applied to opium. Subject to certain grace
periods, it prohibited the practices of opium smoking, opium eating, coca
leaf chewing, hashish smoking and the use of the cannabis plant for any
non-medical purposes.
In 1972, the Single Convention was amended by a protocol, 7 which
strengthened its provisions related to preventing the illicit production of,
traffic in, and use of narcotics. It also highlighted the need to provide
treatment and rehabilitation services to drug abusers by stressing that
treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration
should be considered as alternatives to, or in addition to, imprisonment
for abusers who commit drug offenses.
International control was extended beyond narcotic drugs to man-
made hallucinogens, stimulants and sedatives by the 1971 Psychotropic
Substances Convention.8 Based largely on the control system of the 1961
Single Convention, the Psychotropic Substances Convention differenti-
ates between those substances which are completely prohibited except for
limited scientific and medical purposes, and those whose manufacture,
distribution, trade and use is merely curtailed.' The World Health Organ-
ization is designated to recommend to the Commission on Narcotic
30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1796, T.I.A.S. No. 1895; Protocol Bringing Under International Control
Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of July 13, 1931, done at Paris, Nov. 19, 1948,
44 U.N.T.S. 277; Protocol Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, done at New York,
June 23, 1953, 456 .U.N.T.S. 3.
6. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done at New York, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter Single Convention].
7. Protocol Amending the Single Convention, done at Geneva, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T.
1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 3.
8. Psychotropic Substances Convention, done at Vienna, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543,
T.I.A.S. No. 9725, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175. For U.S. implementation, see Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 101, 92 Stat. 3768 (1978) (codified at scattered
sections of Titles 21 and 42); Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 810-966
(Supp. 1989)).
9. See Schedules I-IV of Psychotropic Substances Convention, supra note 8.
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Drugs, based on scientific and epidemilogical data, whether new sub-
stances should be controlled and to what degree.
Together, these two conventions regulate the legal production and
distribution of controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes
and make illegal all other production. They also provide the international
basis for domestic legislation such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention Act of 1970.10 Although they contain limited provisions relating
to the prosecution and punishment of drug users and traffickers, the two
Conventions are primarily regulatory in nature and do not provide a basis
for comprehensive national action aimed at curtailing and punishing dis-
tibution and use. In the following decade, as the power of the drug cartels
became more pervasive and their methods increasingly sophisticated, the
need for new and more stringent international measures became clear.
Within the United Nations, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs" became
the focus of efforts to formulate and adopt a more comprehensive, long-
range approach to the drug problem at the international level.
Such a "master plan" emerged in 1981 with the adoption of the In-
ternational Drug Abuse Control Strategy. This plan contained proposals
for increased international cooperation to combat both drug abuse and
trafficking through (1) improvement of drug control systems, (2) balanc-
ing legitimate drug supply and demand, (3) eradicating illicit drug supply,
(4) reducing illicit traffic, (5) reducing illicit demand, and (6) provisions
for treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug abusers.' 2 In
the context of this comprehensive approach, it was recognized that, while
the Single and Psychotropic Substances Conventions continued to pro-
vide an adequate basis for regulating the licit production and distribution
of controlled substances, they lacked the effective mechanisms for con-
taining and suppressing the massive volume of illicit trafficking across na-
tional boundaries. There was general agreement on the need to supple-
ment and reinforce those Conventions through the adoption of up-to-date
law enforcement techiniques through national legislation.
Accordingly, in 1984 the United Nations General Assembly unani-
mously adopted a resolution"3 asking the UN Economic and Social Coun-
cil to request the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate prepara-
tion of a draft convention to complement the 1961 Single and 1971
Psychotropic Substances Conventions. Work on the draft began at the
Commission's thirty-first session in February, 1985, with the adoption of
10. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, supra note 8.
11. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, one of the six functional commissions of the
Economic and Social Council, serves as the central policy-making body within the UN sys-
tem on questions of drug abuse control. Consisting of expert representatives of the 40 Mem-
ber States, the Commission has various oversight functions including those under the 1961
and 1971 Conventions and decides, under the recommendation of the World Health Organi-
zation, which substances should be placed under international control.
12. 1981 International Drug Abuse Control Strategy.
13. U.N. GAOR No. 39/41 (1984).
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a resolution containing fourteen fundamental points for inclusion in the
new convention. A first draft was circulated for governmental comment in
June 1986, and a revision was considered in detail by intergovernmental
experts, meeting within the Commission's framework, during the summer
and fall of 1987.14 As further progress was made during 1988, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council decided to convene a plenipotentiary confer-
ence to complete the negotiations and adopt a final version of the
Convention.
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
As adopted, the Convention calls upon party states to take specific
law enforcement measures to improve their ability to identify, arrest,
prosecute and convict those who traffic in drugs across national bounda-
ries. Such measures include the establishment of drug-related criminal
offenses and sanctions under domestic law, making such offenses the basis
for international extradition between party states, and providing for mu-
tual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of covered of-
fenses, as well as the seizure and confiscation of proceeds from and in-
strumentalities used in illicit trafficking activities.
In addition, the Convention imposes new and more stringent controls
on the international trade of previously unmonitored chemicals, equip-
ment and other materials used in the clandestine manufacture of drugs,
and obliges party states to cooperate among themselves in suppressing
illicit traffic by sea or through the mails. Party states must take appropri-
ate measures to ensure that private means of transport operated by com-
mercial carriers are not used for illicit trafficking and must apply mea-
sures to suppress illicit trafficking in free trade zones and free ports that
are no less stringent than those applied in other parts of their territories.
Party states are also required to take effective action to prevent illicit
cultivation of plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, to
cooperate in eradicating illicitly cultivated crops, and to adopt measures
aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand.
Finally, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the UN Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board are empowered with administrative and
oversight responsibilities concerning the operation of the Convention and
14. A further call for the urgent completion of the draft Convention was among the
central conclusions of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking
which convened in Vienna in June, 1987. Convened under a mandate from the General As-
sembly (Res. 40/122 of December 13, 1985), the Conference was charged "to generate uni-
versal action to combat the drug problem in all its forms at the national, regional and inter-
national levels." Many of the specific "targets" adopted by the Conference as objectives for
the international community are in fact reflected in the Illicit Trafficking Convention. See
Declaration of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and Com-
prehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control, U.N. Doc.
ST/NAR/14, (1988).
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the responsibilities of the party states.'"
OFFENSES AND SANCTIONS
Article 3 of the Illicit Trafficking Convention requires that each party
state establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law a comprehen-
sive list of activities involved in or related to international drug traffick-
ing. These offenses largely track existing provisions of U.S. law, but are
currently not covered in the criminal law of many other nations; in the
latter, their adoption will extend and substantially strengthen criminal
regulation of international drug trafficking.
Specifically, the mandatory offenses covered by Article 3(1) of the
Convention include:
- the production, manufacture, distribution or sale of any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961
Single Convention or the 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention;
- the cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant con-
trary to those earlier Conventions;
- the possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance for the purpose of illicit trafficking;
- the manufacture, transport or distribution of materials, equipment
and substances for the purpose of illicit cultivation, production or
manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;
- the organization, management or financing of any of the foregoing
offenses.'
The last provision, which criminalizes the financing, organizing or
managing of any of the acts listed above, should be a significant tool in
reaching the highest levels of the trafficking organizations, or cartels."7 In
addition, the Convention specifically criminalizes drug-related money
laundering, including the conversion or transfer of property derived from
the offense, as well as the concealment or disguise of its true nature and
source.
1 s
Also under Article 3(1), party states are required, subject to their
constitutional principles and basic concepts of their legal systems, to es-
15. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs is one of the functional commissions set up
pursuant to art. 68 of the UN Charter. The International Narcotics Control Board was es-
tablished pursuant to U.N. ESCOR 1106 (XL) of Mar. 2, 1968, pursuant to Single Conven-
tion, supra note 6, art. 45(2).
16. Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(a). All of the offenses listed in this paragraph
are criminal offenses under Title 21 of the United States Code.
17. This paragraph would include such offenses under U.S. law as money laundering, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (Supp. 1989); racketeer influenced corrupt organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (Supp. 1989); and continuing criminal enterprises, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. 1989).
18. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(b). Much of the language was derived from
the United States statutes on money laundering, in particular 18 U.S.C. § 1956-1957 (Supp.
1989).
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tablish as criminal offenses:
- the acquisition, possession or use of property knowingly derived
from the above offenses;
- possession of equipment, materials and- substances knowingly used
or to be used in the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;
- publicly inciting or inducing others to commit the above-listed
offenses;
- related offenses of conspiracy, participation, aiding and abetting,
etc. 9
The obligation of a party state to establish this group of offenses is
made "subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its
legal system," because of the difficulties encountered by the negotiators
in formulating precise definitions acceptable to differing legal systems.
For example, in systems where prosecutorial discretion is limited or non-
existent, there was concern that innocent conduct not be covered inadver-
tently; concepts of "conspiracy" and "criminal association" differ signifi-
cantly from country to country; and for some, including the United
States, a literal reading of the provisions concerning incitement and in-
ducement could have created constitutional difficulties.
These "core" or "covered" offenses under Article 3(1) constitute the
cornerstone of the Convention, and are specifically focused on those drug
trafficking and money laundering activities which have the greatest inter-
national impact. Many of the other provisions in the Convention, for ex-
ample those relating to confiscation, extradition and mutual legal assis-
tance, are keyed to these particular offenses.
The Convention treats "personal use" offenses separately, requiring
party states to adopt such measures, subject to constitutional principles
and basic concepts of their legal systems, as may be necessary to
criminalize the intentional possession, purchase and cultivation of illicit
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for personal consumption
contrary to the 1961 Single Convention, as amended, or the 1971 Psycho-
tropic Substances Convention.2" This distinction was intended to differ-
entiate those offenses from the relatively more serious offenses defined in
paragraph 1 of Article 3, which are directly related to international traf-
ficking. This distinction thereby limits the obligations imposed upon
party states with respect to extradition and mutual legal assistance and
permits party states to fashion alternative remedies such as treatment
and rehabilitation, rather than incarceration, in appropriate cases.
Each party state is obliged to make these covered acts punishable by
sanctions which take into account the grave nature of the offenses, such
19. Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(c).
20. Id. art. 3(2).
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as imprisonment, fines and confiscation. 2' The Convention requires com-
petent authorities to take into account factual circumstances making the
commission of the offenses particularly serious, such as the involvement
of organized criminal groups, use of violence, victimization of minors, and
the fact that the offender holds public office.22
Importantly, the Convention provides that the covered offenses shall
not be considered "fiscal offenses," "political offenses" or "regarded as
politically motivated" for purposes of its confiscation, extradition and
mutual legal assistance provisions.23
JURISDICTION
For the most part, the offenses covered by the Convention are inter-
national offenses, involving acts which occur in, or have an effect on, more
than one state. To give effect to these offenses, each party state is re-
quired under Article 4 of the Convention to establish jurisdiction when
the offenses are committed in its territory or on board its vessels or air-
craft.2 A state may, but is not required to, establish jurisdiction over of-
fenses: (a) committed anywhere by its nationals or habitual residents; (b)
on board vessels outside its territorial sea which it is properly boarding
and searching; and (c) with respect to conspiratorial actions committed
outside its territory with a view to commission of a covered offense within
its territory.2" The Convention thus recognizes a number of conceptual
bases for the exercise of prosecutorial jurisdiction but does not assign a
priority in the case of overlapping or competing jurisdiction.
The Convention also requires the establishment of jurisdiction to
prosecute when the party state refuses to extradite an alleged offender on
the ground that the offense was committed in its territory or on board its
aircraft or vessel, or that the offender is its national. 26 Concomitantly,
when a party state does not extradite an alleged offender for those rea-
sons, it is obliged to submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, unless otherwise agreed with the party requesting
extradition.2" This is a somewhat more limited form of "general jurisdic-
tion" than found in other international criminal law treaties,28 in that ju-
21. Id. art. 3(4).
22. Id. art. 3(5).
23. Id. art. 3(10). This important provision will operate to remove potential barriers to
extradition and prosecution of drug traffickers. The U.S. delegation had also sought to in-
clude a provision to the effect that member states could not decline to extradite their own
nationals for offenses under the Convention. That proposal was not, however, endorsed by
the conference.
24. Id. art. 4(1)(a).
25. Id. art. 4(1)(b). Exercise of jurisdiction on board foreign flag vessels is necessary to
implement the provisions of art. 17 but requires an agreement or arrangement between the
enforcing party and the flag state. See id. art. 4(1)(b)(ii).
26. Id. art. 4(2).
27. Id. art. 6(9).
28. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft ("Hi-
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risdiction to prosecute is permitted but not required when extradition is
refused for any reason other than those given above."
CONFISCATION
Article 5 of the Convention requires party states to enact far-reach-
ing domestic laws providing for the "confiscation" (i.e., freezing, seizing
and forfeiting) of all forms of property, proceeds or instrumentalities used
in or derived from covered offenses. This property includes the proceeds
of the offense, as well as the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
materials and equipment, and other instrumentalities." Parties are re-
quired to take necessary steps (i.e., adopt legislation or administrative
rules) to enable their authorities to identify, trace, freeze or seize prop-
erty, proceeds, instrumentalities or any other objects as preliminary steps
toward the eventual confiscation of that property."'
Importantly, the Convention requires party states to enable their
courts or other competent authorities to order the production or seizure
of bank, financial or commercial records necessary to trace, identify, seize
and forfeit proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking. In this con-
nection, it specifies 2 that parties shall not decline to act on the ground of
bank secrecy; thus, states have an affirmative obligation not to shield
from discovery materials which are needed in forfeiture proceedings. This
provision, and a related undertaking in Article 7 not to invoke bank se-
crecy in the context of a request for mutual legal assistance, are among
the most important in terms of the prosecution of trafficking offenses.
Article 5 also emphasizes the importance of international cooperation
in forfeiture proceedings by requiring party states, upon request of an-
other, to assist in taking measures to identify, trace, and freeze or seize
proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other objects for the pur-
poses of eventual confiscation either by the requesting party or its own
authorities.3 In this connection, the Convention establishes procedures
by which one party may ask another to assist it by forfeiting proceeds or
instrumentalities located in the requested party's territory. Two alterna-
tive mechanisms are contemplated, depending on the law of the requested
member state:
jacking"), done at The Hague, December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Sabo-
tage"), done at Montreal, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7470; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("Maritime
Terrorism"), done at Rome, March 10, 1988, (not yet published). See generally § 404, Re-
statement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
29. Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(b).
30. Id. art. 5(1). U.S. law currently provides authority for the forfeiture of the catego-
ries of property within the scope of this paragraph. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881; 18
U.S.C. § 981, 1956-1957 (Supp. 1989).
31. Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
32. Id. art. 5(3).
33. Id. art. 5(4).
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- initiation of proceedings in the requested state on the basis of evi-
dence provided by the requesting state, or
- an action in the requested state to enforce the judgment of forfei-
ture rendered in the requesting state."'
The alternatives recognize that, while a few countries are able to en-
force foreign criminal judgments of forfeiture, most are not. However,
these other countries may proceed in rem against an offender's assets on
the basis of sufficient factual information provided by another party
state.
United States law currently permits the forfeiture of property located
in the U.S. "which represents the proceeds of an offense against a foreign
nation involving the manufacture, importation, sale or distribution of a
controlled substance" if such offense would have been punishable by im-
prisonment for one year or more if it had occurred in the United States.35
United States law also provides ample authority for U.S. courts to order
assistance to foreign tribunals.
3 6
The disposition of confiscated property and proceeds must necessa-
rily be a matter of domestic law and administrative procedures, at least in
the first instance.3 7 The Convention acknowledges this fact, but also con-
templates the possibility that the parties may enter into agreements pro-
viding either to share between them (or with other states) the confiscated
property or proceeds on a regular or case-by-case basis, or to contribute
the value of confiscated proceeds and property to inter-governmental
bodies specializing in the fight against illicit drug trafficking.3 8 Such as-
set-sharing agreements may be among the most potent inducements to
international cooperation and may result in significant enhancements of
law enforcement capabilities in producing and transit states. U.S. law al-
ready provides authority for such agreements. 9
Where proceeds from illegal activity have become intermingled with
property from legitimate sources, the Convention provides for confisca-
tion up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds. 0 It also seeks
to preserve the rights which innocent bona fide third parties may have in
such situations.4'
34. Id. arts. 5(4)(a)(i) and (ii), respectively.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B). This statute does not, however, grant authority for
forfeiting instrumentalities used in (as opposed to the proceeds of) foreign drug trafficking
crimes.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
37. Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(5). See also id., art. 5(9).
38. Id. art. 5(5)(b).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(i) and 19 U.S.C. 1616a(c)(2).
40. Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(6).
41. Id. art. 5(8).
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EXTRADITION
The Convention should make it easier for prosecuting states to ob-
tain the extradition of narcotics traffickers and cartel chiefs from over-
seas. Article 6 operates to amend existing extradition treaties between
party states to include the offenses covered by Article 3(1) as extraditable
offenses, and provides that they shall be extraditable offenses between
states that do not make extradition conditional on an extradition treaty.42
The scope of this provision is important: it automatically updates older
extradition treaties to include the modern formulation of offenses con-
tained in the Convention. In particular, it explicitly recognizes that nar-
cotics-related money laundering, a new category of offense for many
states, is an extraditable offense. At the same time, reflecting a focus on
activities constituting international trafficking, it excludes offenses involv-
ing possession, cultivation and purchase for personal use.
Under U.S. law and practice, extradition from the United States may
only occur pursuant to a bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and
the requesting country. Extradition to the United States may, however,
take place absent such a treaty relationship if permissible under the law
of the other party. Thus the Convention will serve, like the 1961 Single
Convention, to supplement older bilateral treaties which did not cover
drug offenses."'
While acknowledging that extradition is subject to conditions pro-
vided by the law of the requested party or applicable extradition treaties,
the Convention calls upon party states to expedite extradition procedures
and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating to those procedures in
respect of covered offenses." States must also undertake to conclude bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements to enhance the effectiveness of
extradition.45
In considering extradition requests under the Convention, the re-
quested state may refuse to comply where there are substantial grounds
to believe that compliance would facilitate prosecution or punishment of
a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opin-
ions."' However, extradition requests may not be refused under the Con-
42. Id. arts. 6(1), (2), (3) and (4).
43. The concern expressed by Senator Helms during floor consideration in the U.S.
Senate that the Convention could require the U.S. to extradite U.S. citizens to countries
whose legal systems lack "even rudimentary due process protections or fair evidentiary pro-
ceedings" is misplaced. See 135 CONG. REc. S16617 (1989). However, that concern is re-
flected in an understanding included in the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratifi-
cation of the Convention, dated Nov. 22, 1989, to the effect that "[tihe United States shall
not consider this convention as the legal basis for extradition of citizens to any country with
which the United States has no bilateral extradition treaty in force."
44. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6(5) and (7).
45. Id. art. 6(11).
46. Id. art. 6(6). In the United States, the relevant procedural law reserves the decision
on such matters to the Executive Branch; nothing in the Convention alters that allocation of
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vention on the grounds that they involve "fiscal," "political" or "politi-
cally motivated" offenses."7
If a member state in which an offender is found does not extradite
that person because the offense was committed by one of its nationals, in
its territory, or on its vessel or aircraft, that state is obliged to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of extradition, unless
otherwise agreed with the requesting party." This provision reflects the
aut dedere aut judicare principle common to international criminal law
conventions but limited to the specified grounds of refusal. The obligation
would also apply, however, if the requested state had established permis-
sive jurisdiction under Article 4(2)(b) covering those situations.49 In both
instances, the Convention contemplates that the requesting party may
seek the agreement of the requested party not to exercise its right to sub-
mit the case for prosecution, and if so agreed, the requested state is re-
lieved from its obligation.5 0 The reason is straightforward; the negotiators
were concerned about allowing the authorities requesting an offender's
extradition to have some basis for asking the requested state, if it deter-
mined to deny the extradition request, not to proceed with the prosecu-
tion in order to preserve the option of later seeking extradition from a
third state.
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Modern law enforcement requires a means for the acquisition of evi-
dence abroad in a form admissible in the courts of the requesting state.
Treaty provision for such assistance has long been done on a regional ba-
sis in Europe. In recent years, the United States has embarked on a pro-
gram to negotiate bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs"),
six of which have been recently ratified.5 ' Until this Convention, however,
the U.S. had not been a party to any such multilateral arrangement.2
responsibility.
47. Id. art. 3(10).
48. Id. art. 6(9)(a). As noted above, art. 4(2) requires party states to establish jurisdic-
tion to submit cases for prosecution when extradition is refused on two specified grounds.
49. Id. art. 6(9)(b).
50. Id. art. 6(9)(a). Article 6(9)(a) limits the obligation by the phrase "unless otherwise
agreed to by the Parties"; art. 6(9)(b) does so by providing "unless otherwise requested by
the requesting party for the purposes of preserving its legitimate jurisdiction."
51. Recently ratified MLATs include those with the Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Thailand, and the United Kingdom in respect of the Cayman Islands. Other
MLATs were earlier concluded with Switzerland (done at Berne, May 25, 1971, 27 U.S.T. §
2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302); Turkey (done at Ankara, June 7, 1979, 32 U.S.T. § 311, T.I.A.S.
No. 9891); the Netherlands (done at The Hague, June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10734); Colum-
bia (done at Washington, Aug. 20, 1980) (not yet ratified by Columbia); Italy (done at
Rome, Nov. 9, 1982); Morocco (done at Rabat, Oct. 10, 1983) (not yet ratified). Absent such
a treaty basis, the provision of mutual legal assistance is a matter of comity and is normally
carried out through the device of letters rogatory. Authority for U.S. courts to execute for-
eign requests for mutual legal assistance is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1948).
52. Although the Congress has encouraged the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral
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Article 7 of the Convention provides a general treaty obligation to
provide "the widest measure of mutual legal assistance" to other party
states in investigations, prosecutions or other judicial proceedings in rela-
tion to Article 3(1) offenses." Such assistance includes the taking of evi-
dence, service of documents, executing searches and seizures, examining
objects and sites, providing bank, financial and business records, and
identifying and tracing proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. 4 Other
forms of mutual legal assistance may be provided as allowed by the do-
mestic law of the requested party.5" Provision of mutual legal assistance
in forfeiture proceedings is addressed separately, in Article 5.1'
One of the most significant provisions of the Convention from the
law enforcement perspective is found in Article 7(5), which provides that
"[a] Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance under this
article on the ground of bank secrecy." Thus, bank secrecy laws cannot be
used to justify refusal of a request for mutual legal assistance under this
Convention or under any of the bilateral treaties affected by its
provisions.
As it does with extradition treaties, the Convention operates to
amend bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties between party states to
include covered offenses under Article 3(1). 5 7 Thus, money laundering
within the definition of the Convention will fall within the reach of ex-
isting MLATs. However, the obligations of party states under any ex-
isting bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance treaty are not di-
minished by this Convention." As between states which are not party to
any existing bilateral or multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance,
the Convention provides a basis for according such assistance; indeed, it
specifies the procedures to be followed in making and executing such re-
MLATs, see, e.g., § 4605, Omnibus Anti-Drug Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181 (1988), codified at § 3181 (1948), Senatorial criticism of MLAT relations with non-
democratic countries, and of the prospect that such treaties may require the U.S. to share
law enforcement information with corrupt officials in foreign governments was the source of
one of the Senate's imposed reservations to the Trafficking Convention:
Pursuant to the rights of the United States under Article 7 of this treaty to
deny requests which prejudice its essential interests, the United States shall
deny a request for assistance when the designated authority, after consultation
with all appropriate intelligence, anti-narcotic, and foreign policy agencies, has
specific information that a senior government official who will have access to
information to be provided under this treaty is engaged in or facilitates the
production or distribution of illegal drugs.
See 135 CONG. REC. S16617 (1989) (statement of Senator Helms).
53. Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(1). The broad reference to "investigations, prosecu-
tions and other judicial proceedings" is intended to include all criminal proceedings (other
than those relating to forfeiture).
54. Id. art. 7(2).
55. Id. art. 7(3).
56. See id. art. 5(4).
57. See id. arts. 7(1), 7(6) and 7(7).
58. Id. art. 7(6).
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quests. 9 Requests may be refused only for a limited number of reasons."
The Convention also provides for the possibility of transfer of crimi-
nal proceedings for covered offenses, where such transfer would be in the
interests-of the proper administration of justice."'
LAW ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
In addition to mutual legal assistance pursuant to Article 7, party
states are required by Article 9 to provide other, less formal types of law
enforcement assistance, cooperation and training. This assistance in-
cludes, (a) establishing direct channels of communication between law en-
forcement authorities; (b) assisting in particular inquiries concerning the
identity and location of suspects, the import or export of drugs, or the
movement of proceeds of drug transactions from one jurisdiction to an-
other; and (c) where appropriate and not contrary to domestic law, estab-
lishing joint law enforcement teams.62 Such forms of "cop-to-cop" assis-
tance and cooperation, already provided to some extent through
INTERPOL, can be among the most effective in preparing cases for pros-
ecution. Recognizing that fact, the Convention also provides for the es-
tablishment of specific training programs in modern law enforcement
techniques (covering such matters as detection and suppression of of-
fenses, trafficking routes and techniques, the import and export of drugs,
concealment and movement of proceeds, and property derived from and
instrumentalities used in covered offenses, etc.) as well as international
cooperation in such training in order to "share the expertise.
'63
Specific law enforcement measures tailored to illicit trafficking across
national boundaries are endorsed by the Convention. For example, under
Article 11, states are required to take the necessary measures to allow for
the use of "controlled deliveries" at the international level to the extent
permitted by the basic principles of their respective domestic legal sys-
tems and on the basis of mutual agreements or arrangements." The tech-
nique of "controlled delivery" contemplates the known passage of an il-
licit consignment through a territory in which the authorities elect not to
effect an arrest or seizure immediately, in order to trace the further
movement of the consignment and to identify higher levels of the traffick-
ing organization. Widely used by U.S. law enforcement authorities, the
technique has not been universally adopted, and in some states it may
actually contravene the obligation of authorities not to condone or toler-
ate known illegal behavior. Its inclusion in the Convention not only re-
flects the endorsement of the technique by the international community,
but also provides a specific basis in international law for its adoption and
59. Id. art. 7(7). See also id. arts. 7(8)-(19).
60. Id. art. 7(15).
61. See id. art. 8.
62. Id. art. 9(1).
63. Id. art. 9(2).
64. Id. art. 11(1).
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use at the domestic level. Reflecting the fact that the technique can be
expensive in terms of manpower and resources, the Convention provides
that the decision to employ it shall be made on a case-by-case basis, when
necessary, taking into consideration financial arrangements and
understandings.6"
Drug traffickers have increasingly turned to legitimate transnational
commerce for surreptitious shipment of illegal drugs. Article 15 of the
Convention requires party states to ensure that means of transport oper-
ated by commercial carriers are not used in the commission of offenses
covered under Article 3(1) and to require that the commercial carriers
themselves take reasonable precautions to prevent such use. These pre-
cautions should include such measures as training of personnel, advance
submission of cargo manifests and the use of tamper-resistant, individu-
ally verifiable seals on containers .6 Moreover, states are required by Arti-
cle 19 to adopt measures to suppress the use of the mails for illicit traf-
ficking purposes, including the introduction of investigative and control
techniques to detect illicit consignments." Recognizing the special risks
that free trade zones and free ports pose, Article 18 of the Convention
requires party states to take suppressive measures in those areas no less
stringent than those applied in other parts of their territories, including
monitoring the movement of goods and services, establishing systems to
detect illicit consignments, and maintaining surveillance systems in dock
and harbor areas.
6 8
Illicit traffic by sea represents for many states, including the United
States, one of the most significant threats. Article 17 of the Convention
requires parties to cooperate to the fullest extent possible, in conformity
with the international law of the sea, in suppressing this traffic.6 9 It pro-
vides in particular that a party with reasonable grounds to suspect that a
vessel displaying its own flag, or not displaying any flag or marks of regis-
try, may seek the assistance of other parties in suppressing its use for
that purpose, and the other party states are obliged to render such assis-
tance.7" More importantly, if a party state has reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that a vessel flying the flag of another party is engaged in illicit traf-
fic, it may request the flag state's authorization to take appropriate
measures, including boarding and searching the vessel.71 The flag state
65. Id. art. 11(2).
66. Id. arts. 15(1) and (2).
67. Id. arts. 19(1) and (2).
68. Id. arts. 18(1) and (2).
69. Id. art. 17(1). The "international law of the sea" referred to in this article is the
customary law reflected in the navigational articles of the 1982 United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention.
70. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17(2). Cf. art. 108(2) of the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, re-
printed in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
71. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17(3). This provision applies to a "vessel exercis-
ing freedom of navigation in accordance with international law," which means a vessel in an
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
may subject its authorization to mutually agreed-upon conditions, includ-
ing conditions relating to responsibility.72
MANUFACTURE AND DIVERSION OF CHEMICALS
Reflecting international concern over the diversion of legally pro-
duced chemicals used in the basic manufacture of illicit controlled sub-
stances or to facilitate their processing, the Convention includes provi-
sions for prevention of diversion at the national level and for cooperation
among member states at the international level.73 Specific obligations are
imposed under Article 12 on party states with respect to monitoring sus-
picious shipments, providing for the proper labelling and documentation
of lawful export shipments, maintenance of records, and advance notifica-
tion of international shipments of certain chemicals.7 ' The chemicals cov-
ered by the Convention are listed in two tables annexed to the Conven-
tion, and the specific procedures for adding or deleting chemicals parallel
those under the 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 Psychotropic Sub-
stances Convention.
Separately, party states are required by Article 13 to take appropri-
ate action to prevent trade in and diversion of common materials and
equipment used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances. This provision is addressed to materials and equipment
typically designed for legitimate drug manufacture, such as glassware,
mixing tanks, tableting and encapsulating machines, but which are di-
verted into illicit activities. Party states are obliged to cooperate in
preventing trade in such materials and equipment. 7
ERADICATION AND DEMAND REDUCTION
Although the main thrust of the Convention is aimed at the suppres-
sion of illicit trafficking, the negotiators realized that both eradication
and demand reduction were necessary components of an effective interna-
tional strategy to reduce drug abuse. Thus, Article 14 of the Convention
obliges each party to take appropriate measures to prevent the illicit cul-
tivation of, as well as the eradication of, plants containing narcotic or
area (including the coastal state's contiguous zone) seaward of the territorial sea of a coastal
state, as opposed to vessels "on the high seas." Paragraph 11 of art. 17 requires parties
taking action in accordance with this article to take due account of the rights and obliga-
tions and the exercise of jurisdiction of coastal states in accordance with the international
law of the sea; this provision refers only to the limited circumstances in which a coastal
state has rights beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea (e.g., hot pursuit in the exclusive
economic zone) and does not create or endorse any broader claims by the coastal states
regarding illicit traffic interdiction in the exclusive economic zone.
72. Id. art. 17(6).
73. Id. arts. 12(1) and (8).
74. Id. arts. 12(9) and (10). With respect to proper labelling and documentation, see
also id. art. 16.
75. Id. arts. 12(2)-(7), and 12(11)-(14).
76. Id. art. 13.
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psychotropic sustances (such as opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis
plants) cultivated illicitly in its territory." In this regard, parties may not
take measures pursuant to this Convention which are less stringent than
those stipulated by the 1961 Single Convention, as amended, or the 1972
Psychotropic Substances Convention.7 8
Parties must also take appropriate measures to eliminate or reduce
illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, based inter
alia on the recommendations of competent UN bodies such as the World
Health Organization.7 9
Separately, Article 10 of the Convention calls upon party states to
assist and support "transit states" (i.e., countries through which illicit
shipments pass on the way to their intended destinations) and, in partic-
ular, developing countries in need of such assistance and support, through
programs of technical co-operation in interdiction and other related activ-
ities. Conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements in the areas of
interdiction and other law enforcement activities is specifically
encouraged.80
SUPERVISING MECHANISMS
Within the UN system, the International Narcotics Control Board
has for years exercised broad supervisory responsibility with respect to
the 1961 Single Convention and the 1972 Psychotropic Substances Con-
vention. Consistent with that longstanding role, the Illicit Trafficking
Convention assigns broad oversight functions to the Board, including in
such traditional areas as national coordination, mutual assistance and in-
ternational coordination. The Board is given additional responsibilities in
such areas as illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances, diversion of chemicals and equipment, and commercial documen-
tation and labelling of exports.8" The Board is required to prepare an an-
nual report concerning the information at its disposal.2
In addition, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs is given certain
supervisory reponsibilities likewise consistent with the oversight role ac-
corded to it under the two prior Conventions. In particular, the Commis-
sion is empowered to review the operation of the Convention, to make
suggestions and general recommendations based on the information re-
ceived from party states, and to take action on matters referred to it by
the International Narcotics Control Board. 3
Finally, the Convention assigns an important "clearing house" role to
77. Id. art. 14(2).
78. Id. art. 14(1).
79. Id. art. 14(4).
80. Id. art. 10(3).
81. Id. art. 22(1), referring to the Board's functions with respect to arts. 12, 13, and 16.
82. Id. art. 23.
83. Id. art. 21.
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the Secretary-General of the United Nations by requiring party states to
furnish his office with specific information concerning their obligations
under the Convention. Generally, under Article 20, party states must pro-
vide the text of laws and regulations promulgated to give effect to the
Convention as well as the "particulars" of cases of illicit traffic within
their jurisdicitions which may indicate new trends or otherwise important
information concerning quantity, sources or methods.8 4 Party states are
also obliged to notify the Secretary-General of the laws and regulations
giving effect to their obligations with respect to forfeiture,8" the languages
in which requests for mutual legal assistance may be made, 6 information
requiring the inclusion of a substance in the tables annexed to the Con-
vention, 87 and the designation of an authority to receive and respond to
requests under Article 17 for authorization to board foreign flag vessels.88
CONCLUSION
The Illicit Trafficking Convention includes many important and in-
novative features for international law enforcement cooperation in sup-
pressing the drug trade. It should serve to lift the veil of bank secrecy as
an impediment to the gathering of evidence against traffickers and as a
method of hiding illicit profits. It provides the tools to seize illicit drug
profits and to use those profits to enhance law enforcement efforts across
national boundaries. Signatories have agreed to exchange evidence of
criminal conduct and to extradite accused traffickers so there are no
longer safe havens. Supervision of the manufacturing and sale of essential
and precursor chemicals for the production of illegal drugs is subjected to
increased scrutiny. Party states have undertaken an obligation to ensure
that commercial consignments are free from drugs. The legitimacy of high
seas interdiction is recognized in that law enforcement officials are given
the authority to board, search and, if necessary, seize vessels used in the
drug business. Aggressive efforts are endorsed in the areas of crop eradi-
cation and demand reduction to complement law enforcement initiatives.
Ultimately, of course, the effectiveness of the international counter-
narcotics offensive will depend on the political will and good faith efforts
of all nations to confront the drug trade. The rapid conclusion of negotia-
tions on the Convention, and its adoption in Vienna by consensus, pro-
vide some basis for the expectation that the international community will
in fact carry out its provisions in an effective manner.
84. Id. art. 20(1).
85. Id. art. 5(4)(e).
86. Id. art. 7(a).
87. Id. art. 12(2).
88. Id. art. 17(7).
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Depriving International Narcotics
Traffickers and Other Organized Criminals
of Illegal Proceeds and Combatting Money
Laundering
MICHAEL A. DEFEO*
This paper will focus upon the American experience in attempting to
deprive international criminals, particularly drug traffickers, of illegal
proceeds and to combat money laundering. These efforts began many
years ago in the context of general tax evasion and non-drug organized
crime. Based upon over twenty-five years of experience in developing,
prosecuting and supervising organized crime cases in the federal system, I
must candidly admit that our efforts to combat sophisticated criminality
by attacking its profitability were largely illusory - until recently. Only
the public and Congressional realization of and reaction to the immense
profits of the drug trade finally found recent legislation addressing cur-
rency control and forfeitability of criminal proceeds as essential responses
to sophisticated transnational and domestic criminality.'
To really understand how little experience our nation has in this
area, and thereby to begin to appreciate how little we know and how
much we have to learn, it is essential to study the development of finan-
cial controls in American public administration. Historically, those con-
trols were very weak, as indeed was our central government until the Civil
War. In the first seventy-five years of our history there was no income
tax, no estate and inheritance tax, no means of raising revenue except
customs duties and a few excise taxes on the production of what were
considered luxury items, such as liquor. When the financial demands of
the Civil War did require imposition of a federal income tax, it barely
survived the war emergency and was repealed after ten years. 2 Only in
* Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990)). See
generally CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS 1985, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong, 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182.
2. See Eisenstein, Rise and Decline of Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 226 (1956).
Congress first enacted a personal income tax as a temporary revenue measure during the
Civil War. An Act to Provide Increased Revenue from Imports, to Pay Interest on the Pub-
lic Debt, and for Other Purposes, Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, re-
pealed by and reenacted by An Act to Provide Internal Revenue to Support the Govern-
ment and to Pay Interest on the Public Debt, Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432,
473, repealed by An Act to Reduce Internal Taxes and Other Purposes, Act of May 1, 1871,
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1913 was the modern system of comprehensive taxation of income, profits
and inherited wealth implemented.3 Effectively, the institutional memory
of our government in the field of citizen financial reporting and controls
began seventy-five years ago.
In the years following 1913 some famous tax evasion cases gained
popular recognition, especially the conviction of the famous Chicago
gangster Al Capone in the 1930's.4 Such successes, however highly publi-
cized, were exceptions to a general rule of unsophisticated financial en-
forcement. Congressional hearings in 1934 focused upon the same issues
which plagued us fifty years later - bank secrecy havens, foreign trusts
and proprietaries used to avoid taxation - no effective solution was
found at the time. As is frequently the case, the deficiency existed not in
the obligations imposed by law, which were clear enough, but in the inad-
equate mechanisms provided to secure compliance.
Thus, the overriding philosophy was that of self-declaration of tax
liability on a yearly form. From the 1930's to the 1960's the only informa-
tion which the federal government required to be submitted as a check
upon the accuracy of self-reporting was a form by an employer reporting
the salary or wages paid each employee. There was no independent source
of data on self-employed persons such as storekeepers or professionals
and no reporting from financial institutions and corporations of what is
called unearned income, that is, interest and dividends. Taxpayers were
well aware of these deficiencies, and the use of bank accounts in false
names or simply in distant locations where the taxpayer was unknown
were common.
Even when a taxpayer's returns were selected for audit, or civil exam-
ination, and even if that audit produced indications of tax fraud warrant-
ing criminal investigation, which was very rare, the verification and recon-
struction techniques available to the auditors and investigators were
weak. The simplest and most persuasive method of proving unreported
income was direct proof of the omitted income itself, for example, the
payments from patients omitted from a dentist's records. Identifying and
contacting every patient might be feasible for a dentist or lawyer because
of the multiple documentary sources associated with such professional re-
lationships (appointment books, charts, pleading files as well as receipt
books, account statements and bank records), and the lack of any likeli-
hood the patients or clients would not provide accurate information about
their payments. However, for the cash business, the small merchant, the
gambling casino or the public official receiving cash payments, such re-
construction of income from other records and from interview of probable
ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257.
3. An Act to Reduce Tariff Duties and to Provide Revenue for the Government, and for
Other Purposes (Income Tax Law of 1913), ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166, repealed by, Act of
Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 24, 39 Stat. 776. The modern income tax provisions regarding tax on
individuals are codified in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1564 (1988).
4. See Capone v. U.S., 56 F.2d 927 (1932).
VOL. 18:3
COMBATTING MONEY LAUNDERING
sources of income was virtually a hopeless task.
Consequently, in the years around World War II, several indirect
theories were developed. One innovation was the net worth approach,5
which proceeded upon the assumption that if a person's net value (assets
minus liabilities) at the end of a given taxable period exceeded his net
worth at the beginning of that period plus reported income, then the ex-
cess must be unreported income if the possibility of non-taxable sources
is negated. This approach was the weapon of choice against racketeers
and sophisticated tax evaders for years although it involved heavy eviden-
tiary burdens of proving a starting point at which the taxpayer's assets
and liabilities could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and of con-
ducting a good faith effort to account for all non-taxable sources of funds
during the pertinent periods, such as loans, gifts and inheritance.' Be-
cause of its burdens and the usual necessity to reconstruct multiple small
expenditures made in cash with the precise intent of avoiding detection,
the net worth approach was inherently cost effective only in a small per-
centage of cases."
A supplementary theory, utilized when the tax evaders were so suc-
cessful as to make impossible a reconstruction of their additional tax lia-
bility, was called a Klein conspiracy.8 Named after the principal defend-
ant in the case in which the theory was first successfully utilized, this
approach was developed in a World War II black market situation. The
profiteers were engaged in the liquor business and utilized all of the de-
vices classically associated with international financial crime to conceal
their untaxed profits.9 Canadian whiskey was bought by a New York dis-
tributor through a Cuban proprietary, which falsified the cost of the whis-
key and then returned the excess cost to Klein and his key employees
through secret bank accounts. The scheme was so successful and the doc-
umentary evidence so impossible to secure or reconstruct that there was
no way to prove how much income was unreported or on which tax re-
turns it technically should have been reported. Normally this would have
precluded any specific tax evasion charge. However, the general federal
conspiracy statute punishes criminal association both to commit a specific
crime and joint attempts to defraud any agency of the government."° This
latter concept was utilized in charging Klein and his associates with par-
ticipating in a conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service in its
5. See Cominsky, The Likely Source: An Unexpected Weakness in the Net Worth
Method of Proof, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1981).
6. Id. at 3-5.
7. Id.
8. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1957).
9. Id. at 911.
10. Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud the United States 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1988). This section is based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 88 and 294 (1940). Section 371 consolidates
both §§ 88 and 294. For an informative discussion on the meaning and interpretation of
conspiracy to defraud the United States, see generally Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud
the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
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governmental function of ascertaining and collecting the true tax liability
of the individuals and business entities involved."
Even these more sophisticated tactics proved inadequate to stem the
growing practice of international tax evasion through the 1960's and
1970's. Famous film producers were publicly identified as being involved
in the use of foreign subsidiaries and bank accounts to conceal income.
Major corporations, such as the aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, were in-
volved in massive foreign bribery schemes dependent upon generating un-
traceable funds.12 Las Vegas casino operators removed millions of un-
taxed dollars from the country in a practice call "skimming," and then
added insult to injury by loaning that skimmed money to themselves
through foreign intermediaries and claiming tax deductions based upon
interest that was in fact being paid to themselves. 3
As evidence of these abuses was accumulated, pressure built for ef-
fective controls. The 1970 Bank Secrecy Act' for the first time required
financial institutions to secure a taxpayer identification number, normally
an individual's Social Security number, for all accounts, and to report all
interest earned to the Internal Revenue Service.' 5 Any person who had
money in a foreign bank account was required to report that information
on his or her yearly tax return.'" Another control was imposed by requir-
ing any person carrying a large sum of currency or a monetary instrument
payable to the bearer to declare that fact to the Customs Service when
entering or leaving the United States. Domestic banks were also required
to report large currency transactions, although this law was virtually un-
enforced until well into the 1980's.' 7
In 1976, an historic advance in diplomacy was achieved in a Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance with Switzerland.18 The absolute necessity for such
assistance had been spotlighted by a prosecution involving the Flamingo
Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada, from which over twenty-five million dollars
in gambling income had been skimmed and sent to a Swiss bank account
under the control of the notorious gangster Meyer Lansky by means of
11. Klein, 247 F.2d at 916.
12. See Jones and Berry, Lockheed Paid $38 Million in Bribes Abroad; Lockheed's Ille-
gal Payments Abroad Reached $38 Million, Wash. Post, May 27, 1977, at E9.
13. See Williams v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1439 (1988); Thomas v. Bible, 694 F. Supp.
750 (1988).
14. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1988) and in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act of 1970].
15. According to 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (1988), in order to maintain appropriate evidence
of the identity of persons keeping accounts in insured banks, the Secretary of the Treasury
may prescribe regulations he deems necessary to carry out the purpose and the goals of the
Bank Secrecy Act.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316, 5325 (1983 & West Supp. 1989).
18. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
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interbank wire transfers. 9 That investigative trail ended in Switzerland,
but the 1976 Treaty created procedures allowing Swiss investigative and
judicial assistance to trace funds in certain defined circumstances and fo-
cused attention on the bank haven problem. Other treaties have followed
in the 1980's which steadily are expanding both the procedures for coop-
eration and the offenses for which such cooperation is available.2
0
Drug crimes, however, have dominated law enforcement concerns
throughout the 1970's and 1980's. Although the immense profits being re-
alized in the drug trade were common knowledge in the law enforcement
community, the anecdotal evidence of particularly extravagant purchases
or expenditures by drug dealers lacked public impact. However, a study
by the Federal Reserve finally captured public and Congressional atten-
tion.2 That study revealed that for 1978 the Florida Federal Reserve re-
gion experienced a $3.3 billion surplus in cash, meaning that consumer
banking institutions collected and turned in to the Federal Reserve sys-
tem that much surplus currency in deposits and loan payments. All of the
other Federal Reserve regions of the United States experienced a net defi-
cit of $3.5 billion in currency during the same period. Since Florida had
little other economic activity except tourism and citrus fruit raising, and
since the Florida surplus exactly paralleled the role of that state as the
venue for importation, transshipment and distribution of drugs, the con-
clusion was inescapable that this surplus represented payments coming
from other parts of the country to pay for drugs.22 This conclusion was
reinforced by several other factors. When Federal law enforcement efforts
were concentrated on Florida drug dealers and financial institutions in
1979 to stem the flood of drugs and the related rise in violence, the Fed-
eral Reserve surplus virtually disappeared.23 A comparable surplus began
to appear in currency receipts from the Banco Nacional de Panama, with
its cash shipments to the U.S. Federal Reserve quadrupling between 1980
and 1983. This strongly suggested that drug transactions were now being
paid for in Panama instead of Florida.
19. See United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (1974).
20. In recent years, treaties creating procedures to help trace funds in foreign countries
have been entered into with the Cayman Islands, Belgium, the Bahamas, and Thailand.
Daily Report for Executives, (BNA) Oct. 26, 1989. Also, the U.S. has entered a treaty with
Turkey. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United States-
Republic of Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
21. See generally Banks and Narcotics Flow in South Florida: Hearings on S2236
before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980)
[hereinafter Banks and Narcotics].
22. Id. at 44-45 (statement of Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary of Enforcement,
Department of the Treasury).
23. See generally Banks and Narcotics, supra note 21, at 236-245 (Supplemental Infor-
mation submitted for the record by the U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration). As soon as federal law enforcement did concentrate their efforts in and
around Florida, drug dealers found new and innovative ways to transfer money out of the
country. The most common way involved wire transfers from a national bank to foreign
banks. Id.
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Substantial media attention focused on the Florida situation but it
was dwarfed by the publicity blitz accompanying the so-called Pizza Con-
nection case in 1984.24 Nearly every element except lurid sex was present
in this case to capture public interest. The Sicilian Mafia, always a staple
of crime reporting, arranged the importation of heroin. Payments total-
ling approximately twenty-five to thirty-five million dollars were collected
and transmitted by virtually every imaginable technique to Swiss and
Caribbean accounts, from which the money found its way to the ultimate
recipients to pay for the raw material, the processing in Sicily and as
profit.25
A group appointed by President Reagan in 1983 to study and report
on the phenomenon of organized crime, the President's Commission on
Organized Crime, publicized not only the Pizza Connection case, so-called
because of the role played by otherwise inconspicuous pizza parlor opera-
tions in the heroin distribution, but a number of other notorious situa-
tions.26 A Colombian money launderer in New York City transferred $151
million out of the United States for drug dealers, assisted by Deak, Per-
era, Inc., the international currency exchange best known to American
travelers.17 A Florida financial institution called the Great American
Bank laundered ninety-four million dollars without filing currency trans-
action reports as required by law.2 s Deak, Perera, in a separate case, han-
dled $300 million without filing required currency reports, and when re-
ports were filed, Deak, Perera, regularly and knowingly accepted false
identification.2 9 Additional concern was generated by a currency surplus
in billions of dollars coming from Hong Kong. 0 The transfer of sover-
eignty to the People's Republic of China in 1997 may well account for the
flight of much legitimate capital, but many law enforcement personnel
saw evidence of preparations for entry into the United States by "Triad"
gangsters and an association between the rising currency flow and the
contemporaneously rising flow of Southeast Asian heroin.
By 1980, pressures were beginning to accumulate for effective legisla-
tion. Gradually, the resistance to banking controls began to diminish as
public opinion came to see amoral bankers as an integral part of the drug
problem. It also came to be realized that a major drug dealer might insu-
24. Lubasch, 31 Charged by U.S. with Running a $1.65 Billion Heroin Operation, N.Y.
Times, April 10, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 5; Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 11, 1984, at 2. United
States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (1989) (specific case concerning pizzeria owners in New
York City accused of selling heroin).
25. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (1989).
26. The President's Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President
and the Attorney General, the Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions,
and Money Laundering 31 (1984) [hereinafter the President's Commission on Organized
Crime].
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 42.
30. Id. at 44.
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late himself from ever touching his merchandise, but he would always in-
sist upon having or controlling the money and assets produced by his
trade. Thus, tracing the money promised to be a means of penetrating the
traditional insulation of drug bosses.
One of the first legislative steps was a reenactment of the largely un-
enforced law requiring banks to file reports on large currency transac-
tions.31 This law nevertheless remained ineffective because the penalty
was minor, it could easily be evaded by simply dividing a cash transaction
so that it would be under the $10,000 jurisdictional threshold, and an eas-
ily abused clause allowed banks to exempt regular customers from the
law's provisions.3 2
A major step was taken in 1984 by the enactment of a tax law which
extended the requirement for reporting all currency transactions over
$10,000 to all businesses, including jewelers, car dealers and lawyers.3 3
The last category of covered persons protested mightily, but without suc-
cess in the courts.3" Although this statute contained criminal penalties, as
did the previous reporting statute, compliance continued to be uneven.35
In 1986 several additional pieces of legislation caused currency con-
trol finally to be taken seriously by our banks and their employees. The
law requiring the filing of currency transaction reports by banks was
changed to make a single violation punishable by up to five years impris-
onment and a $250,000 fine, with potential punishment doubled for a pat-
tern of activity." Forfeiture was permitted not only on the originally un-
reported deposit, but also on any substitute asset acquired with that
money." New definitions made punishable an attempt to divide or struc-
ture a transaction to prevent its being reported. 8 In addition, a com-
pletely new statute was enacted which for the first time made dealing in
criminal proceeds a crime per se.39 These statutes punish any transaction
31. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, supra note 14.
32. Id.
33. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C.; 21 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984].
34. See, e.g., United States v. Perlmutter, 636 F. Supp. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988); United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 847 (1984).
35. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supra note 33.
36. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1357(g), 100 Stat.
3207-18, 3207-26 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5317, 5322(b) (West Supp. 1987))
(amended the Bank Secrecy Act to increase the maximum penalty for violation of the act).
37. Id. § 5317(b) (added provisions that authorize forfeiture of any interest in property,
including deposits in financial institutions not reported or containing material omissions or
misstatements of fact).
38. Id. at § 5324.
39. The Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987)) (created three new categories that penal-
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in the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. They apply to all transac-
tions, not just those in cash, in which the persons involved know the pro-
ceeds come from a crime of the type specified in the statute, not only
narcotics offenses but including many other serious offenses.' 0 The new
statute also introduces extraterritorial jurisdiction in two areas. First, by
criminalizing any United States banking transaction involving the pro-
ceeds of foreign narcotics offenses."' Second, by criminalizing any transac-
tion in proceeds known to derive from specified illegal activity by a
United States person, even if done outside United States territorial juris-
diction." Sentences up to twenty years and a fine of $500,000 or twice the
value of the property involved are possible. 3
With these new statutes, the saturation publicity generated by the
cases outlined above and the President's Commission on Organized
Crime, bank compliance with currency transaction reporting require-
ments reached an unprecedentedly high level." A sensational prosecution
of the Bank of Boston, one of the most highly respected banks in the
United States, revealed the routine violation of the reporting laws."'
Abuse of the exemption for regular cash customers was involved in the
Bank of Boston case, and that loophole was closed by requiring govern-
ment approval for such exemptions. Banking institutions, although not
necessarily businessmen and professionals, are now observing the report-
ing requirements more carefully.'
International mechanisms for tracing and seizing illegal proceeds are
also gaining broader international acceptance. Switzerland has used evi-
dence supplied by American authorities to seize and forfeit drug proceeds
in Swiss banks. The Italian-American Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty'
goes further and permits seizure and forfeiture on behalf of the request-
ing state, without regard to the traditional concept of dual criminality
ize activities related to money laundering). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986)
(prohibits knowing involvement in a broad range of transactions involving the proceeds or
property of criminal activity).
40. Id. §§ 1956(a), 1957(a).
41. Id. §§ 1956(a),(c), 1957(f).
42. Id. §§ 1956(f), 1957(a),(d).
43. Id. § 1956(a).
44. See Popham and Probus, Structured Transactions in Money Laundering: Dealing
with Tax Evaders, Smurfs and Other Enemies of the People, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 83 (1987-
88); Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering
Statutes, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 489 (1988); President's Commission on Organized Crime,
supra note 26.
45. United States v. First National Bank of Boston, No. CR 85 52-MA (D.Mass Feb. 17,
1985) (prosecutor's information to which the defendant pled guilty).
46. See generally Temby, The Proceeds of Crime Act: One Year's Experience, 13 CRIM.
L.J. 24 (1989); Fisse, The Proceeds of Crime Act: The Rise of Money Laudering Offenses
and the Fall of Principle, 13 CRIM. L.J. 5 (1989); Morvillo, Laundering Money, 197 N.Y.L.J.
1 (1987).
47. Italy-United States Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed in
Rome, November 9, 1982, entered into force November 13, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1539 (1985) (For discussion see Senate Exec. Rep. 98-36).
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applicable in extradition matters."" The United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Branch, in preparation for the 1990 Eighth
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, in a
series of preparatory meetings and reports, is preparing model treaties
and domestic legislation providing a basic framework for tracing and seiz-
ing procedures. Additional treaty negotiations are exploring shared forfei-
ture, which would increase the motivation of both requesting and re-
quested governments to identify and forfeit the proceeds of foreign
crime."9
The new "money laundering" statutes, sections 1956 and 1957 of Ti-
tle 18 of the United States Code, directly penalize any knowing transac-
tions in the proceeds of most serious domestic crimes and of foreign nar-
cotics offenses, as well as any such transaction by an American person or
entity outside the United States. They have also been made predicate
offenses which can trigger application of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, section 1961, et seq. of Title 18, United States
Code. Increasing attention is being given to the problem of enforcing for-
eign forfeiture judgments and to the procedures necessary to meet Ameri-
can constitutional standards when seizing and forfeiting property based
upon a foreign conviction or judgment.
In general, our law enforcement establishment is enjoying a bounty
of intelligence and evidence from the currency reporting statutes and of
civil and criminal remedies under a wide variety of laws, including the
reporting and new money laundering statutes. However, responsible pub-
lic administrators are attempting to maintain a balanced perspective in
the enforcement of these laws. Our citizenry has accepted some very dra-
conian and intrusive legislation and regulation because of concern over
the drug problem. Concentration of enforcement action under the new
statutes on drug related offenses is likely to maintain support and avoid
controversy. However, the legislation on its face demands compliance by
all segments of society. History has demonstrated that sophisticated
criminals are adaptable. The profitability of drug dealing today may be
rivaled by arms trading or smuggling of high technology items tomorrow.
Revenue collection is also enhanced by these currency reporting statutes
because they not only identify presumptive recipients of illegal income
who are the persons most likely to make cash expenditures over $10,000,
but also incidentally require self-reporting of that transaction by the re-
cipient taxpayer. Accordingly, much of the potential long range value of
these statutes may lie in enforcement outside a narcotics context.
48. Id.
49. See generally Switzerland-United States Memorandum of Understanding on Mu-
tual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Ancillary Administrative Proceedings, done in,
Washington Nov. 10, 1987, reprinted in, 27 I.L.M. 480 (1988); Memorandum of Understand-
ing with Canda on Drug Enforement, Feb. 2, 1988, reprinted in, 27 I.L.M. 403 (1988); Mex-
ico-United States Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, reprinted in, 27 IL.M.
443 (1988).
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Every step outside that context, however, creates a risk of adverse
public reaction. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Drug Enforcement Administration conduct undercover operations in
which their agents offer money laundering services to change the denomi-
nations of currency, to transfer it to another country, or to provide a false
explanation of the source or nature of funds. These operations are so
structured that only drug dealers would have a use for and be willing to
pay for such services. When these undercover operations are concluded,
drugs and money are seized, criminal convictions and forfeitures result,
and the public and Congress are favorably impressed. The Internal Reve-
nue Service, on the other hand, in enforcing a different statute, sends
agents to impersonate drug dealers seeking money laundering services.
Not all of the suspects who respond to the agents' overtures are profes-
sional money launderers. Some are simply greedy entrepreneurs attempt-
ing to seize an opportunity for easy money but who are not otherwise
criminally involved. Such a defendant may not present a sympathetic
enough figure to win an acquittal from a jury but the government can be
portrayed as playing the role of agent provocateur to bankers and busi-
nessmen, which can, in the long run, lead to legislative reaction and en-
danger all currency control, asset tracing and forfeiture legislation.
Accordingly, the challenge to American law enforcement in imple-
menting this bounty of new laws and procedures is how to gradually im-
plement all of the tactical and strategic advantages of the new scheme
without unduly burdening commerce or arousing a hostile public reaction.
Those advantages are substantial. Tactically, the new reporting require-
ments furnish both intelligence on the activities of and evidence against
professional criminals. Strategically, the vulnerability of criminal pro-
ceeds to penalties for dealing in them and to forfeiture reduces the ulti-
mate motivation behind sophisticated criminality, and the reporting re-
quirements incidentally encourage tax compliance.
Realistically, however, it must be admitted that the burdens of main-
taining an elaborate reporting structure are also substantial. In America
we have assumed these burdens because of our drug problem and our
general tradition of lack of respect for law enforcement and consequent
lack of volunteered assistance to law enforcement. Other societies not af-
flicted with the same problems may have much less need for our remedies
and procedures. However, current efforts of the United Nations Crime
Prevention Branch and other international endeavors to provide basic
models for the tracing and forfeiture of illegal proceeds, such as the
agreements at the recent Vienna Conference requiring signatory nations
to enact anti-narcotics measures including asset forfeiture, are praisewor-
thy."° International criminality is an unescapable reality for every nation,
even those we would normally consider the most insular. I have been
50. See U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, done at Vienna, Dec. 20, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
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greatly impressed in a number of international settings, including a
United Nations Conference on Organized Crime and Terrorism in Vienna
a year ago and at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute in To-
kyo last fall, by the interest in combatting international narcotics traffick-
ing and money laundering exhibited by countries all over the world, and
specifically including the East Bloc. I found it highly instructive that
these problems were of substantial concern even in countries in which
strict governmental control of the economy has been, at least until re-
cently, an article not just of economic but of political faith. This revela-
tion added to my belief that a steadily growing cadre of public adminis-
trators throughout the world are beginning to believe that mutual self-
interest and responsible membership in the community of nations impose
an obligation to cooperate in controlling not only narcotics trafficking but
the related accumulation of power and wealth. Not every country needs,
wants or will impose as elaborate and costly a system as we have in the
United States, but every country must address these problems. The more
we all educate ourselves on these issues, the more likely we are to find
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A. Political Organization of Switzerland
Switzerland is a federal republic consisting of twenty-six cantons.'
Cantons have the power under the Federal Constitution to enact legisla-
tion concerning matters not within the federal competence.2 These in-
clude civil and criminal procedure, most tax law as well as the banking
and stock exchange laws. Federal law, contained in the Code of Obliga-
tions (CO), controls public offerings of equity securities by Swiss corpora-
tions, public offerings of bonds by all issuers and various forms of negoti-
able instruments. Substantive civil and criminal law are also within the
federal competence. Federal laws are interpreted by cantonal courts with
possible recourse to the Federal Supreme Court.
B. General Remarks on Regulatory Authorities in the Securities Law
Field
Switzerland has no comprehensive federal legislation controlling the
* Christian J. Meier-Schatz is a partner with the law firm of Pestalozzi Gmur & Heiz in
Zurich, Switzerland. He is also a Professor at the Law School of the University of St. Gallen.
Prof. Meier-Schatz has a doctoral degree from the University of Bern and holds an LL.M.
degree from the University of California, Berkeley. In addition, he is a former Adjuct Pro-
fessor at the University of San Francisco School of Law. He wishes to thank his partners
Christopher Ramstein and Dr. Robert Furter for their helpful comments.
** Kim D. Larsen, J.D., is an attorney practicing with the law firm of Holme, Roberts
& Owen in Denver, Colorado. He is a graduate of Brigham Young University and Columbia
Law School. He has also completed a fellowship in German Law sponsored by the German
Academic Exchange Service.
1. Article 1 of the Federal Constitution of May 29, 1874, as amended.
2. Id. art. 3.
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sale and exchange of securities. Consequently, no central governmental
agency regulates securities markets. This may change in the future, how-
ever, due to an emerging consensus in the financial and political commu-
nities on the advantages of a federal stock exchange law.3 The laws of the
various cantons provide for limited supervision of the securities trading in
their respective territories.
C. Central Control of Banking
The Federal Banking Commission is the most important federal
agency enforcing laws affecting the securities markets. The Federal Bank-
ing Commission is an autonomous body consisting of seven to nine inde-
pendent experts appointed by the Bundesrat. It is the supervisory au-
thority under the Federal Banking Law" and the Federal Law on
Investment Funds.5 Since banks are the most significant participants in
the Swiss securities markets, these regulatory functions have considerable
influence on such markets. Under the Federal Banking Law, the Banking
Commission grants and withdraws banking licenses and supervises the fi-
nancial structure, management and operation of banks. In addition, the
Bankenverordnung in its new version of January 1, 1990, broadened the
regulatory definition of "banks" to include so-called "bank-like finance
companies."6 Finally, it issues the decisions necessary to enforce the rules
of the Federal Banking Law.7
3. In 1989, the Federal Counsel (Bundesrat) appointed a special task force to study,
among other questions related to the Swiss capital market, the possible adoption of a na-
tional stock exchange law. It has recently published its first report recommending a central-
ized stock exchange and a central notification for all securities transactions. One of the ma-
jor purposes of a new Federal stock exchange law should be significantly enhanced
transparency.
4. Swiss Federal Banking Law (Bundesgesetz Uber die Banken und Sparkassen) of
Nov. 8, 1934, as amended [hereinafter Bankengesetz], art. 23.
5. The Federal Law on Investment Funds of July 1, 1966 [hereinafter Anlagefond-
sgesetz] and the Implementing Ordinance to the Federal Law on Investment Funds of Jan.
20, 1967 [hereinafter Anlagefondsverordnung].
6. The new Article 2(a) of the Ordinance concerning the Swiss Federal Banking Law
(Verordnung zum Bundesgesetz tiber die Banken und Sparkassen) of May 17, 1972, as
amended [hereinafter Bankenverordnung], defines bank-like finance companies as institu-
tions that:
a)Publicly accept third party money to finance for their own account an
unlimited number of unrelated persons and enterprises;
b)refinance themselves in order to finance an unlimited number of unre-
lated persons or enterprises for their own account;
c)underwrite firmly or on commission securities or other similar negotiable
instruments and offer them publicly on the primary market.
The new rules contain transitional arrangements. All institutions initially falling under
the definition of Article 2(a) have to announce this to the Federal Banking Commission
within six months (i.e., at the latest on June 30, 1990). They then have a transitional period
of three years to adapt to the new legal regime. In special cases, the Banking Commission
may extend or shorten this period.
7. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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Under the Federal Law on Investment Funds, the Federal Banking
Commission authorizes the establishment of funds and supervises their
activities for compliance with applicable statutes and regulations. For for-
eign investment funds, it grants the necessary authorization to the desig-
nated Swiss bank for a public offering of interests in the funds.8
D. The Swiss Nationalbank
The Swiss Nationalbank's principal duties are to regulate the money
market and to counsel the relevant authorities with respect to currency
questions.0 Organized in the form of a stock company, the Nationalbank
is a semi-public corporation supervised by federal authorities. Fifty-nine
percent of its share capital is held by the cantons with the remainder held
privately. The Board of Directors of the Nationalbank has forty members:
twenty-five elected by the Federal Government and fifteen by the
stockholders."0
The Nationalbank issues, among other things, directives to banks re-
garding the maintenance of reserves, expansion of credit facilities, accept-
ance of foreign source deposits, export of capital and involvement in for-
eign exchange transactions." The Nationalbank is authorized to prohibit
or place conditions upon the following transactions if they exceed ten mil-
lion Swiss francs: (1) specified loans to foreign borrowers, (2) purchases or
offerings of the shares of foreign companies, (3) credits and investments
abroad, and (4) participation in initial placements of debt certificates
with maturity greater than twelve months. 12 Particularly important for
the securities markets is the Nationalbank's authority to obtain copies of
and to examine the financial statements of all banks' s and to require noti-
fication of specific transactions in foreign securities. 4
E. Cantonal Law
In each of the seven cantons where a stock exchange exists, cantonal
laws provide for some type of supervision of the local exchange. The oper-
ations of the three main stock exchanges (Zurich, Basle and Geneva) are
subject to cantonal laws, implementing ordinances and regulations of the
chambers of the respective stock exchanges. The Zurich and Basle Stock
Exchanges are essentially public institutions supervised at the cantonal
level. The Geneva Stock Exchange is private and organized in the legal
form of an association (Verein).15
8. See infra notes 240-249 and accompanying text.
9. Swiss Federal Law on the National Bank of Dec. 23, 1953, as amended [hereinafter
Nationalbankgesetz], art. 2.
10. Id. art. 40.
11. Id. art. 14 et seq.
12. Bankengesetz, supra note 4, art. 8.
13. Id. art. 7.
14. Id. art. 8. See also infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
15. Articles of Incorporation of the Stock Exchange of Geneva (Statuts, Bourse de
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In Zurich the regulatory structure"6 relating to stock exchanges has
three layers. The Cantonal government grants licenses, enacts ordinances
and approves regulations relating to the trading of securities on and off
the stock exchanges. 17 The Zurich Stock Exchange Commission (Bbr-
senkommission), whose members are the Director of the Department of
Economics and six additional persons, of which two are members of the
Stock Exchange Association selected by the Cantonal government, has
the duty to consult with and make recommendations to the Cantonal gov-
ernment concerning proposed regulations, to evaluate the grant or with-
drawal of broker-dealer licenses and to comment on required fees and
deposits. The Bbrsenkommission also nominates candidates for the Zu-
rich Securities Trading Office (Brsenkommissariat).s The Bbrsenkom-
missariat supervises compliance with the regulations and statutes, en-
forces the record keeping requirements and oversees the official
publication of the stock prices.' 9
For the Basle stock exchange, which has a more stringent regulatory
regime than either Zurich or Geneva,20 the supervisory functions are also
Gen~ve) [hereinafter Statuts, Bourse de Genve], art. 1.
16. The most important statutory sources of the Zurich stock exchange are: Law on
Professional Trading of Securities (Gesetz betreffend den gewerbsmassigen Verkehr mit
Wertpapieren) of Dec. 22, 1912 [hereinafter Wertpapiergesetz]; Ordinance on Professional
Trading of Securities (Verordnung zum Gesetz vom 22. Dezember 1912 betreffend den
gewerbsmcissigen Verkehr mit Wertpapieren) of June 26, 1913, [hereinafter Wertpapierver-
ordnung]; Ordinance on Bonds Required for Intermediaries Trading in Securities (Ver-
ordnung iuber die Beanspruchung der Kautionen von Vermittlern im Verkehr mit
Wertpapieren) of Mar. 29, 1923; Ordinance on Duties and Authorities of the Stock Ex-
change Commissioners ( Verordnung iiber die Aufgaben und Befugnisse des Borsenkommis-
sariates) of Feb. 25, 1960 [hereinafter Bbrsenkommissariatsverordnung]. These and other
legal sources and all self-regulatory rules of the Zurich Stock Exchange can be found in a
manual (Handbuch der Ziircher Effektenbdrse) edited by the Effektenborsenverein Zurich.
17. Wertpapiergesetz, supra note 16, § 2 et seq.
18. Id. § 36.
19. Id. § 30 et seq. See also Bbrsenkommissariatsverordnung, supra note 16, art. 3.
20. The regulations of the stock exchange of Basle are too voluminous to be quoted in
detail. The most important legal sources are: Law on Securities Trading and the Stock Ex-
change (Gesetz tiber den Wertpapierhandel und die Effektenbbrse) of Jan. 14, 1982 [here-
inafter Borsengesetz]; General Reglementation for the Securities Trading on the Stock Ex-
change of Basle (Atigemeines Reglement far den Wertpapierhandel an der Basler
Effektenborse) of Dec. 11, 1944 [hereinafter Bdrsenordnung]; Customs for the Trade in Se-
curities on the Stock Exchange of Basle (Usanzen fir den Wertpapierhandel an der Basler
Effektenbbrse) of Dec. 11, 1944 [hereinafter Usanzen]; Reglementation on the Admission of
Securities for Listing on the Stock Exchange of Basle (Reglement iiber die Zulassung von
Wertpapieren zur Kotierung an der Basler Effektenbbrse) of Dec. 16, 1986 [hereinafter
Kotierungsreglement Basel]; Ordinance Regarding Listing Fees on the Stock Exchange of
Basle (Verordnung uber die Erhebung von Kotierungsgebiihren an der Basler Ef-
fektenbbrse) of Feb. 25, 1986; Reglementation on the Procedure in the Event of Nonper-
formance and Financial Difficulties of Licensed Members of the Stock Exchange of the Can-
ton Basel and on the Utilization of Bonds (Reglement iiber das Verfahren bei
Nichterfiallung und Zahlungsschwierigkeiten von konzessionierten Mitgliedern der Bbr-
senkammer des Kantons Basel Stadt sowie tiber die Inanspruchnahme der Realkautionen)
of Dec. 11, 1944 and Decision of the Cantonal Government Regarding an Increase of the
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exercised by three bodies. Among other powers and authorities, the Can-
tonal government may promulgate regulations under its Borsengesetz, ap-
prove the articles of incorporation of the stock exchanges, appoint the
members of its Bbrsenkommission, and designate the Stock Exchange
Commissioner (Bbrsenkommissar).2 The Bbrsenkommission is comprised
of the Director of the Department of the Interior who acts as chairman,
and six other persons of two whom are members of the Stock Exchange
Association. The Bbrsenkommission acts as an advisory board to the Can-
tonal Government. Moreover, it grants and withdraws securities trading
licenses, issues reprimands and penalties and supervises the activities of
the Bbrsenkommissar.2 1 The Bbrsenkommissariat exercises the immedi-
ate supervision over trading in securities and publishes a daily stock price
list.2" The Bdrsenkommissar participates in stock exchange meetings,
controls the records of the exchange, supervises the payment of statutory
fees as well as the posting of necessary bonds. The Bbrsenkomissar also
exercises other supervisory functions relating to the day-to-day function-
ing of the stock exchange.2 Since the Geneva stock exchange is predomi-
nantly a private institution, governmental rules are much less stringent
than in Zurich or Basle.25 The Cantonal government can, however, pro-
hibit the quotation of foreign securities if the country of origin does not
permit the trading of Swiss securities.2" The Cantonal government ap-
points the Stock Exchange Commissioners, who have the legal duty to
supervise the operation of the stock exchange and to announce and regis-
ter the stock prices. 27 In practice, the Commissioners' functions are lim-
ited since the stock exchange operates on a self-regulatory basis.
F. Self-Regulatory Authorities
There are two important self-regulatory organizations whose activi-
ties affect the securities markets. One is the Swiss Bankers' Association
(Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung) which is made up of virtually all
Bond for Stock Exchange Agents (Regierungsratsbeschluss betreffend Erh6hung der
Realkaution fiur Barsenagenten) of Apr. 1, 1980; Regulation on the Recordkeeping of Secur-
ities Dealers (Reglement aiber die Registerfaihrung der Wertpapierhtndler) of Apr. 30,
1974. These and other legal sources and self-regulatory rules can be found in a manual
(Handbuch der Basler Effektenbbrse), edited by the Barsenkommissariat Basel Stadt.
21. Bbrsengesetz, supra note 20, § 13.
22. Id. § 15.
23. Id. § 17.
24. Id. § 17.
25. The two only governmental regulations are: Law on the Stock Exchange of Geneva
(Loi cantonale sur la bourse de Genkve) of Dec. 20, 1856 [hereinafter Loi sur la Bourse];
Implementing Ordinance Regarding the Law on the Stock Exchange of Geneva (Rkglement
d'exkcution de la loi sur la bourse de Genkue) of Sept. 2, 1930 [hereinafter Rglement
d'exkcution]. For a comprehensive collection of the governmental and the private regulation
of the stock exchange of Geneva, the Geneva Stock Exchange has edited a special manual
(Manuel de la bourse de Genkve).
26. Loi sur la Bourse, supra note 25, art. 2.
27. Id. art. 7.
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Swiss banks. The other is the Association of Swiss Stock Exchanges (Ver-
einigung schweizerischer Effektenbbrsen) comprised of all seven Swiss
stock exchanges.
The Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung has passed a broad series of
Agreements (Konventionen I - XIX) covering many aspects of the bank-
ing business. These Agreements, which have certain anti-competitive pro-
visions, have recently been investigated by the Swiss antitrust authorities
(Cartel Commission). In its final report, the Cartel Commission recom-
mended the elimination or alteration of many of the anti-competitive re-
strictions contained in the Konventionen.8 The Bankiervereinigung has
accepted some of these recommendations and vigorously disputed the ar-
guments underlying others.29 It is generally expected that the Depart-
ment of Finance and Customs will transform the Cartel Commission's
recommendations into legally enforceable orders.30
Two Agreements of the Bankiervereinigung affect the Swiss securi-
ties markets. The first is Agreement XVII on Domestic Securities Issues
(Konvention XVII betreffend das inlindische Emissionsgeschtift). It es-
tablishes a calendar for domestic offerings in order to prevent an undesir-
able cumulation of new securities issues. The second is the Agreement
XIX on Notes of Foreign Debtors (Konvention XIX iUber Notes aus-
liindischer Schuldner). It establishes certain disclosure requirements,
prohibits private notes in denominations of less than SFr. 50,000 and
does not allow a quotation of notes on the stock exchanges."' The Swiss
Cartel Commission has recommended that the minimum denomination
rule as well as the quotation prohibition be eliminated.2
The Vereinigung Schweizerischer Effektenbbrsen has also adopted
two important regulations affecting the Swiss securities markets. One is
the Swiss Brokerage Convention of September 16, 1985 (Courtage-
Konvention). In its original version, the Convention fixed the minimum
brokerage fees for all transactions in equity and debt securities effected
both in Switzerland and on foreign securities exchanges. The Cartel Com-
mission severely criticized the Courtage-Konvention as price fixing and
recommended its elimination.3 3 The Vereinigung Schweizerischer Ef-
fecktenbibrsen partially rejected the Commission's suggestions but did
present a new version of the Courtage-Konvention.s" It is expected that
the Department of Finance and Customs will support the Cartel Commis-
28. Veraffentlichungen der schweizerischen Kartelikommission und des
Preisberwachers (VSK) 1989, no. 3 [hereinafter VSK 1989/3.
29. Banken im Wettbewerb, Stellungnahme der Banken und Barsen zum Bericht der
Schweizerischen Kartellkommission 1989 [hereinafter Banken im Wettbewerb]
30. See infra notes 54, 55, 112 and accompanying text.
31. Agreement XIX on Notes of Foreign Debtors (Konvention XIX iber Notes aus-
ldndischer Schuldner). See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
32. VSK 1989/3, supra note 28, 81 et seq.
33. Id. at 86 et seq.
34. Banken im Wettbewerb, supra note 29, 86 et seq.
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sion's suggestions and that the Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung will
appeal the orders of the Department the Swiss Supreme Court.3"
The second important Agreement adopted by the Vereinigung
Schweizerischer Effektenbbrsen is the Convention on the Admission of
Foreign Securities for Trading and Listing on the Swiss Stock Exchanges
of November 4, 1938 (Vereinbarung betreffend die Zulassung von aus-
Itdndischen Wertpapieren zum offiziellen Handel an den schweizerischen
Effektenbbrsen). This Convention was initially signed by the seven Swiss
stock exchanges, the Swiss Nationalbank, the Federal Department for Fi-
nance and Customs and the Cantonal governments of Zurich and Basle.
In its original version, the Convention provided that a Swiss Admission
Office (Schweizerische Zulassungsstelle), comprised of six members se-
lected by the Vereinigung Schweizerischer Effektenbbrsen and three
members designated by the Federal Department of Finance and Customs,
had to pass upon the acceptability for listing of foreign securities on
Swiss stock exchanges. Since 1985, the Admission Office has granted ad-
mission only to debtors of a certain rating quality. In 1988, a decision was
made that securities not meeting the required standards would be admit-
ted to a second or "B" market. This second market has not yet been
established.
The Cartel Commission has further charged that the Swiss Admis-
sion Office is dominated by interested parties. Consequently, it has rec-
ommended replacement of the present admission procedure with a dis-
closure scheme.3 6 The Vereinigung Schweizerischer Effektenbbrsen has
again reacted negatively to these suggestions."s
II. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
As previously mentioned, 8 Switzerland has no comprehensive federal
securities legislation. At the federal level, there are five laws that primar-
ily affect the securities markets. The first of these is the Swiss Federal
Code of Obligations (Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht) (CO) dated
March 30, 1911, as amended). It contains the corporate law of Switzer-
land (Articles 620-763), including requirements for the offering of shares
in connection with the formation of a Swiss company (Article 631) as well
as for any subsequent issuance of shares by such a company (Article 650).
The CO also contains provisions relating to potential liability of incorpo-
rators, directors and officers, among others, in connection with the issu-
ance of securities (Articles 752-761). Additionally, the CO has many pro-
visions regarding specific forms of securities (Articles 965-1155). Finally,
the CO regulates the offering of bonds by domestic and foreign issuers
(Articles 1156-1186).
35. See infra notes 54, 55, 112 and accompanying text.
36. VSK 1989/3, supra note 28, at 93 et seq.
37. Banken im Wettbewerb, supra note 29, 92 et seq.
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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A further federal law affecting the Swiss securities market is the Na-
tionalbankgesetz. Article 16(i) contains provisions that allow the Federal
Council to limit or prohibit the acquisition by foreigners of domestic se-
curities and to limit the importation of foreign bank notes. The
Bankengesetz and the Implementing Ordinance of May 17, 1972, also
have several rules affecting the securities markets. The most important is
Article 8 requiring that notification be given of certain transactions in
foreign securities to the Nationalbank. These capital export regulations
can also restrict issues in foreign countries denominated in Swiss Francs.
Additional sources of federal law are the Anlagefondsgesetz and the
Anlagefondsverordnung. Both regulate in detail the management of in-
vestment funds. Of particular importance for foreign investors is the Or-
dinance on Foreign Investment Funds (Verordnung iiber die auslindis-
chen Anlagefonds) of January 13, 1971 (Anlagefondsverordnung), listing
specific requirements for foreign investment funds.
Switzerland adopted in 1988 a federal insider trading law. This law,
contained in Article 161 of the Federal Criminal Code (Schweizerisches
Strafgesetzbuch) of December 21, 1937, as amended, prohibits insider
transactions by certain persons in securities traded on Swiss stock
exchanges.
There are a number of other laws and regulations which indirectly
affect the trading of securities in Switzerland. One is the so-called Lex
Friedrich which restricts the purchase of real estate by foreigners. As
soon as the value of real estate property of a Swiss company is higher
than a certain percentage (one third as a general rule) of the total assets,
the acquisition of its shares by foreigners may cause legal problems. An-
other regulation influencing capital markets is the Swiss stamp tax law.
This law requires a tax on the issuance of new securities and has so far
prevented the formation of a Euro-market in Switzerland.
III. SECURITIES MARKETS AND PARTICIPANTS
A. Introduction
The seven stock exchanges in Switzerland are located in Zurich, Ge-
neva, Basle, Bern, St.Gallen, Neuchatel and Lausanne. Only the stock ex-
changes in Zurich, Geneva and Basle are included in the following discus-
sion. The other exchanges play a minor role and trade mainly in securities
of a purely local character. The Zurich exchange had the largest turnover
in securities in 1988 (569 billion SFr.),"9 followed by Geneva (200 billion
SFr.) 0 and Basle (83 billion SFr.)."I In 1988, the Zurich stock exchange
listed 2,919 securities of which 1,504 were Swiss bonds, 880 were foreign
bonds, 309 were Swiss equity securities and 226 were foreign equity secur-
39. ZURICH STOCK EXCHANGE, FACTS AND FIGURES 1988, at 5.
40. GENEVA STOCK EXCHANGE, ANNUAL REPORT 1988, at 18.
41. BASLE STOCK EXCHANGE, 1988, at 69.
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ities."I In 1988, the Basle stock exchange listed 2,691 securities of which
1,341 were Swiss bonds, 876 foreign bonds, 249 Swiss equity securities
and 225 foreign equity securities.' The Geneva stock exchange listed in
1988 2,324 securities of which 964 were Swiss bonds, 878 foreign bonds,
240 Swiss equity securities and 242 foreign equity securities."
To date, the Swiss stock exchanges have operated independently of
one another. Each has promulgated its own rules, which in turn are sub-
ject to the respective cantonal laws. Recently, discussions and prepara-
tory investigations have been initiated concerning the introduction of a
federal electronic stock exchange. The outcome of such discussions and
investigations is uncertain at this time.
B. Trading in Listed Securities
Trading in listed securities is the most common form of investment
in Switzerland. On each stock exchange, the responsibility for an orderly
trade in listed securities lies with the representative of the trade office
(Bbrsenkommissar).'5 The Bbrsenkommissar has the power to suspend
trading for short periods of time when large variations in the trading
price of a security occur.'
In order for a security to be listed on a stock exchange, a listing ap-
plication must be submitted to the stock exchange on which listing is
sought. Each stock exchange conducts a review of listing applications re-
ceived in light of its listing requirements. Before a foreign security may
be listed, however, it first must be approved by the Swiss Admission Of-
fice, which examines the suitability of foreign securities upon application
from the issuers.' 7 A decision by the Admission Office that a security is
unsuitable for listing precludes listing on any stock exchange in Switzer-
land. However, a decision by the Admissions Office that a security is suit-
able for listing is not binding upon the individual exchanges, which are
free to make their own determinations. The future of these rules on ad-
missions of foreign securities, however, is unclear in view of the recent
recommendations of the Swiss Cartel Commission.'
In 1989, the Geneva stock exchange introduced a so-called second
42. ZURICH STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 39, at 5.
43. BASLE STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 41, at 54.
44. GENEVA STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 40, at 19 et seq.
45. Wertpapiergesetz, supra note 16, § 30 (Zurich); Bbrsengesetz, supra note 20, § 17
(Basle); Implementing Ordinance of the Loi de la Bourse, supra note 25, § 3 (Geneva).
46. Bbrsenordnung, supra note 20, 3 (Zurich); Bbrsengesetz, supra note 20, § 17(m)
(Basle); R~glement d'exfcution, supra note 25, art. 25 (Geneva).
47. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Details on this procedure are contained
in the Reglementation on the Admission of Foreign Securities on Swiss Stock Exchanges
(Reglement iiber die Zulassung von auslaindischen Valoren an die schweizerischen Bbrsen)
of May 13, 1987, as well as in the Directives for the Decisions of the Admission Office
(Richtlinien fir die Entscheidung der Zulassungsstelle) of Oct. 19, 1988.
48. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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market (deuxi~me march ).49 It should allow the trading of securities of
mid-sized companies, particularly venture capital enterprises, that do not
yet meet the listing conditions of the regular stock exchange but which
would still like to realize the advantages of an officially regulated stock
exchange. This second market does not, as a matter of principle, affect
the pre-bourse of Geneva directly. Nevertheless, it is expected that the
unofficial trading will play a less significant role since some of its volume
will probably be absorbed by the second market.
C. Regulated Trade in Unlisted Securities
Each of the three major stock exchanges have regulated unofficial
trading or "pre-bourse" (Vorbbrse or ausserbirslicher Handel) at which
securities of companies are traded that cannot or do not desire to meet
the official listing requirements. The trading takes place before or after
the normal trading hours at the regular rings. The trading itself follows
rules similar to those of the official stock exchanges. The Zurich stock
exchange has a specific regulation for the unofficial trading.50 It provides
that the unofficial trading is to be supervised by the Stock Exchange As-
sociation, but not by the Bbrsenkommissar. Accordingly, the resulting
stock prices have only an unofficial character. The Vbrborsenreglement
stipulates trading rules and defines the disclosure requirements which are
much less stringent than those required by the normal listing rules."1
Some of the companies trading their securities on the pre-bourse either
do not meet the listing requirements or prefer to avoid the more exten-
sive disclosure rules required for listing. Other issuers use the unofficial
stock exchange as a first step to achieving an official listing. Finally,
newly issued bonds are often traded unofficially pending distribution of
finalized documents. In August 1988, the volume of securities traded on
the pre-bourse was: 363 in Zurich, 363 in Geneva and 299 in Basle.52
D. Unregulated Trade in Unlisted Securities
Unofficial trading activities should be distinguished from off-the-floor
trades in securities. In Switzerland, a significant amount of trading is con-
49. For the legal reglementation of the second market see Deuxime March , Rgle-
ment, directives d'application, Recommendations de la bourse de Gen~ve 1989. While capi-
tal requirements for this Deuxime March are less stringent, stricter disclosure rules do
apply.
50. Reglement i~ber die Vorbbrse of Apr. 17, 1980, as amended [hereinafter Vorbbr-
senreglement]. The legal reglementation of the unofficial trading of Geneva can be found in
the Directives of the Pre-Bourse (Directives du march avantbourse) of Sept. 28, 1987. Ba-
sle also has a similar trading institution which bears the name "pre-market" (ausserbbr-
slicher Handel). It is not explicitly regulated.
51. Vorborsenreglement, supra note 50, art. 6. The Ziarcher Effektenbbrsenverein re-
cently announced a revision of the Vorbrsenreglement which, among other amendments,
introduces an official supervision of the trading by the Bbrsenkommissar.




ducted outside the regular stock exchanges directly among the banks and
other financial institutions. Since the Swiss securities laws do not require
that all exchanges of listed securities take place on the stock exchanges, a
trader is basically free to conduct transactions on or off the exchange
floor.
Off-the-floor trade is often conducted by a bank by internally offset-
ting customers' buying against those selling. Such transactions are carried
out off the floor but are confirmed to clients as having been executed on
the relevant stock exchange. The bank then settles up at the official stock
exchange prices. This method is often the simplest and cheapest way to
carry out clients' orders.
In most cases banks act legally as self-contractors (i.e., they operate
directly as the contracting party). This increases the confidentiality of the
transaction. Moreover, the bank, not an unknown third party, is liable for
payment and delivery of the security.
E. Options and Financial Futures
In 1988, the private organization SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Fi-
nancial Futures Exchange AG) began to offer a fully automated exchange
for traded options and financial futures and for clearing all traded con-
tracts. Currently, the trade is limited to options on the stock of twelve
large Swiss companies as well as one index option. In the future, the in-
troduction of further options and financial futures is planned.
The SOFFEX-trading occurs completely outside the traditional stock
exchange structure. Stock prices are registered on a fully electronic basis.
Since options are not securities in the sense of the Zurich
Wertpapiergesetz, the SOFFEX-activities are under no governmental
control. There are, however, relatively strict private regulations5 that
provide, among other things, that
1. all transactions must be conducted through the SOFFEX system;
2. transaction volumes must be published;
3. market makers are obliged to make price offers; and
4. SOFFEX has the ability to sanction its members through various
specified means.
F. Brokerage Commissions
Switzerland has a long standing tradition of privately fixed brokerage
fees. The 1986 version of the Brokerage Convention (Courtage-Konven-
tion) set minimum prices for brokerage services, except in securities
transaction in excess of SFr. 2 million which could be privately negoti-
ated. This horizontal price fixing purportedly served to prevent ruinous
53. SOFFEX, RULES AND REGULATIONS.
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price competition and to enhance market transparency.
As already mentioned,54 the Cartel Commission severely criticized
the 1986 Brokerage Convention in its report on anti-competitive practices
in the banking sector and suggested its elimination within a reasonable
period of time.5
The Vereinigung Schweizerischer Effektenbbrsen did not accept this
recommendation, arguing that a total elimination of the fixed fees would
lead to an economically and socially undesirable concentration and re-
structuring of the sector. It did, however, enact a more liberal Brokerage
Convention that became effective in January, 1990. In its new version, the
Brokerage Convention allows fixed brokerage fees for transactions smaller
than SFr. 500,000. The new Brokerage Convention significantly increases
the fees for small transactions.
The future of the fixed brokerage commissions as well as the new
Brokerage Convention itself appears to be highly uncertain. The Broker-
age Convention has come under attack by members of the financial com-
munity. Additionally, some banks have given notice of their termination
from the Convention. It is expected that the Department of Finance and
Customs will transform the Cartel Commission's recommendations into
strict orders. The member banks would then have recourse to the Federal
Supreme Court.
G. Stock Prices
On all important Swiss stock exchanges, the prices for listed securi-
ties are established through a "bid and ask" system. Only on the SOF-
FEX, where Swiss options and financial futures are traded, are the prices
fixed on a purely electronic basis. The cantonal stock exchange laws re-
quire the publication of the closing stock prices of listed securities in a
special publication called the Kursblatt.5" The final prices of securities
unofficially traded as well as the SOFFEX prices are also published in the
Kursblatt.5
7
H. The Role of Commercial Banks in Securities Markets
Switzerland has a universal banking system. There are no legal rules
requiring a separation of the commercial and investment activities of
banks. A large number of different banks exist which are variously la-
belled as commercial, mortgage, savings, private, cantonal, local and for-
54. See supra note 33-34 and accompanying text.
55. VSK 1989/3, supra note 28, 86 et seq.
56. See Wertpapiergesetz, supra note 16, §§36, 38 (Zurich); Wertpapierverordnung,
supra note 16, § 11 (Zurich); Bbrsengesetz, supra note 20, § 17 (Basle); Bbrsenordnung,
supra note 20, § 21 (Basle); and R~glement d'ex~cution, supra note 25, § 5 (Geneva).
57. This official publication of unofficial prices is not undisputed. It has been argued,
for instance, that such a practice violates Section 11 of the Wertpapierverordnung (Zurich).
See KOLB, supra note 52, 84.
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eign banks. Most of these banks, with the possible exception of savings
institutions, are involved in a broad variety of banking and financial oper-
ations. While some of these banks are specialized solely in areas not re-
lated to securities transactions, most offer an extensive array of securities
transaction services. Banks are the most important participants on the
Swiss securities markets. They perform many functions, including those
typically performed by investment companies, investment advisors, bro-
ker-dealers and underwriters. Banks also perform investment advisory
functions in Switzerland. While many individuals and companies are ac-
tive in this unregulated field, private banks and special investment advi-
sory departments of larger banks are the predominant actors. The broker-
dealer business is also heavily dominated by the Swiss banks. Almost all
members of the cantonal stock exchanges that are admitted to the floor
are banks. The relevant figures are: twenty-nine for Zurich, twenty-four
for Geneva and eighteen for Basle. 8 Many of the over-the-counter dealers
are also banks. Other market participants include finance companies and
similar institutions. In Zurich there are 232, in Geneva fifty-eight, in Ba-
sle thirty such over-the-counter dealers.
I. Foreign Financial Institution and Securities in Swiss Capital
Markets
Recently, Switzerland has seen a significant increase in the activities
of foreign participants in the Swiss capital markets. This is particularly
true for foreign banks and finance companies, which often create subsidi-
aries in Switzerland. The number of foreign securities traded on Swiss
stock exchanges is quite significant.
In 1988, there were 116 foreign banks in Switzerland, of which ap-
proximately twenty were American. Moreover, 102 finance companies
from abroad, including twenty American companies, were active in
Switzerland."9
The participation of foreign institutions on Swiss stock exchanges is
somewhat limited. There are a few foreign securities exchange members
with access to the floor but currently no U.S. banks. However, a number
of foreign institutions are dealers in the over-the-counter market. These
include the American institutions Chase Manhattan, Citibank, First Bos-
ton, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and J.P. Morgan among others.
The number of foreign securities traded on Swiss stock exchanges is
impressive. In Zurich, 226 equity securities of foreign companies are
traded, including 110 of American corporations. The number of foreign
listed bonds amounts to 880, of which 149 were issued by American com-
panies. Geneva has 242 foreign stocks listed, including 113 American eq-
58. The most recent figures can be found in ZURICH STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 39;
BASLE STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 41; GENEVA STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 40.
59. Figures and names can be found in SCHWEIZERISCHE NATIONALBANK, DAS SCHWEIZER-
ISCHE BANKWESEN IM JAHRE 1988, 308 et seq. (1989).
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uity securities. Geneva also lists 878 foreign bonds. In Basle, 225 foreign
equity securities and 876 foreign debt securities are listed. 0
J. Types of Transactions
The standing customs (Usanzen) of the major Swiss stock exchanges
carefully define the different types of transactions carried out." Four ma-
jor forms can be distinguished:
1. Cash (or Spot) Transactions
Cash or spot transactions are the simplest and most frequent type of
stock exchange operations. In Zurich, all bonds and about seventy percent
of the shares are traded on a cash basis. Theoretically, delivery and pay-
ment occur immediately after the deal is closed. For practical reasons,
both take place between the third and the tenth day after the trade.
2. Fixed Forward Transactions
In fixed forward transactions (Termingeschiifte), closing and execu-
tion of the contract are separated. At closing, all terms (including price)
of the deals are fixed, yet the performance takes place on a pre-deter-
mined future date. In Zurich, for instance, fixed forward transactions are
executed as of the last day of a month which may be the last day of the
current month, the next month or the month after. The Basle and Ge-
neva exchanges also allow forward trading at six or nine months in the
future. Forward trading in registered shares is limited on all stock ex-
changes to no more than three months.
In 1986, the Zurich stock exchange allowed forward trading in Swiss
warrants. Deals may be made for settlements in one, two or three months,
but only transactions related to warrants existing in quantities of at least
SFr. 50,000 may be traded forward.
3. Premium Trading (Prtrmiengeschiift)
Premium trading is a special type of contingent or optional transac-
tion. When a premium deal is closed, price, premium and date of execu-
tion are agreed upon. However, the buyer reserves the right to withdraw
from the contract (i.e., to cancel the deal on the option day). If the buyer
cancels the contract, however, he must pay the seller compensation in the
form of a premium, which normally amounts to two to five percent of the
market price (ecart). Premium trading allows investors to engage in spec-
ulative transactions with limited risks. Economically, they fill the func-
60. For these and additional figures, see sources quoted supra note 58.
61. All the transaction forms discussed below are regulated in the stock exchanges' cus-
tom rules. For Zurich, see Usanzen, for Basle, Usanzen fir den Wertpapierhandel an der
Basler Effektenbarse, § 21 et seq. Geneva has no specific Usanzen, but see R~glement
d'ex~cution, supra note 25, art. 42 et seq.
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tion of call option deals.
Premium trading occurs only for fully paid shares. In addition, there
is no premium or forward trading for shares of banks and insurance com-
panies or for units of investment trusts. Theoretically and legally, put
options would also be possible in which the seller reserves the right to
withdraw from the contract. Such transactions are, however, no longer
executed in Zurich.
4. Carry-over Transactions (Contango Transactions) and Back-
wardation Transactions
These are deals between banks (credit transactions) which are closely
interrelated with the proceedings on the stock exchange. For example, an
investor may purchase securities in a forward deal speculating to resell
them at a higher price. If the price goes down, it is possible to "lengthen"
his position by means of a carry-over transaction. Such carry-over trans-
actions are economical advances granted by the bank. Accordingly, the
bank will require the payment of interest or other charges.
IV. DEFINITION AND FORMS OF SECURITIES
A. Legal Rules
The Swiss Code of Obligations has a broad set of rules related to the
definitions and legal characteristics of securities.2 Article 965 defines a
security as "any document in which a right is incorporated in such a way
that it cannot be claimed or transferred to others without the document."
The legal rules distinguish three specific categories of negotiable instru-
ments. The first is securities in a specific name. These may be trans-
ferred by a change of possession of the instrument together with a written
declaration which need not be written on the security itself. 3 The second
is bearer securities. They may change hands by the mere transfer of the
document based on a valid contract." The final category includes securi-
ties made out to order, which are transferable by delivery of the docu-
ment together with an endorsement. In addition to these general rules,
the Swiss Code of Obligations has extensive provisions for certain securi-
ties, including bills of exchange and promissory notes,6 5 checks,66 instru-
ments similar to bills of exchange, promissory notes and other securities
made out to order,67 as well as documents of title to goods. 8
62. CO, art. 965 et seq.
63. Id. art. 974 et seq.
64. Id. art. 978 et seq.
65. Id. art. 990 et seq.
66. Id. art. 1100 et seq.
67. Id. art. 1145 et seq.
68. Id. art. 1153 et seq.
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B. Types of Securities
On Swiss securities markets, a broad variety of securities are traded.
Three major types can be distinguished, namely equity, debt and other
instruments.
1. Equity Securities
Equity securities can confer on owners rights to, among other things,
vote, receive dividends and share in liquidation proceeds. Registered
shares are not freely negotiable and give full ownership rights to new
owners only when the transfers are entered into the company's share-
holder register.69 Bearer shares are not issued in a specific name. For this
reason they do not need to be registered and are easily negotiable. Pre-
ferred shares allow for different treatment among categories of stockhold-
ers.70 In recent years, certificates of participation (Partizipationsscheine)
have been issued with increasing frequency. They approximate non-vot-
ing shares since they are equity instruments without voting rights that
are entitled only to share in earnings and liquidation proceeds. Another
form of non-voting share is a dividend right certificate (Genussschein)
which may, under certain conditions, be issued to incorporators or credi-
tors in connection with a financial restructuring.7 1
2. Bonds
Bonds, of which there are numerous forms, are debt instruments giv-
ing the holder a right to interest as well as return of the principal. Mort-
gage bonds are bonds secured by real estate that grant holders a lien that
is entered in the mortgage register. Convertible bonds are debt instru-
ments with a right of conversion at a pre-determined ratio into an equity
security. Debt securities also include warrants that grant the right to ac-
quire additional equity instruments upon meeting certain predetermined
conditions. The option certificate is normally printed on the coupon sheet
and can be detached and traded separately on the stock exchanges. Spe-
cial (but important) types of bonds are covered warrants which grant the
same rights but require a cash payment by the holders.
3. Other Securities
Shares in investment funds are playing an increasingly important
role in Swiss securities markets. Such shares represent a joint capital in-
vestment by numerous investors under the responsibility of a fund man-
ager. Although legal instruments of ownership, they give investors only a
69. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
70. An example of this is the payment of five dividends on the preferred shares before
dividend payments to other shareholders.
71. CO, art. 657.
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claim against the fund management.72
Notes are also debt instruments that are not normally publicly issued
but are usually distributed on a private basis to a select number of inves-
tors. Legally, holders have similar rights to bond holders.
Traded options and financial futures are not securities in the tradi-
tional sense. Traded options represent fungible rights to purchase or sell
securities. Financial futures are fungible contracts with respect to
securities.
4. Restrictions of Transfers of Registered Shares
A singular feature of the Swiss capital market is the degree to which
registered shares can be and are under severe restrictions on transfer
(Vinkulierung). Under current legal rules, the board of a company may
refuse to enter a purported transfer in the stock register for any of the
reasons stated in the Company's articles of incorporation. The three most
important reasons for a refusal are typically contained in a company's
Articles of Incorporation are the acquisition of shares by a competitor,
the purchase of shares by a foreign individual or company, and purchases
which bring the purchasers holdings over a given threshold, (e.g.,
purchases over three percent). Moreover, the registration of a new share-
holder may, if appropriate provision is made in the articles of incorpora-
tion, be refused without disclosure of any reason for such refusal.73 Re-
fusal by a company to register a new stockholder has severe consequences
for the stockholder's legal position. Under Swiss law his or her rights are
separated into two categories (Spaltungstheorie). The first, participation
rights (especially the voting right), remain with the seller (record holder)
who theoretically can vote without having any economic interest. The
new holder, however, gains the second category which includes all finan-
cial rights, in particular the right to receive dividends. Although the
holder is the economic owner, he cannot participate in the Company's
decision-making process. This Spaltungstheorie, created by the Swiss Su-
preme Court, has recently come under severe criticism.74
In practice, almost all Swiss companies with registered shares have
transfer restrictions. Many still grant the board power to refuse recorda-
tion of a transfer without any obligation to substantiate the grounds for
such refusal. Lately, however, many larger corporations have liberalized
their ability to, or propensity to, refuse recognition of transfers.
Vinkulierung has brought about an intensive debate in business and
political circles. Many foreign companies and government agencies have
72. See infra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
73. CO, art. 686.
74. The pending revision of Swiss corporation law will probably eliminate the Spal-
tungstheorie by providing that all rights (including financial rights) are transferable only
upon registration. Cf. Botschaft liber die Revision des Aktienrechts of Feb. 23, 1983, 158 et
seq. [hereinafter Borschaft].
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severely criticized the Swiss Vinkulierung rules. Domestic companies that
have been active on the takeover scene abroad, now face the demand for
reciprocity (i.e., to allow at home what they are doing abroad). Vinku-
lierung has also become one of the most hotly disputed issues in the
ongoing revision of the company code. The new version will probably al-
low a Vinkulierung only when the reasons for a refusal are substantiated
in the articles of incorporation. Moreover, it is very probable that public
companies will be permitted to have only a severely limited number of
transfer restrictions. It is quite possible that Swiss companies whose
shares are publicly traded will only be allowed to introduce a percentage
clause (i.e., a provision restricting a new shareholder's holdings to a cer-
tain percentage limit). The traditional foreign ownership clauses prevent-
ing foreign ownership of public companies will, in view of the ongoing
European integration process, most likely be prohibited.
V. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES
A. Introduction
The disclosure rules affecting the Swiss capital markets are relatively
mild when compared with the obligations imposed upon offerings of se-
curities in the United States. There are essentially four legal sources of
registration and disclosure requirements in Switzerland. Statutory provi-
sions are provided for in the CO, the Bankengesetz and the Anlagefond-
sgesetz. Article 631 of the CO requires some disclosure for newly incorpo-
rated companies issuing shares. Article 651 of the CO requires certain
disclosures for Swiss corporations issuing additional stock. Article 1156 of
the CO requires that certain information be made available in connection
with a public offering of bonds. Article 8 of the Bankengesetz contains
specific rules covering all public and private offerings made by a bank of
foreign securities or on behalf of a foreign issuer. There are also specific
registration and disclosure provisions relating to investment funds. 5
A second source of registration and disclosure rules can be found in
the stock exchanges' regulations. There are general listing and prospectus
delivery requirements, as well as specific prerequisites for the admission
to listing of the securities of foreign issuers.
Finally, two Conventions of the Swiss Bankers' Association prescribe
that certain disclosure be made in connection with certain securities of-
ferings. The first is a specific Agreement on privately placed notes (Con-
vention XIX); the other relates to unified conditions for issues by public
debtors (Grosses Syndikat fir Emissionen inlidndischer offentlich-rech-
tlicher Schuldner).
B. Statutory Disclosure Requirements
Article 631 of the CO requires that a prospectus be published when
75. See infra notes 214, 227, 241, 243 and accompanying text.
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shares are publicly offered in connection with the incorporation of a Swiss
company. This is a relatively unusual occurrence since the shares of new
corporations are not often directly offered to the public but are first un-
derwritten on a firm commitment basis by a bank or a bank syndicate.
The disclosure requirements are not at all extensive. They cover only in-
formation regarding the organization of the company, the nature of any
assets received in exchange for stock, specific benefits granted to the in-
corporators and the terms of the subscription offer.7' The law also pro-
vides that a "special prospectus may be dispensed with if the subscription
certificates contain the names of all founders and the information pre-
scribed in this article. '77
According to Article 651 of the CO, existing companies issuing new
shares must publish a prospectus that is somewhat more extensive than
that required of a new company. It must include, among other items, in-
formation regarding the past operations of the company including a bal-
ance sheet and statement of profit and loss for the past year, the last
auditor's report, the dividend history, data on loans and debt securities,
and assets received in exchange for stock.7 Again, no special prospectus
76. In detail, the prospectus must set forth (Article 631):
1. Specific clauses of the Articles of Incorporation required by law to be in-
cluded as well as the clauses that must appear in the articles of incorporation
in order to be valid.
2. Nature of the assets received in exchange for stock, acquisition of assets
immediately after incorporation and special benefits for the incorporators, if
any.
3. The essential elements of the report of the incorporators, as required by
Article 630, CO.
4. Date until which a subscription is binding.
5. Places where the subscriptions may be made.
6. Issue price of the shares.
7. Amount to be paid in on shares prior to the incorporation meeting of the
subscribers.
8. Places where payments for the shares may be made.
77. Id.
78. In detail, the prospectus must disclose the following information (Article 651):
1. Date of registration of the company in the Commercial Register.
2. Name and registered office of the company.
3. Amount and structure of the equity capital, indicating par value of shares,
types and classes of shares as well as preferential rights.
4. Profit-sharing certificates and their respective rights.
5. Members of the board and auditors.
6. Balance sheet and profit and loss statement of the last year together with
the auditors' report.
7. Dividends paid during the last 5 years or, if the company existed for less
than 5 years, since the incorporation.
8. Debt securities issued by the company.
9. The resolution authorizing the new issue of shares including the aggregate
amount, par value, offering price, as well as number and type of the new
shares.
10. Assets received in exchange for stock, acquisition of assets immediately af-
ter the issuance as well as any preferential rights.
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is required if the information called for is contained in the subscription
form.79 Whereas Articles 631 and 651 of the CO apply only to companies
incorporated in Switzerland, Article 1156 of the CO covers the issuance of
bonds by Swiss as well as by foreign debtors. Basically, the provisions of
Article 651 that relate to the issuance of new stock apply by analogy to a
public offering of bonds. Article 1156 further states that the "prospectus
must contain the detailed information concerning the loan, especially the
interest terms, terms of repayment, special security provided for the
bonds, and the representation, if any, of the bond creditors."' 0
C. Distribution of Prospectus
Neither Articles 631 and 651 of the CO, which cover the issuance of
stock, nor Article 1156 of the CO which addresses the public offering of
bonds, define in detail how the required prospectuses are to be distrib-
uted. Commentators generally agree that the prospectus must have at
least the same distribution as the report of founders, which must be avail-
able at all places at which shares or bonds can be purchased
(Zeichnungsstelie).1 A separate prospectus may be dispensed with if the
subscription certificates contain the names of all founders and the infor-
mation prescribed by Article 631, section 2 of the CO. 2 In the interest of
a successful stock or bond offering, issuers will normally go beyond the
legal requirements. They may either make loose copies of the prospectus
itself available or publish these documents or parts thereof in a daily
newspaper. Some commentators have expressed their views that these
voluntary disclosures should also meet the legal information requirements
of Articles 631, 651 and 1156 of the CO.8s
D. Listing Requirements
Securities must meet certain requirements before they can be ac-
cepted for trading on the Swiss stock exchanges. These conditions are
detailed in the listing regulations issued by the Swiss Stock Exchange As-
sociation. The listing requirements of Zurich and Basle are almost identi-
cal. 4 The following discussion concentrates on the rules of the Zurich
stock exchange.
11. Date from which the new shares are entitled to dividends as well as restric-
tions of the right to receive dividends and preferential rights.
12. Date until which the subscription is binding.
79. Id.
80. CO, art. 1156.
81. P. FORSTMOSER, SCHWEIZERIscHEs AKTIENRECHT, vol. I/1 267 (1981) (citing other
sources).
82. CO, art. 631. See also CO, art. 651.
83. Forstmoser, supra note 81, 267.
84. The listing requirements can be found in § 2, et seq., Kotierungsreglement des Ef-
fektenbbrsenvereins Z2rich [hereinafter Kotierungsreglement Zarich]; Kotierungsregle-
ment Basel, supra note 20, § 2 et seq.; Article 4, et seq., Rglement pour l'admission de
valeurs a la cote de la Bourse de GMeve [hereinafter R glement pour l'admission].
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A listing application must be sponsored by a member of the relevant
stock exchange.8s In addition, a specific admission procedure with a par-
ticular quotation request must be followed."6 Normally, securities will be
accepted for listing that have achieved a wide market among the invest-
ing public."7
To be listed, the issuer must meet certain requirements regarding
past disclosures and agree to make certain future disclosures. It must also
have a certain level of paid-in equity capital.8 8 To be listed, the securities
must meet certain requirements relating to nominal value or total market
capitalization, exercise of financial aggregate right, transfer modalities
and evidence of ownership. 8
E. Listing Prospectus
The Zurich, Basle and Geneva stock exchanges have similar require-
ments for preparation and delivery of prospectuses for newly listed secur-
ities.8 0 The following discussion focuses on the Zurich stock exchange pro-
visions. These provisions contain two general rules, namely that the
prospectus as well as the listing advertisement must constitute fair dis-
closure8 ' and that the prospectus should allow an evaluation of the listed
85. Kotierungsreglement Zilrich, supra note 84, §4.
86. Id. § 4 et seq.
87. Id. § 1.
88. Id. § 2 lists five conditions:
1. The candidate must have made available accounting figures for the last five
years.
2. The company is obliged to publish every year an audited balance sheet and
statement of profits and losses as well as a business report.
3. The paid-in equity capital must total a minimum of SFr. 5 million for do-
mestic and SFr. 10 million for foreign corporations.
4. The provisions are applicable by analogy if the issuer is a state, a local com-
munity or another public institution.
5. The requirements may be waived if a third party guarantees fully the obliga-
tions of the issuer.
89. Id. § 3, stipulates four different conditions:
1. The security must have either a minimum aggregate nominal value or a min-
imum total market capitalization (aggregate market value). For Swiss compa-
nies, the figures are SFr. 10 million and SFr. 25 million, respectively. For for-
eign companies they are SFr. 20 million and 50 million respectively.
2. The denomination of the shares must correspond with a unit under the
Bbrsenordnung.
3. For all debt securities as well as for all securities of Swiss issuers the pay-
ment of dividends, capital repayments, the exercise of preemptive rights and
similar financial claims must be possible without fees at a bank that is member
of the Zurich stock exchange.
4. The issuer must have clear rules with respect to the transfer of the shares on
the stock exchange as well as the certification on ownership.
90. Prospectus requirements can be found in id. § 7 et seq.; Kotierungsreglement Ba-
sel, supra note 20, §7 et seq.; Rfglement pour V'admission, supra note 84, art. 4 et seq.
91. Kotierungsreglement Ztlrich, supra note 84, § 7.2.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
security by investors." The listing prospectus must be made available,
without fee, by the sponsoring member of the stock exchange in either
German, French, Italian or English. 3 Instead of a prospectus, issuers may
publish in German in a Zurich newspaper a listing advertisement (Ko-
tierungsinserat) containing limited information about the issuer and the
securities to be listed.94 The listing advertisement must indicate that a
prospectus is available and that it is the only document relevant for the
stock exchange admission.9
The prospectus must contain information about the issuer as well as
about the issued securities. Issuer-related information requirements in-
clude, among other items, information related to the issuer's legal iden-
tity and economic activities, capital and voting structure, board, manage-
ment, auditors, dividends, issued bonds, accounting principles, annual
financial statements, and important subsidiaries."" The security-oriented
information that the prospectus must contain includes a description of
the legal basis of the security issuance, and a description of the security
itself (including voting rights). Information must also be included con-
92. Id. § 8.1.
93. Id.
94. Id. §§ 7.1 and 9.1. The listing advertisement must contain information about the
name, domicile and activity of the issuer, the name of the auditors, specified financial data
as well as information on dividends paid in the last 5 years or since incorporation. Moreover,
detailed data is required with respect to the issued security (including dividend and other
rights), payment services in Switzerland, information concerning unusual aspects of the se-
curities and information concerning certain procedures. See id. §§ 9.2 and 9.3.
95. Id. § 9.4.
96. The Kotierungsreglement Ziirich, id. § 8.2 requires the following information:
1. Information about the legal identity of the issuer (name, domicile, date of
incorporation, etc.) and description of its activities including any quotation on
other stock exchanges.
2. Description of the capital of the issuer (including total amount and structure
of the capital, reserves and other equity) as well as details on preemptive and
other preferential rights or claims.
3. Voting rights.
4. Members of the supervisory organ (board), and management and auditors.
5. Dividends paid in the last five years and other similar payments.
6. Summary data on public bonds (currency, amount, due date) with a descrip-
tion of guarantees and privileges.
7. Accounting principles and accounting year.
8. Last audited consolidated balance sheet and profit and loss statement as
well as report of the auditors.
9. All subsidiaries whose assets equal at least five percent of the assets of the
issuer or SFr. 100 million (with information concerning the participation and
capital structure of these subsidiaries)
10. Last quarterly or semi-annual report, if the period covered by the last au-
dited financial statement is more than six months removed.
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cerning the place of payment, the type and nature of any guarantees and
specified procedural requirements."7
F. Public Offering
Although the requirements of Articles 631 and 651 of the CO (issu-
ance of stock in a Swiss company) and the provisions of Article 1156 (is-
suance of bonds by any issuer) apply only in a public offering of securi-
ties, they contain no definition of such term. No major case law has
developed to address this issue. Modern commentators, however, largely
agree that public offering under Swiss law should have a meaning similar
to that developed internationally." A public offering is characterized by
the extension of subscription offers to an unlimited circle of investors who
are not known on an individual or personal basis to the issuer. 9" Whether
an offering is a public offering depends largely upon the relationship be-
tween the offerees and the issuer or underwriters. Of significance is the
manner in which the offeror seeks to contact the potential investors. Util-
ization of media with large audiences (like television, newspaper ads, etc.)
would cause the offer to be deemed public. The same would be true for an
overly aggressive advertising campaign that addressed the public at
large.100 Other aspects of the offering such as the par value of the securi-
97. Id. §8.3 requires the prospectus to contain the following information:
1. The legal basis of the securities issued and, if the issuer is a foreign com-
pany, the applicable law and jurisdiction.
2. A description of the security (including, among other information, its type,
rights, total amount, and transfer restrictions).
3. For securities that are shares, a description of voting rights and other pay-
ment obligations (if the capital has not been entirely paid in); if the securities
are bonds and similar securities, a complete listing of the borrowing conditions
(including conversion and option rights).
4. A designation of the place of payment in Zurich.
5. Description of the type and nature of any guarantee.
6. The obligation to publish timely all information with respect to the security
in a newspaper that is regularly published in Zurich.
7. Mention of the admission request and of other stock exchanges on which the
security is already quoted or an admission request is pending.
98. For an international perspective, see, e.g., Hopt, Schweizerisches Kapitalmark-
trecht - Begriff, Aufgaben und aktuelle Probleme, 38 WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT 101, 118
(1986).
99. The fact that the number or circle of offerees is somewhat limited, may not pre-
clude characterization as a public offering. Accordingly, even subscription offers by a large
bank to its existing clients (if the number is large), may be considered a public solicitation.
Cf. CAMENZIND, PROSPEKTZWANG UND PROSPEKTHAFTUNG BEIOFFENTLICHEN ANLEIHENSOBLIGA-
TIONEN UND NOTES 20 (1989); Hopt, supra note 98, at 118.
100. For more details (with extensive citations of the relevant literature) see F. TAISCH,
PRIVATPLACIERUNGEN 17 et seq. (1987); Schuster, in KOLLOQUIUM SCHWEIZERISCHES
KAPITALMARKTRECHT 199 (1987); CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 19 et seq.
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ties or the total amount of the issue may also be considered. 1'
Firm underwritings by banks or bank consortia play a major role in
Swiss capital markets. Many offerings of stocks and bonds are firmly un-
derwritten by banks that sell the securities afterwards to the public. This
raises the issue of whether the sale by the underwriter to the public
should be treated as a private or as a public offering.
The vast majority of commentators distinguish in this respect be-
tween an offering of stock and an offering of bonds. A purchase of stock
by a bank on a firm underwriting basis with a subsequent sale of the
shares to the public, is considered by most commentators to be a private
placement not requiring a prospectus. 02 The situation is viewed differ-
ently if one or more banks underwrite an issuance of bonds as firm under-
writers. The subsequent resale of the debt instruments is viewed as a
public offering. Consequently, such a transaction requires a prospectus
under Article 1156 of the CO.03
G. Private Placement of Notes
In commercial practice, notes are privately placed debt instruments
with maturity dates of between two to eight years from the date of issu-
ance, as opposed to listed bonds which have a maturity date between
eight and twelve years. Notes are distributed without any public adver-
tisements by a bank consortium and are not traded on stock exchanges.
Notes are sold in relatively large minimum denominations (SFr. 50,000
and more) to institutional and other sophisticated investors known to the
distributing banks. 0'
Notes play an important role in the Swiss capital markets; especially
for foreign issuers. In 1988, 260 private placements of notes by foreign
debtors were made with an aggregate offering price of SFr. 20.8 billion. In
the same period, only 144 regular bond issues were made by foreign com-
panies totalling SFr. 18.7 billion.'
The issuance of notes has been the subject of controversy. The Swiss
Nationalbank allowed the sale of notes for the first time in 1968 but
placed many restrictions on such sales. In 1986, a significant liberalization
101. CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 20. See also (in an international perspective) Hopt,
supra note 98, at 118.
102. See, e.g., P. FORSTMOSER, supra note 81 at 289 et seq.; CAMENZIND, supra note 99,
at 58.
103. MEIER-HAYOZ AND VON DER CRONE, WERTPAPIERRECHT 286 (1981); A. ERB, DER
PROSPEKT UND DIE PROSPEKTHArTUNG BEi ANLEIHENSEMISSIONEN AM SCHWEIZERISCHEN
KAPITALMARKT 135 (1986); CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 57.
104. Private notes have gained much attention in the financial and legal communities.
For a good description of capital market considerations as well as legal problems, see
TAISCH, supra note 100 and CAMENZIND, supra note 99. See also Merz & de Beer, Umfas-
sendere Informationspflichten bei Notes-Emissionen, 59 SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFT 137 (1987).
105. Banken im Wettbewerb, supra note 29, at 67.
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of the market for notes occurred which resulted in their placement to a
broader circle of investors. There were, however, no rules protecting in-
vestors. Under pressure from the Swiss Nationalbank, the Federal De-
partment of Finance and Customs and the Federal Banking Commission,
the Bankers' Association adopted effective as of May 1, 1987, an Agree-
ment on Notes of Foreign Debtors (Convention XIX).
Convention XIX has as its primary purpose the protection of pur-
chasers of notes of foreign debtors by requiring disclosure about the is-
suer and the securities both before and after private placement of the
notes. It covers sales of notes (i.e., direct placements by syndicate banks
to their own clients). The Convention prohibits price quotations of notes
on stock exchanges and requires a minimum denomination of SFr. 50,000.
For notes with a smaller par value, the provision of Article 1156 of the
CO are applicable."'
The most important rules of the Convention require the lead under-
writer to put together a prospectus.10 7 This disclosure document must
meet the requirements of Article 1156 of the CO. The prospectus must
disclose additional information with respect to the loan conditions, finan-
cial information, the names of guarantors, ratings, etc.108 The prospectus
is not publicly distributed, but every potential investor can require the
delivery of this prospectus from members of the underwriting
syndicate. 0 9
The legal future of notes is uncertain at this time. In its broad inves-
tigation of the banking sector, the Cartel Commission criticized Conven-
tion XIX. Although the Commission welcomed, as a matter of principle,
the self-regulatory investor protection Convention XIX represents, it rec-
ommended elimination of the provisions relating to minimum denomina-
tions and the prohibition of quotations on the stock exchanges.10 The
106. Convention XIX, supra note 31, art. 1.
107. Id. art. 2.
108. Id. art. 3 requires the following additional disclosures:
1. Summary of the note conditions, including option and conversion rights.
2. Information on the latest business developments if the issue is made more
than six months after the last annual statement.
3. Publication of the names of all guarantors.
4. Citation to the source of the disclosed information.
5. Indication of existing ratings for the securities published by international
rating institutions.
6. Specific information if the notes are tied to the issuance of shares.
7. The information that the leading underwriter has obligated the issuer to
deliver to him until the maturity date of the notes all business reports, reports
of the auditors as well as other relevant company documents.
109. Id. art. 4.
110. VSK 1989/3, supra note 28, 37 f.
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banks accepted the Commission's suggestion regarding quotation on stock
exchanges, but insisted on preservation of the minimum denomination re-
quirement in order to preserve segmentation of the market as well as
product differentiation.111 As already mentioned,112 it is generally ex-
pected that the Department of Finance and Customs will transform the
recommendations of the Commission into strict orders. Banks would then
have the possibility of recourse to the Swiss Supreme Court.
H. Specific Rules for Foreign Issuers
There are two key legal rules in Switzerland that affect foreign issues.
The first is statutory and requires authorization for certain transactions
involving movement of capital to or from foreign countries. The other is
self-regulatory and prescribes a specific admission procedure for foreign
securities on Swiss Stock Exchanges.
Article 8 of the Bankengesetz imposes a requirement on banks and
finance companies to notify the Nationalbank, and to receive authoriza-
tion for specific transactions with foreign debtors.118 The purpose of the
provision is to influence capital exports for reasons of public policy. The
Nationalbank may intervene in transactions when it is "in the interest of
the national currency, the development of the interest rates on the money
and capital markets, or the economic welfare of the nation.' 1 ' The fol-
lowing transactions fall within the information and approval
requirements:
1. Loans to foreign borrowers, whether the whole bond issue or only a
portion of it is taken firmly, either as an investment of the bank itself
or for public subscription, or whether it is taken on commission for
placement;
2. Purchase and issuance of shares of foreign companies, unless these
transactions are made pursuant to the exercise of an option;
3. Credits and investments abroad, whether they are made by granting
a loan for twelve months or more, or by purchasing foreign prescrip-
tions or treasury bills for twelve months or longer;
4. Participation in the first placement of debt certificates issued by a
foreign principal with a maturity of not less than twelve months."'
Article 8 does not apply to transactions that involve less than SFr.
111. Banken im Wettbewerb, supra note 29, at 64 et seq.
112. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
113. A similar provision can be found in Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 48. In
the case of significant economic problems, the Nationalbank may (after discussion with the
Bundesrat) prohibit the purchase of foreign securities and real estate for the account of
investment funds.
114. Bankengesetz, supra note 4, art. 8.3. Broader justifications, e.g., general considera-
tions of foreign policy, are not permitted.
115. Id. art. 8.2.
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10,000,000.-16 While these provisions may appear to create substantial
barriers for international capital movements, this is not the case in prac-
tice. Switzerland has maintained a traditionally liberal approach towards
international capital transactions. Accordingly, the Nationalbank is un-
likely to invoke its power under Article 8. This is evidenced by a report
the OECD published in 1989. It confirmed the liberal attitude of Switzer-
land and stressed, in particular, that Article 8 does not in fact create any
major obstacles to international capital transactions, at least as far as the
OECD countries are concerned.1 1
7
As has been discussed already,"' there is also an admission proce-
dure for foreign securities that has been established on a self-regulatory
basis by the Swiss stock exchanges. Its main purpose is to assure investor
protection by guaranteeing fair disclosure and by evaluating the quality
of the securities the issuer seeks to list. The admission criteria, as out-
lined in the new Reglementation of 1987,19 contain disclosure require-
ments that are almost identical to the general admission rules of the
Swiss stock exchanges.2 2 Additionally, the Directives for Decisions of the
Admission Office evaluate the quality and solvency of the issuer. The fol-
lowing criteria are taken into consideration:
1. General evaluation of the issuer.
2. Country risk and transferability.
3. Capital market suitability in the home country.
4. Safety for the investors.
5. Marketability of the issue.
6. Fair disclosure.
In its practice, the Admission Office also requires that Swiss law govern
and that disputes be adjudicated by Swiss courts. The Admission Office
has refused to list a significant number of candidates in the last couple of
years.
The entire admission procedure for foreign securities has been criti-
cized by various parties. As has been mentioned already, the Cartel Com-
mission has recommended a completely new approach.2 In addition,
many Swiss commentators have criticized the unequal treatment of Swiss
and foreign securities in view of the internationalization of the securities
116. Id. art. 8.5. For transactions falling under category 4, the provision of art. 8 apply
if the amount of the debt certificates is expected to exceed SFr. 3 million in a period of one
year.
117. See Neue Zdrcher Zeitung, Nr. 259, Nov. 7, 1989.
118. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
119. Reglementation Concerning the Admission of Foreign Securities for Trading and
Quotation on Swiss Stock Exchanges (Reglement iber die Zulassung von auslndischen
Wertpapieren zum Handel und zur Kotierung an den Schweizer Bbrsen) of May 13, 1987
[hereinafter Zulassungsreglement].
120. See id. § 204 stating simply that prospectus and advertisements shall follow the
general admission rules of the stock exchanges.
121. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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markets and the European integration process.122 The admission regime
has also been criticized by foreign observers, including the OECD in its
1989 report on the Swiss capital transfer policy.'23
I. Continuous Disclosure
1. Statutory Rules
The CO and other laws affecting the securities markets contain no
general disclosure even for publicly held companies. The CO merely
grants inspection rights to shareholders and creditors in certain instances.
According to Article 696 of the CO, the profit and loss statement and the
balance sheet, together with the auditors' report and the management's
business report, must be open for inspection not less than ten days prior
to the annual general meetings of stockholders at the company's main
office as well as at its branches. In addition, these documents must be
available for a period of one year for inspection, and each stockholder has
the right to request a copy of the profit and loss statement and of the
balance sheet.124 Upon request of a creditor, the company must provide
him or her with a profit and loss account and a balance sheet as approved
by the stockholders, both made available at the commercial register.'2 5
This complete lack of any disclosure rules, particularly in view of de-
veloping international standards, is outdated. More stringent reporting
and accounting provisions are major topics of debate in the context of the
pending revision of the company law portion of the CO. The Federal
Council proposed in its new draft disclosure rules requiring that annual
and consolidated statements be published by companies that have issued
bonds, whose shares are quoted on a stock exchange or which meet two of
the following elements: balance sheet total of SFr. 50 million; total turno-
ver of SFr. 100 million; or number of employees greater than 500.126 This
proposal has been heatedly disputed in the Parliament and it is difficult
to predict which disclosure concept will ultimately prevail.
The accounting and disclosure provisions for banks are far more
stringent than those imposed upon companies. 2 ' Banks must prepare an-
nual financial statements consisting of a balance sheet and a profit and
loss statement. In addition, institutions with total assets exceeding SFr.
50 million must prepare an interim balance sheet at the end of the first
six months of a financial period. Those with assets exceeding SFr. 200
million must prepare interim balance sheets at the end of the first three
122. One particularly prominent voice is, for example, the President of the Nation-
albank. See Lusser, Finanz und Wirtschaft, No. 75, Sept. 24, 1988, at 5.
123. Neue Zircher Zeitung, supra note 117.
124. CO, art. 696.
125. Id. art. 704.
126. Article 7(h) of the new draft. See also Botschaft, supra note 74, at 76 et seq.
127. See in particular, Bankengesetz, supra note 4, art. 6 and Bankenverordnung,
supra note 6, art. 23 et seq.
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financial quarters.12 8 The annual financial statements as well as the in-
terim balance sheets must be published or otherwise made accessible to
the public. " ' While the annual financial statements must be published in
the Swiss Commercial Gazette, a Swiss newspaper or in a printed or
mimeographed annual business report, the interim balance sheet must
appear in the Swiss Commercial Gazette, a Swiss newspaper, or in a
printed or mimeographed synopsis that may be published by a bank
association. 3 0
2. Self-Regulatory Rules
Admission rules of the important stock exchanges require corpora-
tions whose shares are publicly traded to make available annual state-
ments and business reports. As a condition to listing, candidates must
agree to publish annually a business report that can be obtained from the
introducing stock exchange member.13 ' This member guarantees in his re-
quest that the issuer will make available a business report and that the
member will inform the public about any changes to the by-laws or about
other important events.'32
Disclosure rules of a self-regulatory nature can also be found in Con-
vention XIX covering notes issued by foreign debtors. The introductory
prospectus must indicate that the lead underwriter obtained the agree-
ment from the debtor to provide it with business reports, auditors' re-
ports, interim statements and information regarding guarantees.'
3. Voluntary Disclosure
All things considered, the disclosure regime in Switzerland is consid-
erably less demanding than those of other countries. Many mid-sized and
large firms have developed disclosure policies which go far beyond the
legal requirements. Most larger companies send an annual business report
including financial statements to their shareholders. They also make such
information publicly available. Many voluntary improvements have also
been made with respect to the quality of the financial data prepared by
companies. This results in part from the fact that many Swiss companies
are active abroad and are influenced by the more rigorous disclosure stan-
dards of the host countries.'3 Despite these positive developments, the
overall disclosure level of Swiss companies is considerably below that of
many foreign countries.
128. Bankengesetz, supra note 4, §§ 1 and 3.
129. Id. art. 6.4.
130. Bankenverordnung, supra note 6, art. 27.
131. See, e.g., Kotierungsreglement Zurich, supra note 84, art. 2.2.
132. Id. art. 5.
133. Convention XIX, supra note 31, art. 3(g).
134. For a good description of recent developments, see D. BAUDENBACHER-TANDLER,
SCHUTZ VOR NEUEN ANLEGERRISIKEN 88 et seq. (1988); see also CH. J. MEIER-SCHATZ, WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT UND UNTERNEHMENSPUBLIZITXT 168 et seq. (1989).
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VI. FEDERAL FRAUD AND CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
A. Civil Liability Provisions (Overview)
Swiss law imposes civil law liability for fraud and other violations of
corporate and securities laws. The most important provisions of Swiss law
in this respect are Articles 752 and 1156 of the CO which dictate certain
obligations in connection with the public issuance of shares and bonds.
Article 39 of the Bankengesetz specifies a rule of civil liability in connec-
tion with the issuance of shares and other securities by banks. Article 754
of the CO mandates certain responsibilities regarding financial state-
ments and other company disclosures. Factual situations not governed by
these specific provisions may nevertheless be actionable under general
contract law (Article 97, et seq.) or tort law (Article 41, et seq.). This is
the case, for example, for the issuance of shares by foreign companies and
the issuance of private notes or liabilities in connection with stock ex-
change admission prospectuses.
B. Criminal Law
A number of the provisions of the federal Swiss Criminal Code
("CC"), may apply to certain acts taken in connection with securities
transactions. The most important are:
- Article 152 - Imposing liability for untrue statements by commer-
cial companies in public communications or shareholder reports.'35
-Article 158 - Imposing liability for improper inducement to specu-
lation by taking advantage of another's inexperience in stock ex-
change dealings. 136
- Article 251 - Imposing liability for forgery. 13 7
135. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [hereinafter CC]. CC, art. 152 (False Business
Declarations) punishes anyone who, as a founder, co-owner, manager, director, trustee, audi-
tor or liquidator of a company makes untrue statements of significant importance in public
information or in reports to the shareholder assembly.
136. Id. art. 158 (inducing speculation) states: "Whoever, with intent of material advan-
tage for himself or another, exploits the inexperience of another on the stock market or his
thoughtlessness to induce him to speculate in stock or goods knowing or able to know that
the speculation is in obvious disproportion to his resources, shall be confined in the prison
or fined."
137. Id. art. 251 (forgery) states:
Whoever with the intent of injuring the property or other rights of an-
other, or to obtain an unlawful profit for himself or another falsifies or tampers
with a document, uses the original signature or mark of another to produce a
false document, or falsely deposes a fact of legal importance or causes it to be
deposed, (or] uses for deception a document of this sort produced by another
shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not over five years or to the prison.
In case the forgery or misuse concerns a public register (or) document, a
hand-written will, bonds, drafts, or other negotiable papers, the penalty shall
be confinement in the penitentiary for not over five years or in the prison for
not less than six months.
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In addition, a number of other CC rules may be applicable, such as
Article 140 (embezzlement),' Article 148 (fraud),3 9 Article 159 (unfaith-
ful management),'" Articles 163 and 165 (fraudulent bankruptcy or
bankruptcy as a result of gross negligence)," ' and Article 166 (violation of
bookkeeping obligations)." '9
There are also criminal sanctions for violating certain provisions of
the Bankengesetz, including, among others, exercising a banking activity
without a license and making false assertions or omissions in the annual
accounts.14 In addition, the Anlagefondsgesetz imposes criminal sanc-
tions on anyone who grossly contravenes the statute (e.g., by acting with-
out the necessary authorization) or who commits other minor offenses."'
In addition to these federal offenses, criminal liability may arise on the
basis of cantonal laws. Under the Zurich Wertpapiergesetz, for instance,
persons may be punished for violating its provisions or the ordinance
In particularly minor cases, the court may impose a prison sentence or a
fine.
138. Id. art. 140 (embezzlement) states:
Whoever embezzles a movable object belonging to another [but] entrusted
to him, with the felonious intent of his own or another's profit, or whoever
converts entrusted goods, particularly money, fraudulently to his or another's
profit, shall be confined in the prison for not over five years.
Whoever commits the offense in his capacity as a member of an authority,
as an official, guardian, custodian, professional trustee or manager or in the
exercise of a vocation, trade or business for which he has been officially li-
censed, shall be confined in the penitentiary for not over ten years or in the
prison for not less than one month.
Embezzlement from a relative or a member of the same family shall be
prosecuted only on petition.
139. Id. art. 148 (fraud) states:
Any person who, with intent to make an unlawful profit for himself or
another, shall fraudulently mislead another person by falsely representing or
concealing facts or shall fraudulently use the error of another and thus cause
the deceived person to act detrimentally against his own or another's property,
shall be confined in the penitentiary for not more than five years or in the
prison. The offender shall be punishable with a penitentiary term of not over
ten years and fined if he makes a business of committing frauds. Defrauding a
relative or a member of [one's] own family shall be prosecuted on petition only.
140. Id. art. 159 (unfaithful management) states:
Whoever dissipates the resources of another person entrusted to him by
law or contract shall be confined in the prison. If the offender acted from self-
ish motives, he shall be confined in the prison for not over five years and fined.
Unfaithful management to the disadvantage of a relative or a member of the
[same] family shall be prosecuted on petition only.
141. Id. art. 163, punishes fraudulent bankruptcies in which debtors diminish or de-
stroy their assets or mislead receivers and creditors with respect to their assets. Id. art. 165,
covers debtors who fall into bankruptcy because of a gross recklessness, excessive specula-
tion or extremely gross negligence.
142. Id. art. 166, makes it a criminal offense to fail to comply with accounting proce-
dures that are required by law and thereafter to fall into bankruptcy.
143. Bankengesetz, supra note 4, arts. 46-50.
144. Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 49/50.
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promulgated thereunder. 14
Unquestionably, the most important criminal provision relating to
the securities market is Article 161 of the CC, the new insider rule, as
discussed below. 4 6
C. Private Remedies in Connection with a Prospectus
1. Introduction
As already mentioned,"17 Swiss law neither requires the registration
of public securities offerings nor does it provide for a federal securities
commission. Apart from criminal prosecutions, private remedies are the
sole enforcement device with respect to false or misleading information in
prospectuses.
The legal bases for these private actions are Articles 752 and 1156 of
the CO. Article 752 addresses prospectuses, circulars or similar notifica-
tions in connection with the issuance of shares and bonds.14 Article 1156,
which overlaps somewhat with Article 752, covers bond prospectuses." 9
There have been some discussions concerning the relationship between
the two rules. According to a new Supreme Court decision and to the
dominant opinion of commentators, both provisions apply in parallel if
their statutory requirements are met.'50
2. Scope of Application
Article 752 covers all forms of direct and indirect public offerings of
shares and bonds. In Switzerland, public offerings are often firmly under-
written by a bank consortium and afterwards distributed to the investing
public. Although in this case the law does not require a formal prospec-
tus, Article 752 applies to all documents distributed in connection with
such an indirect public issuance. In addition, Article 752 applies not only
to the issuance of shares and bonds, but also to the issuance of profit
145. Zilrich Wertpapiergesetz, supra note 16, art. 39.
146. See infra notes 171-177 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
148. CO, art. 752 reads as follows:
If, on the occasion of the formation of a company, or of the issuance of
shares or bonds, there have been made or divulged statements in a prospectus,
or in circulars, or similar notifications, which are incorrect or do not comply
with the legal requirements, anyone who has cooperated intentionally or negli-
gently in this connection will be liable to the individual stockholders or bond
holders for damage caused thereby.
149. Article 1156, 1 3 states: "If bonds are issued without a prospectus complying with
these provisions, or if the prospectus contains incorrect information or information not in
accordance with the legal requirements, the persons who intentionally or negligently took
part are liable jointly and severally for damages."




sharing certificates or participation bonds.181
Article 1156 also governs the offering, on a firm understanding basis,
of bonds. In such circumstances, bonds of a company are first purchased
directly by banks or other financial institutions in order to place them
with the public. Under these circumstances, Article 1156 (unlike Article
752) requires that a formal prospectus be distributed.8 2
Neither Article 752 nor Article 1156 imposes liability for prospec-
tuses delivered solely in compliance with stock exchange regulations for
admission of securities to public trading. " There are no statutory liabil-
ity rules applicable to stock exchange admission documents. The provi-
sions of Articles 752 and 1156 apply only when the stock exchange admis-
sion prospectus is simultaneously used in connection with a public
offering of the same securities.
Articles 752 and 1156 have a broad scope of application. Not only are
formal prospectuses (whether legally required or not) covered by this rule
but also "circulars, or similar notifications," including all forms of adver-
tising and information intended to attract investors and to inform them
about the company.'" The same is true for cases in which no prospectus
was issued or no other information whatsoever was made and in which
the public was deceived by the company's silence.
3. Who Can Assert a Claim?
According to the text of Articles 752 and 1156, a private action can
be brought by shareholders and bondholders who were injured by a viola-
tion of these sections. Actions may also be brought, however, by owners of
option rights on the stocks or bonds as well as holders of profit sharing
certificates or participation bonds.
There has been a long-standing discussion among commentators as to
whether only shareholders and bondholders who buy securities directly
from the company in a public offering may bring a suit or whether subse-
quent acquirors also have a private remedy. The better view is that all
security holders may bring suit as long as there is a causal relationship
between the incorrect or incomplete information and the damage suffered
by the individual owner. "
4. Against Whom Can a Claim be Asserted?
According to Article 752, "anyone who has cooperated intentionally
151. For a description of these securities types, see supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
152. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
153. The discussion on the stock exchange admission prospectus, see supra notes 90-97
and accompanying text.
154. These include, for example, newspaper ads, subscription bulletins, oral advertise-
ments, etc.
155. See, e.g., (with further sources) FORSTMOSER, supra note 150, at 285.
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or negligently in... connection" with a public offering in which incorrect
or incomplete information is given, is liable. This formula addresses all
persons who participated in the production or distribution of prospec-
tuses, circulars and all other documents or information addressed to the
investing public. A private action may especially be brought against sig-
natories of prospectuses and circulars, directors and officers, auditors,
banks and similar institutions, as well as all sorts of experts and advisors
(including lawyers).
5. Materiality
The text of Article 752 prohibits "statements ... which are incorrect
or do not comply with the legal requirements." According to case law and
commentators, this provision applies to many factual circumstances like
the non-issuance of a legally required prospectus, the distribution of in-
complete or incorrect data and the nondisclosure of material information.
Moreover, Articles 752 and 1156 apply also when the information given is
true but misleads the public in one way or another or if the information
contains unduly optimistic statements.
Both provisions require a causal relationship between the damages to
the investor and the violation of the disclosure rules. If the investors
would have lost their money even if all information in the prospectus
would have been true, Articles 752 and 1156 do not apply. Accordingly,
plaintiff has to prove that the investment decision was also influenced by
the information in the prospectus and that he or she would not have pur-
chased the security if he or she would have had a different and complete
picture of the company or had known that the prospectus contained in-
complete or untrue data. So far, courts have not set very high standards
with respect to the evidence of such a causal relationship.' The prospec-
tus liability rules do not apply when the investor would have purchased
the securities despite his or her knowledge of the incorrect information or
had indeed known the incomplete or untrue data.""7
A special problem arises when no prospectus has been published at
all." "' In this case, a hypothetical relationship has to be construed be-
tween the violation of information rules and the damages. There is no
explicit case law addressing the issue. However, it is probably safe to rely
on the relatively generous standard of the Supreme Court with respect to
materiality. Courts would probably argue that investors would not have
purchased the securities if a complete and correct prospectus had been
published.' 59
156. See (with further sources) CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 107 et seq. But see also
FORSTMOSER, supra note 81, at 99, quoting two Supreme Court decisions addressing the
issue in a broader context.
157. CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 108.
158. Cf., e.g., P. Widmer, Ko-Referat zum ZfU-Seminar vom, 21./22. Jan., KILCHBERG-
ZORICH 1988, 5.
159. Accord CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 108.
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6. Public Offerings by Foreign Companies
As far as public issues of shares are concerned, Article 752 of the CO
applies only to corporations incorporated in Switzerland. This does not
mean that foreign entities that distribute their equity securities to the
Swiss public have no duties. They can, however, only be prosecuted on
the basis of the general tort rules of Article 41 of the CO.
Public offerings of bonds are regulated. Article 1156 clearly addresses
all forms of public offerings of bonds made in Switzerland. The legal
domicile of the issuing company does not affect liability. Swiss and for-
eign companies are, accordingly, responsible for correct and complete in-
formation under this provision.
D. Other Private Remedies
In a number of circumstances securities information may be dissemi-
nated to the investing public but not be subject to the ordinary prospec-
tus liability rules discussed above. Some of the more important regulatory
gaps shall be briefly sketched.
Articles 752 and 1156 of the CO are not applicable to private place-
ments of notes. Although some commentators have asked that the provi-
sions of these Articles be applied to privately placed notes by analogy,6 0
the majority of commentators are against such an approach."6 ' In addi-
tion, there is no case law applying the ordinary prospectus rules for
shares and bonds to private note placements. As already discussed, s '
Convention XIX establishes a prospectus duty in connection with pri-
vately placed notes, but it does not grant causes of action to investors.
Purchasers of privately placed notes are therefore left with tradi-
tional contract and tort remedies. Contractual causes of action, however,
are available only in limited situations and are subject to significant en-
forcement problems. 163 As a result, modern commentators increasingly
postulate a broader liability theory based on a general trust relation-
ship."6 " Arguably, such a trust approach should be enlarged towards a
broader concept of professional liability that would require, in a manner
similar to the American "shingle theory," that all distributors of investor-
related information must cause such information to meet certain mini-
mum standards.6 5 To date, courts have been reluctant to adopt innova-
160. Hopt, Schweizerisches Kapitalmarktrecht - Begriff, Aufgaben und aktuelle
Probleme, 38 WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT 101-119 (1986).
161. See, e.g., TAISCH, supra note 100, at 76.
162. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
163. See R.H. WEBER, DOME PETROLEUM UND BANKENHAFrUNG 28 et seq. (1987); TAISCH,
supra note 100, 88 et seq.
164. See TMSCH, supra note 100, at 94. See generally U. KAISER, DIE ZIVILRECHTLICHE
HAFTUNG FOR RAT, AUSKUNFT, EMPFEHLUN0 G UND GUTACHTEN (1987).
165. For the theoretical development of such a concept, see MEIER-SCHATZ, UBER DIE
PRIVATRECHTLICHE HAFTUNG FOR RAT UND ANLAGERAT (1990, forthcoming).
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tive concepts of liability in general and in particular with respect to the
private placement of notes.
The same limited contract and tort remedies are also available in
connection with prospectuses required by stock exchanges for the listing
of securities. 66 Normally, such admission procedures do not coincide with
the initial public offering of shares or bonds. Accordingly, Articles 752
and 1156 do not apply. If the admission prospectus is also the relevant
information document for the public offering of new securities, the ordi-
nary prospectus liability rules apply.167
The prospectus liability rules also have no application to the disclos-
ure of periodic financial statements. In Switzerland, such statements are
not required to be filed with a governmental agency. Violations of ac-
counting rules and the distribution of inaccurate or misleading financial
or other corporate information may, however, constitute a breach of gen-
eral fiduciary duties under Article 754 of the CO. 6 s In such cases, private
causes of action are, of course, primarily brought against the company's
auditors. Ultimately, however, members of the board as well as officers
remain liable for the distribution of inaccurate or misleading financial
statements.
E. Special Rules for Banks
Article 39 of the Bankengesetz contains a special prospectus liability
rule for banks. 9 This liability provision is triggered when false or illegal
statements or information are distributed in connection with the issuance
of shares, authorized investment certificates, participation certificates or
bonds. The range of documents for which liability may be imposed under
this rule is broad. It applies not only to prospectuses but also to circulars
and similar documents, including advertising materials and oral presenta-
tions. It also applies to the failure to deliver any prospectus at all. Article
39 of the Bankengesetz applies to all persons who intentionally or negli-
gently cooperate in the production or distribution of the information (e.g.,
underwriters, experts, auditors, and legal advisors). Legal actions may be
brought by all shareholders or bondholders, including those who acquired
166. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
167. CAMENZIND, supra note 99, at 89; FORSTMOSER, supra note 150, at 248, 279.
168. Article 754 states: "All persons appointed directors, managers, or auditors are lia-
ble to the company as well as to the individual stockholders and creditors of the company,
for the damage caused, intentionally or negligently, by a default in their duties."
169. The text of Article 39 reads as follows:
Whoever, on the occasion of the establishment of a bank, or of the issue of
shares, of authorized investment certificates, of participation certificates or of
bank bonds has, in prospectuses, in circular letters or in similar documents,
made or divulged untrue assertions or statements contrary to the requirements
of the law, intentionally or negligently, shall be liable for the damages caused
to its associate (shareholder, partners of limited liability companies, coopera-
tive members) or bond holder.
Bankengesetz, supra note 4, art. 39.
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their securities after the original issuance, provided there is a causal rela-
tionship between the purchase of the securities and the wrong or mislead-
ing information.
In addition, the Federal Banking Commission has recently played a
much more active regulatory role with respect to the supervision of bank
management by attempting to enforce some basic principles of fair trad-
ing. Article 3, paragraph 2(c) of the Bankengesetz requires that bank of-
ficers and directors must assure the proper conduct of the bank's busi-
ness. In several cases, the Banking Commission requested corrective




Since July 1, 1988, Switzerland has had a new criminal insider provi-
sion (Article 161 of the CC). This insider rule has a relatively long and
complex legislative history. Before its enactment, the prosecution of in-
sider trading suffered from two major deficiencies. First, insider informa-
tion was only protected if it qualified as a business secret. Second, only
the disclosure by an insider to a third person could be prosecuted and not
the misuse of the confidential information by the insider himself. After
intensive academic and political debates which went on for almost fifteen
years, Article 161 was finally enacted."'
2. Structural Elements of Article 161
The basic principle of Article 161172 is well established: Neither an
170. See, e.g., Forstmoser, Eflektenhandel durch Insider, 45 SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIEN-
GESELLSCHAFT 133 (1973); Nobel, Das Insider-Geschilft, 79 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG
124 (1983).
171. For a brief review of the legislative history see Forstmoser, Insiderstrafrecht, Die
neue schweizerische Strafnorm gegen Insider-Transaktionen, 60 SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIEN-
GESELLSCHAFT 122, 123 et seq. (1988).
172. The text of CC, art. 161 (misuse of knowledge of confidential facts) is as follows:
1. Any person, who as a member of a board of directors, the management, an
auditing body or an agent of a company limited by shares or of a company
controlling or depending on such a company, be it a member of a public au-
thority or of civil service, be it any person rendering assistance to one of the
aforementioned persons, who obtains a pecuniary benefit for himself or any
other person by misusing the knowledge of a confidential fact, or who informs
a third party of such a fact, and, this fact, when becoming known, will in a
foreseeable manner considerably influence the market price of shares, other
securities or of comparable ledger securities of a company or of options refer-
ring to the aforementioned stocks and securities, traded on a Swiss stock ex-
change or prebourse market, shall be subject to punishment by prison up to 3
years or by fine.
2. Any person who gains directly or indirectly such confidential facts by a per-
son referred to in subsection 1 and obtains a pecuniary benefit for himself or
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insider nor a tippee should misuse informational advantages by trading in
securities for financial gain. Insiders may be corporate representatives
like directors, managers or auditors, or persons acting for such persons
such as attorneys or other advisors. Moreover, the legal text mentions
members of a governmental body or agency, a public servant or any per-
son rendering assistance to such persons. A tippee is an external recipient
of secret data if he or she, either directly or indirectly, gets the informa-
tion from an insider and if he or she knew or should have known that this
information was illegally disclosed.
The elements of a criminal offense are met when an insider or a tip-
pee knows a confidential fact and understands that its disclosure would
substantially affect the market prices of the security. In addition, the in-
sider must intentionally use this information for personal gain or disclose
it to a third party for the purpose of obtaining a profit."'
The requirements of Article 161 are only met when inside informa-
tion is disclosed and used with respect to shares, participation certifi-
cates, bonds, debentures or other negotiable instruments or rights issued
by Swiss or foreign companies listed on an official stock exchange or an
official secondary market. Accordingly, transactions which occur on the
over-the-counter market are not covered. 74 While "insider" and "tippee"
are relatively broadly defined in the statute, the definition of insider in-
formation is not. Article 161 requires that it be foreseeable that the dis-
closure would have a substantial effect on prices. It refers, for example, to
the imminent issuance of new participation rights or to events of similar
importance. Much of the new insider rules' regulatory stringency will de-
pend upon the judicial interpretation of this legislative definition of in-
sider information. Commentators so far agree that the statute's language
may not be interpreted too narrowly and that it covers information like
surprisingly negative financial statements or unexpected progress in the
any other person by misusing this information shallbe subject to punishment
by prison up to 1 year or by fine.
3. Facts within the meaning of subsections 1 and 2 are the imminent issue of
new participation rights, changes in the combination of companies or similar
circumstances of comparable importance.
4. In the event of a projected change in the combination of two companies,
subsections 1-3 shall apply to both companies.
5. Subsections 1-4 shall apply correspondingly, if the misuse of the knowledge
of a confidential fact relates to parts, other securities, ledger securities or corre-
sponding options of a cooperative or a foreign company.
Important first comments on the new insider law are Forstmoser, supra note 171;
Krauskopf, Die neue Insider-Norm, 38 WIRTSCHAF1 UND RECHT 166 (1986); N. SCHMID,
SCHWEIZERISCHES INSIDER-STRAFRECTH (1988). See also BOTSCHAFr UBER DIE kNDERUNG DES
SCHWEIZERISCHEN STRAFGESETZBUCHES (INsIDER-GESCHAmrE) (1985).
173. The term "profit" includes also the avoidance of price-losses.
174. As long as securities are traded on stock exchanges or official secondary markets,
transactions in such securities are also within purview of Article 161 when they occur
outside these markets. This is important since much of the trading in publicly traded securi-
ties occurs off the stock exchanges.
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field of research and development or product development." 5
Insider transactions are only a criminal act when the abuse of infor-
mation occurs intentionally. While insiders risk imprisonment of up to
three years or a fine, tippees face imprisonment of up to only one year or
a fine. These criminal sanctions are all applied ex officio. Moreover, a
court may order that the illegal profits be turned over to the govern-
ment."7 ' Such profits may also be awarded to the injured parties.1 77
3. Civil Liability
Article 161 of the CC does not provide for civil sanctions. General
contract or tort rules may, however, provide remedies in certain circum-
stances. The remedies that might be available include, in particular, dam-
ages and rescission.
4. International Judicial Assistance
Before Article 161 of the CC was enacted, Switzerland had major dif-
ficulties with respect to international law enforcement cooperation, in
particular with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Although a
1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters s7 8 was in place, it
was of limited usefulness in insider trading investigations because of its
requirement that the criminal act in question be punishable in both coun-
tries. 7 9 Since most forms of insider trading were not punishable in Swit-
zerland, many U.S. insider-transactions were completed over Swiss bank-
ing accounts that were protected under the Swiss secrecy laws. In 1982,
the Swiss government signed a memorandum of understanding with the
SEC.' At the same time, the Swiss banks entered into a self-regulatory
agreement by which they undertook to accept orders for purchases or
sales of U.S. securities only if the client signed a waiver of Swiss bank
secrecy laws with respect to insider-transactions.' 8 '
Article 161 has solved many of these difficulties since insider-transac-
tions are now a criminal offense in both Switzerland and the U.S.
Problems, however, may still arise since the elements of the criminal pro-
175. See, e.g., Forstmoser, supra note 171, at 129; Krauskopf, supra note 174, at 230.
176. CC, art. 58.
177. Id. art. 60.
178. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, (United States-
Switzerland), 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
179. d., art. 8(2).
180. Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, (United States-
Switzerland), 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983).
181. Agreement of the Swiss Banker's Association on the Misuse of Information, Aug.
31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983). This legal regime has caused an intensive criticism by and
discussion in the political and academic community. For a comprehensive restatement, see
P.C. HONEGGER, AMERIKANISCHE OFFENLEGUNGSPFLICHTEN IM KONFLIKT MIT SCHWEIZERISCHEN
GEHEIMHALTUNGSPFLICHTEN (1986); J.M. Rapp, Recent Developments in U.S. Insider Trad-
ing Prohibition and Swiss Secrecy Laws: Towards a Definitive Reconciliation?, 5 INT'L TAX
& Bus. LAW. 1 (1987).
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visions in the two countries are not identical. To minimize such conflicts,
the two countries promised each other in a Letter of Exchange of Novem-
ber 10, 1987, to grant mutual assistance not only in criminal matters, but
also in certain civil and administrative law procedures related to insider
transactions if they involve criminal-like sanctions."' 2
VII. TAKEOVERS
A. Introduction
The worldwide wave of mergers and acquisitions has now reached
Switzerland. Although hostile takeovers are not yet widespread,'83 some
recent actions of offerors as well as target companies have opened a dis-
cussion regarding tender offer practices. At a very late stage in the cur-
rent revision of the stock company law, an attempt was made to intro-
duce specific statutory provisions on hostile takeovers. This motion was
blocked and the new company code will probably not contain any provi-
sions on this subject.
B. The Takeover Code
Effective as of September 1, 1989, a new Takeover Code was enacted
on a self-regulatory basis. Adopted by the Swiss Association of Stock Ex-
changes, it is consistent with the traditional approach of private self-regu-
lation that constitutes much of the Swiss capital market law. The Code
itself has been significantly influenced by the London City Code on Take-
overs and Mergers as well as by the proposal for a Thirteenth European
Economic Community directive on takeovers.
The new Takeover Code"" is intended to regulate public tender of-
fers for securities of public companies to enable shareholders to make
well-informed decisions and to prevent market manipulation. 5 It applies
only to public offers for Swiss companies whose shares are traded on a
stock exchange.' 8 The Code's requirements relate primarily to public dis-
closure of significant information. Additionally, however, the Code con-
tains a series of substantive and procedural rules. Among other goals,
these rules were designed to assure the equal treatment of all sharehold-
182. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Switzerland and the
Government of the United States of America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and
Ancillary Administrative Proceedings, published in 140/I Bundesblatt 394 (1988) (German
translation).
183. See for a description of some examples, e.g., M. STEINMANN, PRAVENTIVE
ABWEHRMASSNAHMEN ZUR VERHINDERUNG UNFREUNDLICHER UBERNAHMEN MIT MI'rELL DES
AKTIENRECHTS 29 (1989); H. ZIMMERMANN, M. BILL, R. DURACHER, FINANZMARKT SCHWEIZ:
STRUKTUREN IM WANDEL 129 (1989).
184. Association of Swiss Exchanges, Swiss Takeover Code [hereinafter TC]. See also
A. HIRSCH & D. SIEGRIST, KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN UBERNAHMEKODEX (1989).
185. TC, supra note 184, art. 1.
186. Id. art. 2.
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ers of the same class.18 7
The Code lists a broad variety of items that must be disclosed to the
shareholders and to the general public. The most important disclosure
requirements relate to the identity of the offeror (including the identity
of those acting in concert with it), details of the securities and the issuer
including the minimum and maximum number of shares to be acquired,
information regarding interests already held, details of the offeror's fi-
nancing as well as of the price per share and the closing date of the of-
fer.' 8 Formally, an offer must, at a minimum, be published in a newspa-
per that is prescribed for the relevant securities by the stock exchanges'
quotation rules. 9 The first banking day after the closing date of the of-
fer, the offeror must announce publicly whether the offer has been suc-
cessful and how many shares have been tendered.'
More substantively, the Code contains a series of important proce-
dural rules that affect the transactional structure of tender offers. An of-
fer may only be accepted ten banking days after the initial publication.
Moreover, the offer must remain open for at least one month thereaf-
ter. '9 An amended offer may only be made in" the event of a counteroffer
or of the introduction of a defensive measure."' 2 When a counteroffer is
made, shareholders have a right of withdrawal. 93 Partial offers are possi-
ble, but all shareholders must be treated on a pro-rata basis. In addition,
the code states that if the offeror, after the offer is closed, has more than
fifty percent of the voting rights, he must satisfy fully all shareholders
wishing to tender. 4 Finally, the Code contains a rule against price ma-
nipulation. In particular, an offeror may not sell any of the same securi-
ties for which an outstanding tender offer is in effect.'95
The application of the new Swiss Takeover Code is supervised by the
Self-Regulatory Commission for Regulation of the Association of Swiss
Stock Exchanges. The Commission has no statutory powers. Tender offer-
ors falling within the Code must file the tender offer with the Commission
which must examine it for compliance with the Code's requirements
within eight banking days after the filing is made.'96 The strongest indica-
tion that the Code will be followed is the fact that all stock exchange
187. Id. art. 3.1.
188. Id. art 4.
189. Id. art. 3.3.
190. Id. art. 3.6. If an offer has been successful, the offeror must, in addition, extend it
for ten banking days after the publication of the offer's result. Id. art. 3.7.
191. However, not more than two months, unless a counter-offer is published. Id. art.
3.4.
192. Or if the offeror himself increases the consideration or extends the offering period
(within the two months limit). Id. art. 3.5.
193. Id. art. 3.5.
194. Id. art. 3.8.
195. Id. art. 5.4. After the closing date, the offeror may not publish a new offer for one
year unless it is a counter-offer. Id. art. 3.9.
196. Id. art. 9 in connection with art. 5.2.
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members, who are the most important participants in the takeover mar-
ket, have agreed to comply with the Code's provisions.""' Furthermore,
the Code requires the accountants of the offeror to file a report with the
Commission. This report must be filed simultaneously with the tender
offeror's report and relates to compliance with the Code rules and does
not address the substantive fairness of the offeror's price.'
The enactment of the Takeover Code has generally been welcomed
by commentators from the viewpoint of public policy. It remains to be
seen whether this self-regulatory structure has the sufficient strength to
be effective. Moreover, the Code has some severe deficiencies. Since no
disclosure obligations with respect to substantial share ownership are re-
quired, creeping takeovers are still possible. Moreover, the Code appears
to favor targets. Target companies are under no obligation to disclose any
information, including financial statements, that might facilitate a share-
holder's decision to tender. Furthermore, it does not touch the wide dis-
cretion of target management with respect to defensive measures.
C. Defensive Steps
To date, relatively few hostile tender offers have been made in Swit-
zerland. 99 Although no unfriendly attack has been directly successful,
many targets have sold out to white knights. While there are many rea-
sons for the lack of hostile tender offers in Switzerland, one is certainly
the corporate culture which still considers hostile offers a violation of bus-
iness ethics. In addition, management of target companies have adopted a
wide variety of defensive measures.
Certainly, the most important defensive tactic is the share transfer
restrictions (Vinkulierung) discussed above.200 Quite an impressive array
of other pre- and post-offer measures are also feasible." °' Among those
adopted most frequently by public companies are lock-up clauses, 202
placement of newly-issued shares in friendly hands, and voting
restrictions.
It remains to be seen whether this extremely liberal attitude towards
target management defenses can survive in the near future. Switzerland is
currently negotiating with the European Economic Community ("EEC")
a broad new treaty on a Common European Economic Area. It may well
be that Switzerland will be forced to conform closely to the emerging
197. Id. art. 7.
198. Id. arts. 5.2 and 5.3.
199. See supra note 181.
200. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
201. For overviews of potential defensive tactics, see Meier-Schatz, Aktienrechtliche
Verteidigungsvorkehren gegen unerwiinschte Unternehmenslibernah men, 60 SCHWEIZER-
ISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 106, 107 (1988); A. Kuy, DER VERWALTUNGSRAT IM
UBERNAHMEKAMPF 63 (1989); STEINMANN, supra note 181, at 49.
202. For example, high supermajority provisions for changes of the by-laws especially
with respect to the Vinkulierung or to changes of the board composition.
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EEC company law standards. In this event, some defensive measures, in
particular the Vinkulierung may be eliminated.2 3 A number of Swiss
companies have already adapted to this new climate by, for example,
eliminating their share transfer restrictions for foreigners.
VIII. INVESTMENT FUNDS
A. Introduction
Investment funds play an important role in the Swiss finance and
investment markets. In 1985, there were 148 investment funds with total
assets of SFr. 22.06 billion.0 4 Unlike U.S. mutual funds organized as cor-
porations, Swiss investment funds have a contractual structure. They are
by law open-end funds in the sense that investors may at any time resell
their certificates to the fund management.0 5 The law allows only invest-
ment in securities and real estate, but not in title documents for mer-
chandise.0 6 Investment funds appear in many forms. They are structured
according to type of investment,0 7 investment strategy,208 geographic or
industry focus, 0 9 or currency.2 10 The first appearance of investment funds
in Switzerland dates back to 1930. In historical terms, their legal regula-
tion occurred relatively late. In 1967, the Anlagefondsgesetz as well as the
Anlagefondsverordnung (Implementing Ordinance) were enacted, fol-
lowed in 1971 by the Auslandsfondsverordnung (Ordinance on Foreign
Investment Funds).21
B. Domestic Investment Funds
1. Anlagefondsgesetz (including Anlagefondsverordnung)
The Anlagefondsgesetz defines an investment fund as a pool of as-
203. For example, a recent Task Force of the Swiss Government has already asked in
its report for a harmonization of disclosure and defensive measure rules. (Recommendation
12).
204. For comparative figures, see GYGAX, ANLAGEFONDS; E. ALBISErrI, HANDBUCH DES
GELD-, BANK- UND BORSENWESENS DER SCHWEIZ, (4th ed. 1987). Further information on eco-
nomic background of Swiss investment funds may be found in A. VON ALBERTINI, GRUN-
DLAGENFORSCHUNG ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN ANLAGEFONDSGESETZ (1974); R. SIGG, ZUR
METHODIK DER LEISTUNGSBEMESSUNG UND - ANALYSE BEIM AKTIENANLAGEFONDS (1979).
205. For a good description of the structural elements, see GYGAX, supra note 204, at
38. Recently, suggestions for a fundamental revision of the Anlagefondsgesetz have been
made. A Task Force of all governmental parties proposed a strict separation of real estate
and other funds as well as a mandatory quotation of funds above a certain size.
206. Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 6.
207. The most important forms are securities funds (share funds, bond funds, money
market funds, mixed funds), real estate funds and mixed securities funds.
208. They are classified along the lines of investment risk as growth funds and pure
income funds.
209. There may be a geographical concentration (Europe, North America, Pacific, Far
East, etc.) or a concentration in one or several industrial or service sectors.
210. Some funds are structured around certain currencies.
211. Hereinafter Auslandsfondsverordnung.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sets contributed by investors on the basis of public solicitation for the
purpose of a common capital investment and managed by the fund man-
agement for the account of the investors according to the principle of di-
versification of risk.2 2 The law applies to all funds whose management
has its legal domicile in Switzerland.2 "3 The Anlagefondsgesetz has spe-
cific and stringent rules with respect to organization and operation of in-
vestment funds. They require authorization from the Federal Banking
Commission, which is granted only to a bank as defined by the
Bankengesetz.21 ' The law requires a minimum equity capital, namely
SFr. 1 million, or SFr. 2 million if the fund also engages in banking opera-
tions.2 15 In addition, the fund management is required to maintain an ad-
equate ratio between equity capital and total worth of the investment
fund. 216 If the fund management is not a bank, the law requires a special
custodian bank which also requires an authorization from the Federal
Banking Commission.217 The Anlagefondsgesetz contains strict invest-
ment guidelines. It allows investments only in securities and real estate.2 1 s
Specific guidelines as to the fund's investment policy must be stipulated
in detail in the fund regulations.21 9 In addition, the law mandates basic
diversification provisions. Not more than seven and a half percent of the
total assets of the fund may be invested in the same company.220 Partici-
pations in any single enterprise may never exceed five percent of the vot-
ing rights. If several investment funds are managed by the same manage-
ment (or by associated managements), the aggregate maximum limit of
voting rights is ten percent.22 '
As already mentioned, Swiss investment funds are legally based on
collective investment contracts. In such a contract, the fund management
is obliged to let the investor participate in the fund in proportion to his
212. Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 2. Good introductions into the Swiss invest-
ment fund law are found in P. FORSTMOSER, ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN ANLAGEFONDSGESETZ
(1972); K. AMONN, DAs BUNDESGESETZ OBER DIE ANLAGEFONDS (1972). A more detailed com-
mentary is J.B. SCHUSTER, ANLAGEFONDSGESETZ, (2nd ed. 1975). According to the latest in-
formation from the Bankenkommission, a general revision of the Anlagefondsgesetz is
planned.
213. Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 1.
214. Also, to a corporation or to a cooperative having as its exclusive object and pur-
pose the management of investment funds. Id. art. 3, 1 1 and 2.
215. Id. art. 3, T 3.
216. Id. art. 4. Detailed rules can be found in Anlagefondsverordnung, art. 7 et seq.
217. Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 5.
218. Investments may not be made in title documents for merchandise, unit share cer-
tificates of another investment fund managed by the same or by a fund management associ-
ated with it, or in other securities issued by the fund management. Id. art. 6.
219. See the detailed list in Anlagefondsverordnung, supra note 5, art. 10.
220. This amount may be increased up to 10% by way of subsequent calls. Anlagefond-
sgesetz, supra note 5, art. 7, T5 1 and 3.
221. Id. 2. These diversification restrictions do not, of course, apply to real estate
investment funds. Id. 1 4. It is important to note that the Anlagefondsgesetz contains, in




payments and to manage for renumeration the fund in accordance with
the provisions of the fund regulations and the law.2 22 The investment con-
tract is contained in the fund regulations adopted by each fund. The con-
tent of such regulation is regulated by the Anlagefondsgesetz, which re-
quires, among other items, provisions on the name and domicile of the
fund, its investment policy guidelines, its utilization of net profits and
capital gains, and its publications.2 2
The fund itself is managed by the fund management which has a
wide range of legal rights and duties. Beside the relevant investment deci-
sions"" and the safe keeping of the fund assets,22 the most important
duties include a general duty of loyalty2 26 and extensive bookkeeping and
reporting obligations which include the publication of annual financial
statements. 2 27 The investors themselves are provided with a series of indi-
vidual rights.22 The most important among them is the right of with-
drawal which allows each investor to withdraw at any time from the col-
lective investment contract and to require payment in cash of his share in
the investment fund in return for the unit share certificate. 2  In addition,
investors may require certain information and have the right to recover
damages from the fund management if it violates its obligations. 230 Other
sections of the Anlagefondsgesetz prescribe a special audit procedure2 31
as well as the fund's supervision (including withdrawal of authorization)
by the Federal Banking Commission. 232 Finally, the Act contains a series
of penal provisions which make specified actions in connection with in-
vestment funds criminal offenses.2 3
2. Stock Exchange Regulations
The stock exchanges of Zurich and Basle have specific private rules
with respect to investment fund certificates. The Zurich rules,23 for in-
stance, state as a principle that certificates of investment funds subject to
222. Id. art. 8, 1.
223. Id. art. 11. For more detailed regulations, see also Ankagefondsverordnung, supra
note 5, art. 10 et seq.
224. See Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 12.
225. Id. art. 13.
226. Id. art. 14.
227. Id. art. 15. Very specific rules (including particular provisions for real estate funds)
are provided for in Anlagefondsverordnung, supra note 5, art. 14 et seq.
228. Anlagefondsgesetz, supra note 5, art. 20 et seq.
229. Id. art. 21, 1. The redemption price shall be calculated as of the day of payment
in accordance with the same principles as the issue price. Id. 1 3. The Federal Banking
Commission may, in exceptional circumstances, grant the fund management a limited exten-
sion of time for the repayment of the certificates. Id. 4.
230. Id. arts. 23, 25 et seq.
231. Id. art. 37 et seq.
232. Id. art. 40 et seq.
233. For a detailed catalogue, see id. arts. 49 & 50.
234. Reglement fiber die Kotierung und den Handel von Anteilscheinen von
Anlagefonds of Apr. 17, 1974 [hereinafter Anlagefondsreglement].
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the Anlagefondsgesetz may be officially traded and quoted on the Zurich
securities exchange.2 35 The fund, however, must have a net asset value of
at least SFr. 50 million at the time of initial quotation. Should this value
later sink below SFr. 20 million, the official trading will cease at the end
of the then current year.2 Listed funds have the obligation to make cer-
tain reports and to give certain information to the stock exchange author-
ities.2 37 This includes daily disclosure of the prices at which the certifi-
cates are sold and repurchased.238
The Basle stock exchange has a legal regime that is very similar to
the one of Zurich.2 8 It also defines the conditions for listing and rights of
investors especially with respect to inforhiation and disclosure rights. The
stock exchange of Geneva does not have any specific rules relating to in-
vestment funds.
C. Foreign Investment Funds
Foreign investment funds are separately administered pools of assets
that are administered by a fund management having its domicile abroad.
The term also includes investment funds incorporated or organized in any
other manner under foreign law which otherwise correspond to the defini-
tion under Swiss law and give the investor a right against the company
itself or a company affiliated with it for the payment of his share.2" Any
public solicitation in or from Switzerland of certificates in a foreign in-
vestment fund, as well as the conclusion of contracts aiming at a later
acquisition of such certificates, require the authorization of the Federal
Banking Commission.2 41 Such authorizations are only granted to a bank
with legal domicile in Switzerland or to a Swiss branch of a foreign
bank. 242
In addition, the fund regulations or the by-laws of such a foreign in-
vestment fund must meet minimal requirements with respect to manage-
ment, investment policy, credits and assignments of property and rights,
open-end character, and auditing and reporting requirements.2 4 3 Foreign
investment funds are also subject to certain disclosure rules. They must
make annual statements consisting, among other things, of a statement of
assets and liabilities at market value, a profit and loss statement, infor-
mation concerning the utilization of net profits and capital gains as well
235. Id. 1 2.
236. Id. T 3.
237. Id. 5.
238. Id. 6.
239. Richtlinien flber die Kotierung von Anlagefonds-Anteilscheinen an der Basler Ef-
fektenbbrse of November 30, 1971.
240. Auslandfondsverordnung, supra note 212, art. 1, 1.
241. Id. art. 2. "Public solicitation" is defined in art. 1 as any solicitation which is not
exclusively directed to a narrowly limited number of persons (e.g., solicitation by prospec-
tus, printed advertisements, posters, circulars, at bank counters).
242. Id. art. 3, also requiring a minimum capital of SFr. 2,000,000.
243. See the extensive list in id. art. 4.
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as a report of the auditors. 2" All documents, including fund regulations,
by-laws, offering prospectuses, investment plan contracts, etc., must be
drawn up or translated into one of the official Swiss languages.2 4
Foreign investment funds must, as a matter of principle, have a rep-
resentative bank in Switzerland.2" The Swiss representative bank is re-
sponsible for all solicitations and publications of the fund, for the distri-
bution of the investment plan contracts and the reports that must be
delivered to the Swiss Nationalbank.24" The Federal Banking Commis-
sion, as supervisory authority, may require that appropriate security be
provided by the foreign investment fund if the rights of the investors ap-
pear to be in jeopardy.2,4 It may also revoke a foreign investment fund's
authorization if, among other reasons, the initial prerequisites are no
longer met, the required security is not provided, or false or misleading
statements have been made. 4 9
IX. BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISORS
A. Broker-Dealers
There are no special rules at the federal level regulating the activities
of broker-dealers. Most broker-dealers are, however, banks or finance
companies28 0 whose structure and behavior are closely supervised by the
Federal Banking Commission.
Special provisions exist in cantonal stock exchange laws. The Zurich
Wertpapiergesetz, for instance, states that whoever intends to profession-
ally purchase or sell securities or act as an intermediary therefore, on or
off the stock exchange, requires an official license.2 5" ' Such licenses are
only granted to persons of good civil standing, of good reputation and
with the necessary expert knowledge.2 5 2 Moreover, the licensee must have
its legal domicile or a place of business in the canton of Zurich.252 If the
business conduct of broker-dealers does not comply with sound commer-
cial standards, the license may be withdrawn.2
54
244. Id. art. 6.
245. Id. art. 7.
246. Id. art. 8.
247. Id. art. 9 et seq.
248. Id. art. 14, with a list of circumstances that indicate such an immediate danger for
investors.
249. Id. art. 15.
250. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
251. This license is granted by the Department of Economics after obtaining opinions
from the Stock Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchange Commissioner's Office and the
Board of the Stock Exchange Association. Wertpapiergesetz, supra note 16, 2.
252. Id. 31/1. If a license is granted to a company, a representative is to be designated
who is subject to the provisions of the law in the same manner as the company itself. Id.
31/3.
253. Id. 3/4.
254. Id. V 4 The licensee has to pay an annual cantonal fee and to make a tangible bond
deposit with the Department of Finance. Id. 6.
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The Basle stock exchange has similar, but somewhat more stringent
and detailed rules. Broker-dealer activities require a license.2 55 The Bbr-
sengesetz stipulates a series of prerequisites, including the existence of an
adequate infrastructure and organization as well as professional back-
ground and reputation.2 " The Bbrsengesetz also includes a list of duties,
whose violation is punishable by administrative sanctions.2 5 7
The Geneva stock exchange, as a private institution, does not have
specific broker-dealer-related provisions.
B. Investment Advisors
Switzerland has no federal or cantonal legal rules addressed specifi-
cally at investment advisors.25 Since many advisory services are fur-
nished by banks, 59 the Federal Banking Commission exercises at least
indirect control of these activities. In addition, investment advisory activ-
ities are, of course, governed by ordinary civil law provisions. To the ex-
tent advice is given within a contractual framework, the rules on mandate
law apply.260 Under specific circumstances, publicly spread investment
tips may be captured by tort law rules or, as newer concepts dictate, by a
specific professional responsibility concept.
2 1
X. CONCLUSION
Compared to countries with similarly sophisticated capital markets,
Switzerland has relatively little regulation of market activities. This
should change in the near future due to an emerging consensus in Swit-
zerland regarding the need for a federal stock exchange law. Additional
changes will likely be brought about by the antitrust concerns that have
been raised by the Swiss Cartel Commission, by attempts to harmonize
the Swiss capital market law with the law of the European Community
and by pending revisions to the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations.
255. Borsengesetz, supra note 20, 1.
256. Id. 1 3.
257. Id. U 5, 6.
258. This may change in the near future. The special task force (See supra note 3)
recommended considering legislation covering the activities of investment advisors.
259. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
260. CO, art. 354 et seq.
261. See for more details and sources, MEIER-SCHATZ, supra note 165.
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